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Preface 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
Dr Emmett Brown, Back to the Future 
 
In late 2005 I was interviewed at Loughborough to undertake a PhD with Professor Mike 
Woodhead and Dr Carys Siemieniuch and was subsequently offered the studentship. To my 
parent’s delight I left a well paid job in industry to return to the university where I had spent the 
previous five years studying for my Masters degree. I jest, they were very supportive. As I write 
this my PhD time is about to come to an end and, at twenty seven years of age, I find myself still a 
student and in the unusual position of having avoided income tax for the majority of my adult life. 
On this point alone I consider my PhD to have been a great success. Sadly tax avoidance is not the 
criteria on which a PhD is awarded, rather it is the thesis that lies beneath this page.  
 
This thesis is a record of my research efforts over the past three years; essentially it is a story of 
what I have done... a non-fictional and academically rigorous story I hasten to add. The research 
problem that this thesis addresses required a number of different research threads to answer it. 
Through hard work and a (substantial) dash of luck these research threads combined at the end of 
this research into a new approach to tackling system of systems problems. With the uncertainties 
present in any research activity the chances of this occurring has, at times, felt on par with the 
quote at the start of this preface by Dr Emmett Brown. The output of this is not an end point, but 
rather a natural stopping point for this research given the three year PhD time constraint. The 
journey described herein establishes the current state of the art and then advances us a small step 
while providing indicators of future applications and further research. I have been very lucky to be 
able to pursue threads of research which have interested and entertained me. After months of 
writing, revisions and rewrites I hope this thesis still conveys that passion. 
 
Phil Johnson 
October 2009  
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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the nature of systems problems and the need for an open viewpoint to 
explain a system by viewing it as part of a larger whole and explaining its role in terms of that 
larger whole. The problem this research investigates is wicked and hence is unique in each 
instance. Therefore, an empirical proof would only hold for that particular instantiation of the 
problem, not the problem as a whole. After exposing some of the limitations of traditional systems 
engineering to this type of problem it is clear that a new approach is needed. The approach taken 
in the thesis is model driven and it is the architecture of this approach that is the stable artefact 
rather than the artefacts of a particular solution. The approach developed in this research has been 
demonstrated to be practicable. 
 
Specifically, this research has developed and demonstrated a novel approach for a decision 
support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both 
open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission. Such planning decisions are wicked due to the uncertain and unique 
nature of military missions. Critical rationalism was used to validate the model driven approach 
and to falsify a parametric approach representative of traditional systems engineering through 
historical case studies. The main issue found with the parametric approach was the entanglement 
of functionality with the individual systems selected to implement the system of systems. The 
advantage of the model driven approach is that it separates functionality from implementation and 
uses model transformation for systems specification.  
 
Thus, although wicked problems do not have an exhaustively describable set of potential solutions 
this thesis has shown that they are not unapproachable. 
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Chapter 1  
Motivation 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter introduces the research problem that this thesis addresses. The background is briefly 
discussed to set the scene for the specific technical problem for this research. This technical 
problem is elaborated upon and formally stated as the research problem from which a number of 
objectives are set. The research methodology used to meet these objectives is then discussed and 
finally an overview of the structure of this thesis is presented. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
Each chapter in this thesis begins with a model which is a representation of the content of that 
chapter and its contribution to the overall structure of this thesis and research. The model shows 
key words and their relationship to other, with the keywords summarising the content of the 
chapter shown in bold. The relationships show the logical links between the keywords and hence 
the research areas. The model conforms to Logical Modelling Notation which seeks to capture the 
exact meaning of the definition within the limitations of natural language. Logical Modelling is 
introduced in greater detail later in this thesis and detailed in Appendix K. The sentences on which 
the logical model for this chapter is based are shown below with the keywords shown in bold. 
 
This Research
 
 has established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of an Approach for a 
Decision Support System. The Approach will match System of Systems to Military Missions. This 
Research references a Literature Review. 
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Figure 1 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter One 
 
The keywords shown in Figure 1 cover the contents of this chapter and the lines between them 
indicate the relationships between the keywords. As the keywords shown in Figure 1 are new they 
are all highlighted. As this model is built on in subsequent chapters only the new keywords added 
to the model will be highlighted to show the contribution of each chapter. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The history and key milestones of systems engineering have been well documented by the main 
organisations including the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International 
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) and the United States Department of Defense (US 
DoD). In the literature the modern history of systems engineering has been well documented, for 
example Brill’s 1950-1955 history (Brill 1998). To return to the start of modern systems engineering: 
according to Ackoff we have undergone a “Systems Revolution” as we have transitioned from the 
“machine age” to the “systems age” (Ackoff 1974, 2-4). Jackson and Keys (1984) summarise 
Ackoff’s paper as follows: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
(Jackson and Keys 1984, 476) 
 
When Ackoff was concerned with systems which were open and cannot be understood using the 
methods of reductionism, he was proposing that a change in thinking was required from the 
analytical mindsets of the machine age, which derived an explanation of the whole of something 
through explanation of its constituent parts, to a synthetic mode of thought (or open systems 
viewpoint) that sought explanation of something by viewing it as part of a larger whole and 
explaining its role in terms of that larger whole. See Ackoff (1974, 3). The first part of Ackoff’s 
statement encapsulates the reductionist mode of thought or the closed system viewpoint. Note that 
the something referred to in the previous sentences is not bound to be a physical object, but could be 
elements of any kind, e.g. concepts, ideas, people. 
 
To return to Jackson and Keys summary of Ackoff consider a definition for machine: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
 (Oxford English Dictionary 1989) 
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A machine could be considered to be a physical device that transmits mass and energy to perform 
an activity. This machine viewpoint leads to a more common use of the terms open and closed in 
which these terms refer to attributes of the system in question. For example von Bertalanffy (1950, 
23): “A system is closed if no material enters or leaves it; it is open if there is import and export 
and, therefore, change of the components”. This is in contrast to Ackoff who considered that an 
open or closed system is a viewpoint on that system. 
 
The central theme of this thesis can be stated by paraphrasing Ackoff (1974, 3): consider an open 
viewpoint that seeks to explain a system by viewing it as part of a larger whole and explaining its 
role in terms of that larger whole
1.1.1 General Systems Theory 
. 
The “synthetic mode of thought, when applied to systems problems, is called the systems approach” 
(Ackoff 1974, 3). The systems approach integrates the reductionist and the synthetic method, 
encompassing both holism and reductionism. Note that there is a large body of literature that 
purports to apply the systems approach but there is a lack of other definitions as to what a systems 
approach actually is. For the purpose of this discussion Ackoff’s definition will be used. The systems 
approach captures the way in which the pioneers of the general systems movement in the early 
fifties were operating. Among the peers of this group were Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a biologist, 
and Boulding, an economist, both of whom wrote on General Systems Theory, as introduced by 
Boulding: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
(Boulding 1956, 197) 
 
General Systems Theory recognised that problems were systemic in nature and could no longer be 
neatly partitioned into separate sciences. A significant role of General Systems Theory therefore 
was to “facilitate communication between disparate fields of interest, i.e., to provide a common 
language with which to discuss systemic problems” (Boulding 2004, 127).  
 
General Systems Theory sought to provide a common language by combining modelling and 
communication. Modelling provides precision while communication provides comprehensibility, 
both of which are a basic need of design (a planning process), as succinctly stated by Brooks: 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
(Brooks 1995, 234) 
 
The need for such a common language with the comprehensibility of communication (natural 
language) and the precision of modelling is due to the problem of planning and systems. With a 
focus established for systems we now seek a definition for this term. 
1.1.2 Defining Systems 
The word system comes from the Greek sustema meaning reunion, conjunction or assembly 
(Francois 1999). Two of many definitions from the literature are presented below: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
(International Council on Systems Engineering 2007) 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
 (Hitchins 2003) 
 
The definitions shown above convey a sense of what systems are about but they are each 
incomplete. These definitions were used by Dickerson (C. Dickerson 2008) to derive through 
logical modelling a formal, logically consistent definition for systems. Logical modelling is utilised 
in the latter stages of this research in section 5.3, Logical Modelling; further details on logical 
modelling may be found in Appendix K, Logical Modelling . The formal definition proposed by 
Dickerson is shown below. 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
(C. Dickerson 2008, 3) 
 
Note that whilst this provides a logically consistent definition for a system it does not necessarily 
tell us if an assemblage is an open or closed system as defined by Ackoff (1974, 3). The logical 
expectation is that any definition of systems should not tell us whether an assemblage is open or 
closed as that is a viewpoint on the system, not the system itself. The question of characterisation of 
systems has been raised in the literature, a cross section of which is shown in Ford et al (2009) but 
has yet to be universally agreed.  
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The consideration of whether a system is open or closed is not captured within the established 
definition of system. The open and closed aspects are an attribute of the viewpoint on a system, that 
is to say a system could be viewed as either open or closed. Hence a systems approach needs to be 
able to address the larger whole, using an open system viewpoint, while still maintaining a bridge 
to the closed system viewpoint to allow the system of interest to be viewed from both viewpoints. 
With system discussed we now consider combinations of systems to form system of systems. 
1.1.3 System of Systems 
Systems can be combined through interactions into a system of systems to achieve high level 
purposes unachievable by individual systems. Underlying the importance of the concept of system 
of systems (SoS) a dedicated IEEE academic forum has been established to explore this area of 
research (De Laurentis, et al. 2007). Further information on the history of SoS can be found in 
Gorod, Sauser and Boardman with their review of the modern history of SoS (Gorod, Sauser and 
Boardman 2008) which is built upon in Brill’s work (1998). The Defense Acquisition University 
neatly describe the objective for, and characteristics of, a system of systems: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
Chapter 4.2.6 - System of Systems Engineering(Defense Acquisition University 2006) 
 
Jamshidi presents an overview of the six most commonly used definitions from the literature and 
references to many more (2005) but there is currently no universally accepted definition of system 
of systems (Sage and Biemer 2007, 6). A point of agreement among many systems and stakeholders 
is that “if the term system were correctly defined then it could be applied to itself to give a 
meaningful definition for system of systems” (Dickerson and Mavris 2009). Applying the definition 
of systems (C. Dickerson 2008, 3) to itself results in the following definition: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
(Dickerson and Mavris 2009) 
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Just as Ackoff (1974, 3) noted that systems are inclusive in their scope and are not bound to 
physical objects, but elements of any kind, e.g. concepts, ideas, people, so it can be said of system of 
systems. The United States Department of Defense has explicitly identified the social aspects of SoS 
as one of the main challenges of realising SoS: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
 (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition 
and Technology, Systems and Software Engineering 2008, 7) 
 
Therefore system of systems should not be considered only in terms of physical objects either and 
have found useful employment in other disciplines. For example, François presented a literature 
review of systemics and cybernetics (François 1999) in which the philosophical underpinnings of 
systems thinking is traced through various disciplines including psychology. The formulation of 
Gestalt psychology, the psychology of perception and forms, has systemic underpinnings as 
“perception must start by picking up static structures and dynamic interrelations between 
elements, i.e. is systemic” (François 1999, 206). The word gestalt in German literally means "shape" 
or "figure", but in English takes on another meaning of wholeness which is the basis for Gestalt 
psychology, that is the brain is holistic and the whole is different from the sum of the parts. 
 
Gestalt psychology is of interest here because these concepts of psychology can reach into physical 
science. As Gorod et al noted, “Boulding imagined SoS as a gestalt in theoretical construction 
creating a spectrum of theories greater than its parts” (Gorod, Sauser and Boardman 2008, 486). 
Boulding also notes that such gestalts have “been of great value in directing research towards the 
gaps which they reveal” and gives the Periodic Table in chemistry as an example. He continues to 
note that SoS “might be of value in directing the attention of theorists towards gaps in theoretical 
models, and might even be of value in pointing towards methods of filling them” (Boulding 1956, 
129).   
 
To repeat the central theme of this thesis (paraphrasing Ackoff (1974, 3)): consider a synthetic mode 
of thought that seeks to explain a system by viewing it as part of a larger whole and explaining its 
role in terms of that larger whole. System of systems are more problematic to explain due to their 
scale and interactions/interdependencies of their constituent systems and the wider social and 
organisation issues. SoS present a series of individual problems related to the constituent systems 
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which can be considered from a closed viewpoint. From an open viewpoint the SoS also presents 
social and organisational issues. Such interdependent problems combined with the social and 
organisational aspects have been identified in the literature and are discussed in the next 
subsection. 
1.1.4 Wicked Problems 
According to Ackoff, with the advent of the systems age problem solvers are increasingly faced not 
with separable problems, but rather with systems of interdependent problems, or messes (1974, 5). 
This correspondingly necessitates a holistic response to the problem: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Ackoff 1974, 5) 
 
The concept of the solution to a complex problem being more than the sum of its parts is a familiar 
systems concept. The critical point is that the aim of this exercise is one of satisficing (Simon 1979, 
13) rather than optimisation to the main goal. Hence, whilst solutions to messes can be sought from 
a holistic perspective using models, the utility of such exercises is at the communicative level (as 
per Boulding) rather than the absolute level. Ackoff states that the “attempt to deal with a system 
of problems as a system – synthetically, as a whole – is an essential property of planning in contrast 
to problem solving” (Ackoff 1974, 5). To paraphrase Ackoff: an essential property of dealing with a 
system of problems from an open systems viewpoint is planning. 
 
Prior to Ackoff’s paper Rittel and Webber had noted that “planning problems are inherently 
wicked” (Rittel and Webber 1973, 160). They elaborate: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Rittel and Webber 1973, 160) 
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Rittel and Webber suggest that planning problems, particularly societal problems, are inherently 
wicked. They identify engineering and science problems as being bounded such that the objective 
is clear and hence, due to this clarity, the solution can be identified. A systems engineer or systems 
architect face systems of problems (Ackoff’s mess) where the mission may not be clear and, in turn, 
uncertainty may exist as to whether the problems have been solved. In the context of this research 
planning is the architecting of an approach to solve the system of problems from an open system 
viewpoint. Note that it is the attributes of the whole which imparts wickedness. Planning defines 
the approach to solve the system of problems before
Appendix A
 starting to solve the individual problems 
which necessitates a closed system viewpoint. The implication of this is that any system of 
problems dealt with from an open systems viewpoint will likely be wicked as defined by Rittel and 
Webber (1973), the distinguishing properties of which are summarised in . If these are 
wicked problems then the aim is not to optimise but rather to find the good as opposed to bad 
solutions (as according to the third of Rittel and Webber’s (1973) characteristics of wicked 
problems). Such wicked problems do not have an exhaustively describable set of potential 
solutions as according to the sixth of Rittel and Webber’s (1973) characteristics of wicked problems. 
 
By combining modelling and communication a bridge can be formed between the open system 
viewpoint of the architect and the closed system viewpoint of the engineer, as General Systems 
Theory set out to achieve. This would allow the wicked planning problem of the whole to be 
addressed using an open system viewpoint while still maintaining a bridge to the closed system 
viewpoint required to solve individual problems. Overall this approach would be an application of 
a “synthetic mode of thought” to systems problems (Ackoff 1974, 3) and hence would be a systems 
approach. With the rationale established for the need for a systems approach to deal with such 
systems of problems an initial statement of the research problem can be made, as discussed next. 
1.1.5 Initial Statement of Research Problem 
From the preceding discussion an overview of the academic area of interest has been given and an 
initial research theme identified and developed. This theme is the basis for the initial statement of 
the research problem as stated below: 
 
Is there a decision support system that can analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both 
open and closed viewpoints? 
Initial Statement of Research Problem 
 
This problem is the initial statement as it is at the conceptual level. To enable meaningful research 
to be conducted it needs to be restated at a more practical level where research can be conducted 
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and later, utilising the understanding gained from this application, the conceptual findings can be 
derived. The practical application that this initial research problem will address is the subject of the 
next subsection. 
1.2 A Research Application 
This research was funded by the Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems (SEAS) Defence 
Technology Centre (DTC), established by the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD).  There are two 
distinct phases of this research, the original approach using traditional systems engineering 
approaches and methodologies, and an advanced approach using next generation systems 
engineering techniques. The advanced methods explored and developed in this research have been 
demonstrated useful but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare the improvements of these 
advanced methods over the original ones. The Combat Search and Rescue mission, which will be 
introduced in section 2.5, was chosen in line with the SEAS DTC as the instantiation of the practical 
application of this research. 
 
The military has always been subject to change in the way it conducts war as the underlying 
technology and capability of the systems at its disposal have evolved: “War is a product of its age. 
The tools and tactics of how we fight have always evolved along with technology” (Alberts, 
Garstka and Stein 1999, 1). Recent military advances such as the tenets of Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC), or Network Centric Warfare (NCW) (Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999), have 
highlighted the untapped potential capability of existing and proposed systems through more 
effective interoperability between systems to form system of systems (SoS). This potential 
capability can be realised through synergy between independent systems to enable the desired 
overall system performance (Abel and Sukkarieh 2006). This concept is significant enough that in 
2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology charged the Systems 
and Software Engineering Directorate to develop a guide for SoS, “recognising the value of 
systems engineering as a key enabler of successful systems acquisition and the growing 
importance of systems interdependencies in the achievement of war fighter capability” (Office of 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Technology, Systems and Software 
Engineering 2008, iii). By working within an SoS rather than as an independent system the 
advantages of a collaborative information environment can be realised and the individual 
capability of a system leveraged within the architecture of the SoS.  
 
Two types of military SoS have been identified, dedicated SoS which have been consciously 
engineered to fulfil a need (e.g. an air traffic control system) and virtual SoS which are SoS created 
to support a specific military operation (Cook 2001, 3). Specifically, virtual SoS are characterised 
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where “an SoS is mostly constructed at short notice based on available equipment or capabilities to 
meet an immediate mission requirement” (Chen and Clothier 2003, 173). Whilst conceptually the 
benefits of forming SoS at short notice are appealing, the practicalities involved with achieving this 
are difficult to realise. As Chen and Clothier note: “another feature of a virtual SoS is that it is 
regularly dismantled following operational deployment” (2003, 173). Essentially then a virtual SoS 
could be considered to be a temporal SoS created to fulfil a specific need (a mission in a military 
context) and encapsulates the entire SoS lifecycle from cradle to grave in a compressed timescale as 
determined by the specific need it addresses. A dedicated SoS can be thought of as a closed 
viewpoint for which a reductionist approach can be taken in line with von Bertalanffy (1950). A 
virtual SoS however, as a temporal creation requires an open viewpoint as espoused by Ackoff 
(1974). 
 
Given the apparently small time scales involved the main barrier to forming such a virtual SoS is a 
fast route to establishing “good” SoS architectures that enable the collaborative capabilities of the 
constituent systems required by the need that the SoS fulfils. This point recognises that not all the 
capabilities of systems may be collaborative, either because they are unsuitable for distributed 
implementation or because of the so called stovepiped nature of their realisation which directly 
prevents them from interoperating within a SoS. Hence, combining systems into a SoS is currently 
a difficult undertaking requiring considerable expertise and experience. There is an identified lack 
of process for SoS and whilst there has been some starts made towards this end, e.g. (Sage and 
Biemer 2007, 5), one has yet to be formalised. Considering the temporal nature of a virtual SoS a 
methodology to elicit the requisite SoS architecture to enable the military to conduct missions 
would seem to be a fundamental gap in our ability to support SoS decision makers. Hence, this is 
the focus of this research. The problem is compounded by the generally held consensus that those 
in positions of power with regard to a system do not really care about how the system is 
constructed; they are rather more concerned with its performance characteristics: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Boardman and Sauser 2006, 118) 
 
Recognising that in an SoS characteristics such as survivability would be a product of the whole of 
the SoS presents a conflict between the need for careful formation of the SoS to achieve the 
requisite capability to conduct a particular mission (which will be dependent on the component 
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systems) and the lead individual’s concern with the emergent characteristics of the SoS. These two 
opposing views, top down and bottom up, must be reconciled through a middle ground. Later 
discussions will cover the issue of decision making and recently emerging military changes such as 
the proliferation of decision makers within the battlespace and the apparent shift from traditional 
hierarchical decision making processes towards faster, more fluid models. This research will aim to 
support these two transitions through a fast, usable and lightweight decision support tool to 
support, rather than dictate to, the decision maker. A discussion on the concepts of evaluating the 
SoS follows next. 
1.2.1 Evaluating System of Systems 
With the concepts of systems and SoS introduced the question becomes one of purpose for this 
research. A military conflict, at the lowest tactical level, could be thought of as two competing 
virtual SoS pitted against each other within an environment; in such a situation which SoS will 
prevail? Utilising techniques such as functional analysis an appreciation can be gained of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the component systems within each SoS. This will give an indication 
of the capability of each, but remember that for a SoS such a reductionist approach will not suffice, 
rather a synthetic approach is required. This requirement is compounded as the most influential 
aspects of a system are not necessarily the purely functional or even quantifiable. They could be the 
somewhat more abstract characteristics, the qualitative non-functional traits exhibited by the 
system.  
 
The need for such non-functional characteristics has been alluded to through the use of the ‘ilities’ 
in requirements engineering. The ‘ilities’ refer to the set of terms ending in ‘ility’ which can be used 
to characterise systems, e.g. reliability, manoeuvrability, adaptability. Various authors have 
identified individual ‘ilities’ (Rhodes 2006) and their importance for SoS Engineering (Saunders, et 
al. 2005). However, there is currently no common, consistent and formally defined set of non-
functional characteristics, including the ‘ilities’, which can be used to characterise SoS in commonly 
understood terms. This research contributes to a SEAS DTC project entitled “Impact of Different 
Cultural Attribute Sets on Semi-Autonomous and Autonomous System Decision Structures and 
Interfaces”. One thread of work within the project focuses on the impact of ‘soft factors’ relating to 
cultural values on communicating and implementing decisions and is described in more detail in 
Siemieniuch and Sinclair (2006). The implications of this research are that cultural values can 
impact the ability of systems to conduct missions. When these systems are formed into a SoS there 
is a cumulative effect that can impact the ability of the SoS to conduct the mission (Siemieniuch 
and Meese 2006). A later paper based on a continuation of this work states that “there is an 
increasing recognition of the potentially deleterious effects of incompatible individual and 
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organizational cultures on complex systems and organizations” (Hodgson and Siemieniuch 2008). 
This supports the notion that non-functional characteristics of a SoS may be as important as its 
functional characteristics in determining its suitability to conduct some task.  
 
In the military domain, which this research is focused on, tasks are normally expressed as missions. 
Military organisations typically have many systems available which can be combined and 
configured to form multiple SoS, any of which could be used to conduct a mission. Which of these 
SoS from both functional and non-functional viewpoints are suitable to conduct the particular 
mission? This choice is routinely faced by military decision makers. How they currently make this 
decision is discussed in detail in the next chapter (in section 2.3 Review of Military Decision 
Making), but for now it is suffice to say that they lack support in terms of being able to profile the 
SoS alternatives using a transferable, commonly understood set of system characteristics which can 
be applied to both SoS and the mission to allow easy comparison and to highlight capability gaps 
between “what is needed” and “what we’ve got.” Current military decision support methodologies 
rely on the experience of the decision maker to understand the systems/SoS in specific scenarios. At 
the SoS level the variables of interest in this decision are the selection of the systems comprising the 
SoS and the configuration of their organisation and interconnections. SoS can be represented using 
system architectures to capture the pertinent information concerning these variables, which are 
elaborated upon in the next section. 
1.2.2 Systems Architecting 
It is important to differentiate between systems architecture and systems architecting. The systems 
architecture that this research will consider is in the military context and hence will address 
military missions as discussed in the next subsection. For the purpose of this section a systems 
architecture can be thought of in the same way as a cartographer’s map, which is not the terrain 
but rather a useful abstraction for the purpose of navigation. A system’s architecture deals with the 
interdependence of the chosen components and the overall functionality of the system, at a level of 
abstraction that is useful to the architect. As Maier and Rechtin (2000) states, “architecting deals 
largely with unmeasureables using non-quantitative tools and guidelines based on practical 
lessons learned; that is, architecting is an inductive process.  At a more detailed level, engineering 
is concerned with quantifiable costs, architecting with qualitative worth” (Maier and Rechtin 2000). 
Qualitative worth implies that the level of detail required of individual systems is relative to the 
impact that they will have on the overall SoS in achieving the objectives and purpose of that SoS 
(and therefore ensuring client satisfaction). From Maier and Rechtin (2000): 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
(Maier and Rechtin 2000). 
 
But what characteristics of a system are important with respect to the function, cost and timeliness 
required for success? How should these characteristics be measured? As discussed, at an 
architectural level it is the qualitative worth of a system that is important, as opposed to the precise 
details.  
 
In this research the objective is not to establish a single-point mathematically based optimising 
methodology, but one rather more based on satisficing. The complexity inherent in system designs 
and the high level of uncertainty associated with the systems which comprise the SoS and the 
environment usually requires robust optimal solutions to be found in most cases, rather than 
sensitive, single-point solutions. This is founded in the principal that, within the constraints under 
which the SoS operates, there is a need to make a “good” decision among alternatives. 
1.2.3 Systems Architectures And Military Missions 
A military mission, simplistically, involves achieving some purpose and objectives in an uncertain 
environment where a friendly force and an enemy force exist in competition with one another. In 
simplistic terms, mission success for a friendly force could be thought of as requiring it to meet and 
exceed the capabilities of the enemy force and, in so doing, meet the mission’s objectives. This 
“positioning for capability superiority” is similar in concept to the positioning for information 
superiority model proposed by Alberts, Garstka, and Stein (1999), as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Positioning for Information Superiority(Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999) 
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This model deals with gaining information superiority over an adversary, with three key metrics 
proposed: relevancy of information, accuracy of information and timeliness (of information). In 
simplistic terms, by outperforming the enemy for each of these metrics, information superiority is 
achieved. However, in the context of military operations, the mission has to be assessed in terms of 
numerous criteria. Similarly, the SoS assembled to carry out the mission has to be judged in terms 
of the capability which it needs for superiority over the enemy forces. This capability could be 
thought of as an expression of the combined functional and non-functional system characteristics 
that comprise the SoS, as discussed earlier. The concept of capability superiority fits with Rechtin 
(1999) who defines such competition in architectural terms as, “an attempt by one system or 
organisation to equal or surpass others to gain something of value” (Rechtin 1999). In terms of this 
research the “something of value” would be defined in the mission’s objectives. This positioning 
for capability superiority is shown in Figure 3, where the SoS’s capability signature envelops the 
mission demand’s capability signature, hence achieving capability superiority. More rigorously, 
the comparison requires an investigation of a feasible trade space. This multi-dimensional space is 
difficult to represent in two dimensions, but the spider diagram format of Figure 3 helps to 
interpret the comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Positioning for Capability Superiority 
 
The idea that mission success could be enabled (as opposed to guaranteed) by considering 
competitive architectures, in terms of qualitative capabilities, is also lent credence by Rechtin. On 
the subject of competitive systems Rechtin (1999) states, “Like economies and the art of war, it is 
primarily about relative levels between the competitors’ capabilities rather than about their 
absolute values, sizable and important as the latter may be” (Rechtin 1999). This, in the context of 
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military missions, would indicate that a higher level of abstraction will suffice for comparing 
competing SoS, or comparing SoS in the application of “what we need” against “what we’ve got”. 
To achieve the view of capability superiority as illustrated in Figure 3 a commonly understood set 
of functional and non-functional system characteristics are required as well as a framework to 
allow the effective assimilation of SoS capability signatures from the system architecture. This 
research considers what these system characteristics might be, how they could be measured and 
how they could be used to support a decision maker to decide what architecture to use for a 
particular mission through the utilisation and development of systems ideas to this application. 
With the concept of capability superiority introduced we now pursue a definition for capability 
which is the focus of the next subsection.  
1.2.4 Capability 
Capability has been defined by the UK Ministry of Defence as: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Ministry of Defence 2009) 
 
Capability is delivered by force elements combined into packages (system of systems). This 
research considers how to rapidly assess these packages in terms of the required capability. While 
the UK Ministry of Defence considers the general problem of working within a coalition this 
research will be bounded to consider the particular problem of indigenous force elements. This is 
with the expectation that the developed approach may be extended at a later stage to include 
coalition forces. The US DoD’s Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan contains another 
definition for capability which implies methods for assessing packages: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Department of Defense 2004, 15) 
 
Capability moves away from a means based perspective (e.g. platforms and systems) to a combined 
ways and means perspective. This perspective does not consider the systems but rather the overall 
capability required to perform a mission. Hence, to assess these packages both the ways and means 
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must be assessed in some way. To a degree this alleviates the problem of Maslow’s Maxim (also 
known as the silver bullet):  
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Abraham Maslow (Thornton-Wells, Moore and Haines 2004) 
 
In military terms the hammer and nail of Maslow’s Maxim are analogous to platforms and their 
effects. By moving to a capability based perspective of problems the solution can be expressed in 
terms of capability which a platform may or may not be able to fulfil. The platform is no longer the 
driver of the solution (and can no longer be proposed as a silver bullet to those problems). Figure 9 
shows the components of capability as according to the UK Ministry of Defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – The Components of Capability (Ministry of Defence 2009) 
 
Note in Figure 4 the multiple viewpoints on capability of which the joint capability packages, or 
system of systems, is only one. To return to Maslow’s Maxim the problem here is captured by the 
Threat and Physical Environment and the answer by the Joint Capability Packages and Coalition 
Contribution. An appropriate capability can therefore be realised by matching the mission demand 
(incorporating the Physical Environment and Threat) and the SoS (incorporating the Joint Capability 
Packages and Coalition Contribution) as proposed in the previous section. 
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1.3 Statement of Research Problem 
Previously an initial research problem had been identified from the academic literature: 
 
Is there a decision support system that can analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both 
open and closed viewpoints? 
Initial Statement of Research Problem 
 
When this research talks of a system capable of supporting both open and closed viewpoints it 
shall be referred to as a holistic system. This conceptual problem has been considered in a military 
application where a need has been identified to be able to match alternative SoS architectures to 
particular mission requirements in order to support military decision makers. This is based on the 
lack of processes to support SoS formation (Sage and Biemer 2007) which has been identified as a 
critical shortcoming by the author due to the temporal aspects of virtual SoS formation for 
particular missions, as described by Cook (2001) and Chen and Clothier (2003). The research 
problem is stated below: 
  
Is there a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole 
from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission? 
Statement of Research Problem 
 
A systems approach will be taken to create an architecture for a decision support system that can 
analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both open and closed viewpoints. Note 
that this is not the solution (as this research addresses wicked problems and there are no solutions) 
but rather an architecture of a systems approach to the problem. With the research problem 
established a research methodology was defined which is outlined in the next section. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
John Stuart Mill 
 
The epistemology, or theory of knowledge, most heavily drawn upon in this research is critical 
rationalism, as advanced by Karl Popper. Popper advocated empirical falsification over the 
classical observationalist/inductivist account of scientific method. Popper’s philosophy of critical 
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rationalism was "the first non justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy" 
(Bartley 1964, 23). The core concept is captured by Taleb (2007): 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Taleb 2007, 126) 
 
This research does not seek a solution, rather it seeks a decision support system that can view a 
system as part of a whole, a system of systems, from both open and closed viewpoints. Hence it 
cannot be proved – only stated such that its use can be demonstrated and, most importantly, can be 
falsified. A solution cannot be pursued as the problem is wicked and hence unique each time so an 
empirical proof would only hold for that particular instantiation of the problem, not the problem as 
a whole. So whilst the decision support system cannot be proved right it will at least be falsifiable. 
1.5 Research Method 
The research method followed by this research is in line with traditional methods of scientific 
research to the extent that they can be applied to open and wicked problems. The major 
adjustments to address the wicked nature of the problem this research addresses are in stages four 
and seven.  
 
1. Formation of the research topic - open and closed viewpoints, systems and system of systems  
The background for this research is discussed in subsections 1.1 and 1.2. 
2. Hypothesis – towards a holistic decision support system  
The hypothesis of this research is that there is a decision support system that can be used 
to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both open and closed 
viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a particular 
military mission, as stated as the research problem in subsection 1.3. The decision support 
system this research seeks to develop is holistic due to the linked open and closed 
viewpoints it will consider. The proof of existence of such a decision support system will 
be through the existence of an architectural approach that informs the solution. 
3. Conceptual definitions – military missions, functional and non functional characteristics  
Defined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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4. Architectural approach – the parametric approach / model driven approach  
Defined initially in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and revisited in Chapter 6. 
5. Gathering of data – historical case studies  
Started in subsection 2.5 and extended in 4.3. Narratives for the historical case studies may 
be found in Appendix I.1 and J.1. 
6. Analysis of data – historical case studies conducted with developed decision support tool  
First set of case studies completed in subsection 4.3 and then reanalysed in Chapter 7. 
7. Test and revision of hypothesis  - testing falsification from an open viewpoint 
Testing is performed initially in Chapter 4 and with the second developed decision 
support tool in Chapter 7. The hypothesis is revised with the findings from this first set of 
case studies in Chapter 5. The testing of the hypothesis is conducted in line with critical 
rationalism and hypothesis is capable of falsification. This is what distinguishes this 
research method as traditional reductionist evaluation methods are inappropriate for this 
research. 
8. Conclusions – findings on a wicked problem  
The conclusions to this research are reported in Chapter 8 along with future research 
opportunities.  
1.6 Objectives 
Seven objectives were set to answer the research problem stated previously in subsection 1.3 using 
the research method outlined in 1.5. Each objective is listed in turn as a separate sub heading and 
briefly described. 
1.6.1 Objective 1: Review General Decision Making 
This research aims to develop an approach for a decision support system. To undertake this an 
appreciation is required of how people make decisions and a review of general decision making 
from the literature is required. 
1.6.2 Objective 2: Review Military Decision Making 
The context of this research is military orientated. The author recognises that military decision 
makers may make decisions differently from their civilian counterparts. This review will allow 
military decision making literature to be assessed and compared to general decision making 
theory. 
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1.6.3 Objective 3: Identify a Decision Making Model to Support 
To develop an architecture of an approach for a decision support system a specific decision making 
model must be identified to support. This objective is to identify, after reviewing the general and 
military decision making literature which model is most appropriate to support, with justification 
of course. 
1.6.4 Objective 4: Identify a Practical Application for this Research 
A specific practical application is required for this research, firstly to help guide the development 
of the approach and secondly to provide a specific context for the case studies. This objective is to 
identify an appropriate practical application for these purposes. 
1.6.5 Objective 5: Develop an Architecture of an Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
With a decision making model identified to support and a practical application established this 
objective is to develop an architecture of an approach for a decision support system. 
1.6.6 Objective 6: Implement the Developed Approach 
This research considers a wicked problem in so much that there is no particular right answer. The 
architecture of an approach for a decision support system established by the previous objective is 
not practically usable until it is implemented in some manner. This objective is to implement the 
developed approach. 
1.6.7 Objective 7: Conduct a Set of Case Studies with the Implemented 
Approach 
The final objective of this research is to conduct a set of case studies with the implemented 
approach to assess its validity using the chosen research methodology of critical rationalism. 
 
This thesis will address the success of the research in terms of achieving these objectives in Chapter 
8, section 8.2. 
1.7 Contribution of this Research 
This research will ultimately demonstrate the novel application of a model driven approach to 
decision support. Specifically, this will allow the decision maker to see how their proposed 
solution (expressed as a system of systems) matches the mission’s requirements. This is initially 
achieved through a parametric approach as discussed in Chapter 3 that identifies three sets of 
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characteristics (functional, non-functional and physical environment) that can be applied to 
Systems of Systems and mission requirements to allow them to be matched. The resultant findings 
from a set of case studies (shown in Chapter 4) conclude that whilst the sets of characteristics are 
useful the parametric approach is flawed. An alternative to the parametric approach is a model 
driven approach, as introduced in Chapter 5. A model driven approach for the functional set of 
characteristics is developed in Chapter 6 and the set of case studies originally conducted with the 
parametric approach are repeated with the model driven approach in Chapter 7. It is this novel 
application of a model driven approach to decision support as developed in Chapter 6 and tested 
in Chapter 7 that is the main contribution of this research. Further contributions that this research 
makes are discussed in the conclusions in Chapter 8. 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
The Research Problem developed in this Chapter is expanded upon in Chapter 2 and a practical 
application identified. An architecture of an approach for a decision support system is developed 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 documents the implementation of the developed architecture and two 
initial case studies are conducted using the developed software tool. The findings from the first set 
of case studies indicated a different approach was required from the initial architecture developed. 
Chapter 5 addresses these findings by developing an architecture of a model driven approach for a 
decision support system. The implementation of the architecture of a model driven approach is 
presented in Chapter 6. This second implementation is evaluated by repeating the two case studies, 
which is covered in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 reviews the research reported in this thesis, revisits the 
original research question and objectives, outlines future research opportunities and finally draws 
to a close with a set of conclusions. A Glossary of the acronyms used are provided in Chapter 9. 
The References cited in this Thesis are shown in Chapter 10. Finally, the Appendices are contained 
in Chapter 11 which starts with a separate table of contents for them. 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter started with a discussion of the nature of systems problems and the need for an open 
viewpoint to explain a system by viewing it as part of a larger whole and explaining its role in 
terms of that larger whole. This was linked to General Systems Theory which sought to provide a 
common language to discuss systemic problems by combining modelling and communication; 
modelling to provide precision while communication provided comprehensibility. An overview of 
the definition of systems and system of systems was covered and led to a discussion of wicked 
problems. By combining modelling and communication a bridge can be formed between the open 
system viewpoint of the architect and the closed system viewpoint of the engineer, as General 
Systems Theory set out to achieve. This would allow the wicked planning problem of the whole to 
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be addressed using an open system viewpoint while still maintaining a bridge to the closed system 
viewpoint required to solve individual problems. Overall this approach would be an application of 
a “synthetic mode of thought” to systems problems (Ackoff 1974, 3) and hence would be a systems 
approach. A practical application for the research was discussed and a need identified for this 
approach within the military domain to support decision makers. The research problem was stated 
with this practical application focus: 
 
Is there a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole 
from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission? 
Statement of Research Problem 
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Chapter 2  
Problem Definition and Practical Application 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter considers decision making in a general context, specifically the types of decision 
making situations that humans undertake and the viewpoints on modelling decision making. The 
main decision making under risk theories are surveyed and a general need to support human 
decision making behaviour justified. With the particular type of decision making that this research 
is interested in established and the type of model required to build a DSS around identified we 
then consider military decision making to understand how military decision makers currently 
make decisions. Emerging decision making models for the military are then considered to find one 
that accurately reflects how military decision makers are actually making decisions that this 
research can support. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
As introduced at the start of Chapter 1 the sentences describing this chapter are shown below with 
the keywords highlighted which are shown in turn in a logical model on the next page. 
 
This 
From the previous chapter(s): 
Research
 
 has established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of an Approach for a 
Decision Support System. The Approach matches System of Systems to Military Missions. This 
Research references a Literature Review. 
The Decision Support System supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision 
Making model. The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
This chapter introduces: 
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Figure 5 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Two 
 
The new keywords introduced in this chapter are highlighted in Figure 5. Hence, the keywords not 
highlighted in Figure 5 are from the model established in Chapter 1.  
Decision 
Maker 
Approach System of Systems 
Military 
Missions 
Problem & 
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Literature 
Application 
is 
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of 
of 
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2.1 Background 
This chapter considers decision making in order to identify a model of military decision making 
that the decision support tool this research aspires to develop can support, as outlined in Chapter 
1. By understanding how military decision makers actually make decisions the decision support 
tool will be able to better match how they work and, in so doing, will hopefully be more usable by 
them.  
 
Decision making is a considerable field of study and this chapter starts in subsection 2.2 by 
reviewing the general decision making literature to build up a picture of how humans make 
decisions and to start to identify any need for support for human decision making activities. The 
literature review presented was focused through reference to a more extensive review conducted 
by Hubbard (2010). The particular case of decision making in the military is considered in section 
2.3, including a review of the major decision making paradigms. Combining the findings from the 
general decision making review with the particular case of military decision making subsection 2.4 
considers future trends in military decision making models and settles on the model to be used in 
this research. The chapter finished with subsection 2.5 which outlines the particular military 
mission to which the decision support system will be applied. 
2.2 Review of General Decision Making 
Most decisions are gambles. They are choices between alternatives, the information about which 
are incomplete. The decision maker must therefore choose between the alternatives, the choice has 
not been made for them. The literature distinguishes between two particular types of decision 
making situations, those based on risk and those based on uncertainty. Risk is defined as “decision 
situations in which the probabilities of an outcome are objective or given, such as betting on a flip 
of a fair coin, a roll of a balanced die, or a spin of a roulette wheel” (Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez 2004, 
399-400). Risk can be thought of as a closed viewpoint on a situation where reductionist methods 
can be applied to determine the probabilities of outcomes. Uncertainty is defined as situations in 
which the outcomes are subjective and the decision maker must estimate or infer the likelihood of 
an outcome occurring (Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez 2004, 399-400). Uncertainty can be thought of as 
an open viewpoint on a situation where the outcomes must be subjectively evaluated using 
synthetic methods. Most decisions involve risk, a comprehensive history of which can be found in 
Bernstein (1996). However, the decisions of interest to this research clearly involve uncertainty 
rather than risk; the nature of war does not lend itself well to quantitative risk assessment. The 
academic research on decision making considers three broad questions (Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez 
2004, 399), which are: 
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• How should decision makers behave when faced with risk/uncertainty? (Normative) 
• How do decision makers behave when faced with risk/uncertainty? (Descriptive) 
• How can decision makers be made to act more normatively? (Prescriptive) 
 
The research problem stated previously in subsection 1.3 refers to supporting
 
 military decision 
making. Supporting military decision making is not normative or prescriptive, hence these are out 
of this research’s scope. To develop a decision support system requires a model of how decision 
makers behave – a descriptive model – to construct the tool around. This recognises that decision 
makers in the military can already make the decisions that this research considers, so the aim is to 
support rather than prescribe to them.  
So how are decisions made in general? To start to answer this requires a move into the literature of 
economists. While we are primarily interested in decisions of uncertainty there is considerably 
more literature available on risk. Risk can be considered to start with as the argument has been 
made in the literature that “our understanding of the simpler situation of risk readily extends to 
the more realistic case of uncertainty” (Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez 2004, 400).  
 
In economics the standard theory of individual choice is the Expected Utility Theory (Starmer 2000, 
332). It has been described as “the major paradigm in decision making since the Second World 
War” (Schoemaker 1982, 529). Bernoulli proposed expected utility as a resolution to the St. 
Petersburg Paradox in his 18th century paper Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis (translated 
more recently by Dr Louise Sommer (Bernoulli 1954)). The St. Petersburg Paradox considered a risk 
based decision whereby someone pays a fixed price to play a game where the winnings depends 
on the number of tosses of a fair coin it took it took to get heads. The amount they received was 2n, 
where n is the number of tosses of the coin to get heads and the probability of winning is (½)n. The 
curiosity of the paradox was that whilst it is a game of infinite expected monetary value the results 
found that people were only willing to pay a small monetary value to play it. This was an irrational 
decision making behaviour. Bernoulli’s theory was that people maximise expected utility rather 
than expected monetary value and presented a descriptive model to show this. As a descriptive 
model it had no practical value until von Neumann and Morgenstern “showed that the expected 
utility hypothesis could be derived from a set of apparently appealing axioms on preference” 
(Starmer 2000, 334). These axioms are detailed in Schoemaker (1982, 531-532). However, these 
axioms are normative and prescriptive, as opposed to descriptive.  
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Expected Utility Theory is an example of, and arguably the most prevalent of the so called 
conventional decision making theories. These theories “model choice as preference maximisation 
and assumes that agents behave as if optimizing some underlying preference function. The as if is 
significant here: the conventional approach, interpreted descriptively, seeks to predict which 
choices are made and typically, there is no presupposition that the model corresponds with any of 
the mental activities actually involved in making choices.” (Starmer 2000, 349). While these 
conventional models of decision making dominate economic theory, psychology is more focused 
on modelling the process of making a decision.  The most noted of these non-conventional theories 
is Prospect Theory which was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in response to their 
critique of Expected Utility Theory. There are two main features of Prospect Theory of interest to 
this research: the first is the isolation effect which is where the decision maker discards components 
that the alternatives share. This editing process is inconsistent between decision makers as a pair of 
prospects can be partitioned into shared and different components in multiple ways. The 
recognition that people can interpret the same situation in multiple ways is a theme which will be 
expanded upon later in this thesis when we consider Transformational Grammar (section 5.2). The 
second and more important feature of Prospect Theory is the consideration of outcomes as an 
interpretation of gains and losses relative to a reference point. This reference point could be taken 
to be the status quo, or one’s current assets. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note: “Although this 
is probably true for most choice problems, there are situations in which gains and losses are coded 
relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo. For example, an 
unexpected tax withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experienced as a loss, not as a reduced 
gain.” Such situations are illustrated in Figure 6 where 𝜒 = 0 is the status quo, or reference point. 
Notice that the gains curve is concave and the losses curve is convex and steeper. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991, 1047-1048) characterised these features as general behaviour of decision makers 
using the terms Loss Aversion and Diminishing Sensitivity. These features are characterisations of 
irrational decision making behaviour. Diminishing Sensitivity, which is the decrease in the 
marginal value from the reference point, helps describe the St Petersburg Paradox. 
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Figure 6 – The Valuation of Outcomes in Prospect Theory (Starmer 2000, 351) 
 
The decision biases revealed by Prospect Theory are expanded upon in various other psychology 
literature surveyed on decision making. For the amusement of the reader two thought experiments 
are given in Appendix C which help illustrate these limitations. Various “cures” to these human 
decision making biases/limitations have been proposed and developed, including decision making 
methodologies to help us make decisions, decision support systems to monitor and guide human 
decision making, and “expert systems” that remove humans from the decision making process 
and, the theory goes, in doing so our human fallacies.  
 
This research considers decision making under uncertainty and seeks a descriptive model of 
military decision makers for which a decision support system can be developed. Two main 
decision making theories from economics are the Expected Utility Theory which states that people 
maximise utility as opposed to reward and Prospect Theory which characterises the general 
behaviour of decision makers with the terms Loss Aversion and Diminishing Sensitivity. Both of 
these theories indicate that humans are innately irrational decision makers liable to be subject to a 
number of decision making fallacies. Note that this does not specify how the decision makers 
actually make the decision, rather it characterises the likely features of the decision made. A 
decision support system would be useful to help negate these decision biases. Aware of these 
limitations of decision making we now consider how decisions are made within the military and 
consider how best to support them. 
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2.3 Review of Military Decision Making 
This subsection considers how decision makers in the military make decisions. The subsection 
starts with a consideration of general military decision making before looking at decision making 
in military operations in 2.3.1. The predominant decision making process, the Military Decision 
Making Process is discussed in 2.3.2. Finally the Observe Orient Decide Act Loop is discussed in 
2.3.3 and extended to the emerging tenants of Network Centric Warfare in 2.3.4. To begin, decision 
making in the military is described in the United States Army doctrine: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
The Military Decision-Making Process (Department Of The Army 1997, 5-1) 
 
Decision making is dependent on information, the nature and use of which in warfare has changed 
so significantly in the past decade it has had a transformational influence on the way in which 
modern warfare is conducted. The value of information for decision making is defined as “the 
difference between a decision maker’s payoff in the absence of information relative to what can be 
obtained in its presence” (Banker and Kauffman 2004). In the military domain the prevalence of 
information enabled relatively recently through the tenets of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) or 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) has impacted the way in which decision making is conducted: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Implications for Military Operations, Network Centric Warfare (Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999) 
 
Note the underlying message in the above quote is that more information has a direct correlation to 
better decision making (however that may be measured). The increase of information availability 
has also decreased the time that decisions must be made in for them to be effective. Information 
has always been a crucial commodity to posses in warfare, arguably more so today than ever 
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before because of its availability.  Sun Tzu in his thesis The Art Of War emphasises the need for 
information about both the enemy and your own forces: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 Sun Tzu, The Art Of War (Heinl 1966, 320) 
 
In modern warfare the role of information has been elevated to that of a decisive factor in victory, 
as proposed through the original tenets of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) (Alberts, Garstka and 
Hayes, et al. 2001, Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999). It has been proposed by Alberts, Garstka and 
Stein (1999) that information has the dimensions of relevance, accuracy, and timeliness, as shown 
in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Superior Information Position (Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999) 
 
Positioning within these dimensions to exceed a competitor is described as information superiority: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Information Age Organizations, Network Centric Warfare (Alberts, Garstka and Stein 1999) 
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Information on the battlefield, about the enemy, the environment and your own forces, has been a 
decisive factor in the outcome of the great military campaigns of history. This is still true today 
where the battlefield has become the battlespace which encompasses air, land, sea and space as 
well as enemy and friendly force locations: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
U.S. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (U.S. Department Of Defense 2006) 
 
The battlespace is a strategic level concept which can be considered at a lower, operational or 
tactical level by appropriately bounding the area of interest. Considering the scope of the definition 
of battlespace in the quote above and the amount of potential information that it would 
encompass, bounding is necessary to prevent information overload. War is often surrounded by 
confusion and a lack of information, the so-called fog of war. The Prussian military philosopher 
Carl von Clausewitz wrote: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Alberts, Garstka and Hayes, et al. 2001, 36) 
 
Whilst advances in communications and human machine interfaces have increased the availability 
of information in the battlespace the sheer quantity can threaten to overwhelm the recipient. Filters 
can be employed to simplify and reduce the incoming data but at the risk of obscuring or removing 
useful information. What is useful information in this context? What is the value of such 
information? 
 
To help answer this we step into the world of Information Theory which began with Shannon’s 
seminal paper (1948) which considered the transmission of information across a noisy 
communications channel. Shannon’s paper (1948) contained many revolutionary ideas, including 
the use of binary digits, or bits, to measure information and the idea of information entropy. It is 
not this paper that is of particular interest to us, but rather a paper written a little later on which 
linked Shannon’s theories to gambling. Shannon’s paper was founded in cryptography and it 
considered coded messages; but could the theory be applied to situations where no coding was 
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used? This was considered by another employee at Bell Labs, where Shannon worked, called John 
Kelly, Jr.  Kelly was apparently inspired by news reports of a con involving an American TV show 
called The $64,000 Question. The latest incarnation of this show is Who Wants To Be A Millionaire? 
and the format is largely the same with contestants answering questions, each question doubling 
their winnings. The show was broadcast live on the East Coast but its broadcast was delayed by 
three hours on the West Coast, for scheduling and time difference reasons presumably. The 
bookies on the West Coast allowed bets to be placed up to the shows airing.  The con involved 
West Coast gamblers placing bets on the winner of the show after finding out who had won from 
East Coast viewers (Poundstone 2005, 66). Kelly considered how a gambler with access to such 
“inside information” may best utilise it for maximum financial gain and founded his work in 
Shannon’s theories (Kelly 1956). 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
The Gambler With A Private Wire,  
A New Interpretation Of Information Rate (Kelly 1956, 918) 
 
The scenario Kelly considers is placing bets on racehorses and shows how a gambler can maximise 
their return but is applicable to any application where profit can be made from having information 
not generally available. In the context of gambling and the stock markets “insider information” has 
rather negative, if not criminal, connotations. This is not necessarily the case: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Entropy, Fortune’s Formula (Poundstone 2005, 76) 
 
To return to a military context, inside information can be thought of as intelligence, which is 
information gained about the enemy that gives us some sort of advantage over them. This could be 
thought of as an external or environmental edge, which is an advantage gained through knowledge 
outside of our system boundary. In the research we are focusing on, if a military system were able 
to model or estimate the qualities of a system more accurately against mission requirements would 
this constitute inside information? By knowing more accurately what you are deploying to achieve 
some objective, and knowing how well the deployed system matches up to the requirements of 
that objective then some sort of edge would be gained. This could be thought of as an internal or 
systemic edge. This consideration of gambling is not entirely at odds with military operations; in 
fact they are somewhat analogous as stated by Carl von Clausewitz. 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War(Graham 2008) 
 
If war is viewed as a game of chance, a gamble so to speak, it would seem wise to understand the 
elements of the game that could contribute to success or failure. At a lower level of war, the tactical 
level at which individual missions are conducted, these elements could be thought of as functional 
(what we need to be able to do to achieve the mission) and non functional (the intangibles required 
for mission success). Whilst the consideration of these elements would not guarantee success, they 
would help indicate if the odds were in our favour or not. If we are not functionally capable of 
conducting a mission we would be unlikely to succeed. But what information would we need 
about ourselves and the enemy to achieve this? This question of characterisation is a key thread of 
this research and will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
As discussed previously humans can be susceptible to certain fallacies, as introduced in the 
previous subsection 2.2 and elaborated upon in Appendix C. That is not of course to say that we 
should not make decisions, our decision making ability generally helps avoid catastrophe (Perrow 
1984). However, in times of highly stressful, time limited decision making (as exemplified by 
military decision making) we are most vulnerable to our innate psychological weaknesses. The key 
is the limitations that intrude on our ability to process information, as Klein (1999) states: 
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Why Good People Make Poor Decisions (G. Klein 1999, 274) 
 
In the military context of this research, where a bad initial decision can be very costly, a decision 
support system that helps overcome these fallacies through clear, concise information presentation 
would seem to be advantageous. At a time when the information available to the decision maker is 
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ever increasing the DSS will also help alleviate so called “paralysis through analysis”, where the 
quantity of information overwhelms the decision maker and prevents decisions being taken. 
Hence, such a DSS could help alleviate the effects of stressors as identified by Klein.  
 
Decision making is changing in the military due to the increased availability of information which 
is leading to better, but more time constrained decision making. War is often surrounded by 
confusion and incomplete information leading to increased uncertainty. The value of timely and 
accurate information about the enemy (intelligence) provides an informational advantage to the 
decision maker. Military decision making is typically time constrained and highly stressful which 
limit human decision making and can negate any informational advantage. A decision support 
system which could alleviate these effects and maintain any informational advantage would be 
useful. The following subsection considers decision making within the military and considers the 
contribution that the decision support system this research aims to develop could make. 
2.3.1 Decision Making in Military Operations 
Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, who became Chief of the Prussian Großer Generalstab, 
oversaw the formation of the Generalstab (general staff) of the Prussian Army. The Generalstab 
was mainly responsible for the rapid defeat of France in the Franco-Prussia War of 1870. This 
defeat proved that large-scale wars could be won by planning detailed requirements, rapidly 
devising capabilities to meet them and implementing them exactly (Paparone 2001). This concept 
has been maintained and extended to decision superiority, as espoused by the US Military in their 
concept for future operations, quoted below: 
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(Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000, 8) 
 
Decision-making during military operations has traditionally been done only by humans, 
supported by a few notable automated decision-aid tools used for specialist applications such as 
mission planning, reactive defensive aids, carefree handling of aircraft. Within the force structure, 
it is increasingly likely that decisions will be made by lower ranks acting as autonomous units, or 
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autonomous individuals, in order to enable shorter response times in the face of varying threats. 
This is partly the result of force transformation to achieve greater agility, enabled by concepts such 
as network centric warfare, and partly in response to the emerging asymmetric (Ancker III and 
Burke 2003, 20) and non-traditional warfare threats, both of which require fast response time and 
decentralised decision making. We will touch on these areas later on in this section. 
 
In Gary Klein’s book Sources Of Power (1999) he includes anecdotal reasons for how his research 
company won a research contract from the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioural and Social 
Sciences. He talked to some program administrators at the institute who explained how, “the U.S. 
Government had spent millions of dollars in the 1970s and early 1980s finding out how people 
make decisions, and the army has used these findings to build very expensive decision aids for 
battle commanders in the field. Unfortunately, most of the aids were disappointing. No one would 
use them” (G. Klein 1999, 7). One reason for this is likely to be the fact that decision making in war 
carries a high price for error (Alberts, Garstka and Hayes, et al. 2001, 37). This, combined with the 
intrinsic uncertainty and changeable availability of information, makes war a hostile environment 
to conduct decision making within.  
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The Military Decision-Making Process (Department Of The Army 1997, 5-1) 
 
Military decision making requires both closed and open viewpoints. Information superiority, when 
effectively translated into superior decisions, achieves decision superiority. To enable this decision 
making is moving down the traditional command and control chain. Decision aids have been 
implemented before; anecdotal evidence indicates they were poorly received. The developed 
decision support system must support how military decision makers actually make decisions to 
help realise decision superiority. The U.S. Army’s decision making process, the Military Decision 
Making Process, is the first considered. 
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2.3.2 Military Decision Making Process 
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is the U.S. Army’s decision making process. It is an 
analytical approach to problem solving: 
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The Military Decision-Making Process (Department Of The Army 1997, 5-1) 
 
The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and their staff members to examine the situation, 
develop alternative courses of action and reach logical decisions. It is a scalable approach, such that 
when there is sufficient planning time and staff support, a comprehensive evaluation of numerous 
friendly and enemy courses of action can be conducted. In more time constrained situations the 
products created previously (when time and staffing allowed thorough evaluations) can be 
utilised. 
 
The MDMP utilises doctrine to ensure a consistent understanding of terms and symbols used in the 
process, which also helps to maintain consistent situation assessment. The complete MDMP, whilst 
a time consuming process, analyses multiple friendly and enemy courses of action to ascertain the 
optimal friendly course of action (COA). Utilising this process helps ensure the integration, 
coordination and synchronisation of the operation, whilst preventing oversights. The use of the 
complete MDMP results in a detailed set of plans/orders based in doctrine to ensure consistency of 
meaning. The complete MDMP process is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 – The Military Decision Making Process (Department Of The Army 1997)  
 
The MDMP has seven steps, with each step contributing to the next. A brief synopsis of each step 
presented in Appendix D: The Military Decision Making Process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Staff Inputs and Outputs in the MDMP (Department Of The Army 1997) 
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In time constrained environments omitting steps of the MDMP is not a solution. Rather, four 
primary techniques are suggested to save time. 
1. Increase the commander’s involvement, allowing him to make decisions during the 
process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step. 
2. The commander becomes more directive in his guidance, limiting options. This saves the 
staff time by focusing members on those things the commander feels are most important. 
3. The commander limits the number of COAs developed and war-gamed, in extreme cases 
he can direct that only one course of action be developed. The goal is an acceptable COA 
that meets mission requirements in the time available, even if it is not optimal.   
4. The fourth and most time saving technique is maximizing parallel planning. Although 
parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is 
critical. In a time-constrained environment, the importance of warning orders increases as 
available time decreases. A verbal warning order now is worth more than a written order 
one hour from now. The same warning orders used in the full MDMP should be issued 
when the process is abbreviated. In addition to warning orders, units must share all 
available information with subordinates as early as possible. 
 
The MDMP is a normative and prescriptive decision making process. In this research we seek a 
descriptive model of military decision makers. The most widely recognised descriptive military 
descriptive model is the OODA Loop as described in the next subsection. 
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2.3.3 Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop 
Col. John Boyd, a United States Air Force (USAF) military strategist, developed the OODA decision 
making loop.  OODA refers to four overlapping and interacting processes: Observe, Orient, Decide 
and Act. This loop is reproduced in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – John Boyd’s OODA Loop (Boyd, The Essence of Winning & Losing 1995) 
 
 
Boyd was a very good fighter pilot and had the nickname “40-Second Boyd” because of his ability 
to defeat any opponent in aerial combat within this time limit. From his extensive combat 
experience he developed the OODA loop as a way of explaining to USAF trainees how to defeat 
the enemy in aerial combat. 
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John Boyd, Patterns Of Conflict (Boyd 1986, 5) 
 
Boyd presents this OODA loop as occurring at tactical and strategic levels (Boyd 1986). War is 
conducted at three descending hierarchical levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical. Decision 
making occurs at all three levels. (U.S. Department Of Defense 2006) 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(U.S. Department Of Defense 2006, 509) 
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(U.S. Department Of Defense 2006, 391) 
• xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(U.S. Department Of Defense 2006, 526) 
 
The OODA Loop is a descriptive model of military decision making, originally developed by John 
Boyd to describe aerial combat but applicable across the military domain at the tactical level. Some 
recent concepts about how war is conducted is starting to speed up this process due to the 
increased proliferation of information, as discussed in the next subsection. 
2.3.4 Network Centric Warfare 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), or Networked Enabled Capability (NEC) as it is known in the 
UK, provides the theory for warfare in the current Information Age. NCW is essentially about 
evolving military organisational behaviour to generate a tactical advantage from the effective 
networking of a war fighting enterprise. This evolution can be typically characterised as the ability 
of geographically dispersed entities to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness. This 
provides an inherent information superiority position which can be exploited through self-
synchronisation and other tenets of NCW theory (Alberts and Hayes 2003, 98). The shift towards 
these tenets through a development of situational awareness and command and control is shown 
in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 – NCW Maturity Model (Alberts and Hayes 2003, 109) 
 
The rate of conversion from a position of information superiority to action is known as speed of 
command. Traditionally speed of command can take hours because of the time it takes to process, 
correlate, interpret and then act on the information through the chain of command. NCW 
principles combined with command and control (C2) processes could reduce the speed of 
command significantly. Hence, NCW provides the concepts to obtain the maximum tactical 
advantage from position of information superiority. NCW provides a broad organisational 
influence as it is transparent to mission, force size and geography. In addition NCW has the 
potential to contribute to the coalescence of the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, 
which were outlined in section 2.3.3. This coalescence supports the current drive in military 
organisations to move towards the more flexible system of systems that modern conflict demands. 
In summary, NCW is not limited to technology and could be considered to be an emerging military 
response to the Information Age. The U.S. Marine Corps Distribute Operations concept provides a 
good example of the implications of the tenets of NCW on military decision making. Distributed 
Operations is a U.S. Marine Corps operational concept of how to meet emerging asymmetric 
warfare threats. The premise of Distributed Operations is to utilise the tenets of concepts such as 
Networked Centric Warfare to allow the decentralisation of informed decision-making down the 
traditional command chain to squad level, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
 Problem Definition and Practical Application   - 43 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 – The Proliferation of Decision-Makers (Hagee 2005) 
  
Rather than prescribing courses of actions the subordinate commander is empowered to develop 
their own, guided largely by commander’s intent (Hagee 2005). Commanders intent is a concept 
that has its roots in the French Revolution and General Napoleon Bonaparte’s method of 
conducting war. After he defeated the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 the Prussian army 
developed the Aftragstaktik philosophy, best translated as mission-orientated command (Widder 
2002). The foundation of this philosophy was the concept of commander’s intent, which is a 
description of the commanders desired outcome/end state that subordinates would work towards 
without being prescribed how to achieve it (Shattuck 2000). 
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Widder, Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung (Widder 2002, 5) 
 
Today Auftragstaktik is inseparably linked with Innere Führung, which is the commitment of a 
soldier to moral and ethical standards. Essentially Innere Führung is the German military’s 
corporate culture (Widder 2002).  
 
The use of commanders intent as a cultural philosophy combined with concepts of Distributed 
Operations aims to break down the hierarchical levels of war into a flatter, more agile methodology 
for conducting war. At the centre of all of these concepts is the proliferation of decision makers at 
the lower ranks to enable faster response times and more adaptable approaches to the changing 
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environment of the battlespace. This proliferation of decision makers is supported through the 
shared awareness that enables self-synchronisation as shown in Figure 11. This shift in military 
operations, both in execution and in tempo, marks a changing point in military decision making. 
The next subsection explores the literature to understand what these changes may entail for future 
military decision makers. 
2.4 Future Trends in Military Decision Making 
There are alternatives to the classical decision making theories that were presented in subsection 
2.2. These alternatives mostly emanate from descriptive studies of decision making in naturalistic 
environments. Naturalistic Decision Making is the description of proficient decision making 
strategies that emphasise recognitional as opposed to analytical processes (Klein and Calderwood 
1991, 1018). A leading theory of Naturalistic Decision Making is Klein’s Recognition Primed 
Decision (RPD) strategy, with its inception in (Calderwood, Crandall and Klein 1987), extension in 
(Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989, Klein and Crandall 1996) and collated into a full 
description in (G. Klein 1999). Klein’s model of decision making was based on investigations of 
“the decision making strategies used by experienced personnel in operational setting, such as 
urban fire fighters, wild land fire fighters, tank platoon commanders, paramedics and design 
engineers” (Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989, 463). Klein’s research found that unlike 
traditional comparative theories the people he observed and interviewed did not make choices 
between alternatives. Rather, the decision makers acted and reacted based on “prior experience, 
planning, monitoring and modifying plans to meet specific constraints” (Klein and Calderwood 
1991, 1020). There was no consideration of an optimal choice, which was seen by the decision 
makers as potentially paralysing – the so called ‘paralysis by analysis’, rather workable actions 
were chosen. At the core of this process was the decision makers ability “to  recognise and 
appropriately classify a situation to generate a typical way of reacting” (Klein and Calderwood 
1991, 1020). These decision strategies have been described in a recognition primed decision (RPD) 
model as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Unlike the comparative methods discussed in subsection 2.2 the model proposed by Klein has 
more in common with Simon’s satisficing (1979) which seeks the first option that works as opposed 
to optimising where the best option is sought that is harder to achieve (G. Klein 1999, 20).  
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Figure 13 – Recognition Primed Decision Model (Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989, 464) 
 
The implications for the military based on this model are considerable when compared to the 
MDMP as presented in subsection 2.3.2. The MDMP and other traditional step-by-step models 
have been described by Schmitt and Klein (1999, 510) as “inconsistent with the actual strategies of 
skilled planners, and they slow down the decision cycle. As a result, the formal models are usually 
ignored in practice, in order to generate faster tempo.” From Boyd’s OODA loop as shown in 
subsection 2.3.3 any slowdown of the decision cycle is a potential weakness, hence in line with 
NCW a faster tempo is sought. There is considerable evidence in the literature to support Schmitt 
and Klein’s (1999) claim that the formal models are usually ignored in practice (McLamb 2002, 
Bushey and Forsyth 2006, Thunholm 2006).  
 
RPD has been proposed by several authors as an enabler towards a better decision making process 
within the military (Ross, et al. 2004, Schmitt and Klein 1999, Bushey and Forsyth 2006, Thunholm 
2004). In line with the stated objectives of this research to enable the developed Decision Support 
System (DSS) to be adopted most easily by the military by conforming to existing decision making 
models, the RPD will be adopted as the model of current and future military decision making for 
the purposes of this research. 
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This research has found the Military Decision Making context relates most closely to RPD Making 
which is a leading theory of Naturalistic Decision Making; hence RPD was selected as the model of 
choice for this research.  It was felt to be beyond the remit of this PhD to conduct an in depth 
survey of decision making approaches and techniques due to the scope and depth of this subject 
area. The literature survey was thus limited to differentiating between classical decision making 
theories to situate the choice of RPD in the military context of this research. 
2.5 Combat Search And Rescue Missions 
To consider how to support effective military decision making a practical application was required.  
To ensure that the research would be valuable and applicable to the SEAS DTC a military mission 
was an obvious context to use.  The majority of combat missions were deemed unsuitable by the 
researcher due to security issues, especially with access to information.  The Combat Search And 
Rescue (CSAR) mission was chosen as the initial practical application as there is a quantity of 
literature (including United States military doctrines) available within the public domain.  An 
initial review of this literature indicated that the mission involved decision making in a variety of 
situations at various levels of authority, making it suitable for this research.  CSAR is also an 
approved SEAS DTC vignette for research.  Whilst the overall outcome of the research will be 
focused on CSAR, the less specific outcomes should be valid and applicable to a number of other 
mission types.  
 
A United Kingdom focus was sought for the CSAR mission but was not possible due to the very 
limited amount of information available from the UK military. A literature search found that the 
United States made CSAR related documentation freely available. For this reason the CSAR aspect 
of this research has a distinct United States basis simply because of the unrestricted availability of 
information, particularly military doctrines. A definition for CSAR was initially sought from these 
sources and a number of definitions were found within the available literature; a small selection of 
which is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – CSAR Definitions 
Literature Definition 
Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms  
(U.S. Department Of Defense 2006) 
A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect 
the recovery of distressed personnel during war or 
military operations other than war. 
Joint Doctrine Encyclopaedia  
(U.S. Department Of Defense 1997) 
Combat Search and Rescue  CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces 
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(United States Air Force 1998, 1) to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during 
major theatre war or military operations other than 
war (MOOTW). 
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Combat Search and Rescue  
(U.S. Department Of Defense 1998) 
Combat search and rescue (CSAR) encompasses 
reporting, locating, identifying, recovering, and 
returning isolated personnel to the control of 
friendly forces in the face of actual or potential 
resistance. 
 
Note that all of these definitions have a human focus.  Due to the SEAS DTC project that this 
research supports focusing on (semi) autonomous systems (S/AS), it seemed clear that the generic 
CSAR functional model would need to orchestrate CSAR missions consisting of both human and 
platform (non-human) targets.  Therefore, the following definition was adapted from existing 
definitions for the context of this CSAR modelling work: 
 
“CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of assets isolated in hostile 
territory.” 
 
There are a set of assumptions that accompany the above definition, which are: 
• “Hostile territory” refers to an area where opposing forces have the intent and capability to 
effectively oppose or react to recovery operations and/or threaten the isolated asset. 
• The “territory” could include land, sea and littoral rescues, but space (as presently 
considered a demilitarised zone) and air (deemed unlikely) are excluded. 
• An “asset” includes humans, platforms and data. 
• “Isolated” refers to an asset when it becomes separated from its operational unit and is in 
danger of being captured. 
 
To provide further context a brief history of CSAR is now presented. 
2.5.1 A Brief History of Combat Search And Rescue 
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That Others May Live (Taylor Jr. 1967) 
 
The first known aerial rescue was conducted by the French during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 
when observation balloons airlifted some 160 wounded soldiers away from the Prussian artillery 
(Taylor Jr. 1967, 61). CSAR missions started during the Second World War when the air forces for 
both Britain and Germany started to mount dedicated missions to rescue downed air crews from 
the heavily trafficked English Channel. Britain set up a number of Air Sea Rescue (ASR) squadrons 
which were dedicated to this task. At this time of course no helicopters were in service and so all 
rescues were conducted using aircraft such as the Supermarine Walrus, the Avro Anson and the 
Westland Lysander (Evans 1999, 9). Innovations such as the use of radar helped identify survival 
dinghies at longer ranges and in poorer weather conditions than previously possible. The range of 
these rescue missions was increased by using larger planes, such as the Consolidated Catalina and 
the Short Sunderland flying boat. By the end of the Second World War the British and American 
rescue forces had recovered 5721 airmen from the seas around the UK and a further 3200 airmen 
worldwide (Morgan 2003, 21). The most important technological change for CSAR missions was 
the advent of the helicopter at the end of Second World War. Without the limitations of having to 
land to rescue personnel thanks to the ability of the helicopter to hover and the use of winches to 
load and unload, the helicopter became the favoured CSAR recovery platform. In March 1946 the 
United States of America (USA) established its own Air Rescue Service (ARS) within Air Transport 
Command to provide rescue cover for the continental USA (Evans 1999, 14, National Musueum of 
the USAF n.d.). The scope of the ARS had expanded by 1949 to cover all of the world’s transport 
routes and also included war zones which involved US or UN personnel. In 1966 the ARS was re-
designated the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS). This peace time organisation was 
transformed through necessity by the Vietnam War into a specialised combat rescue organisation. 
The ARRS crews saved 4,120 lives during Vietnam, 2,780 in combat situations (Evans 1999, 19). 
Whilst the equipment and techniques have been much improved since the Vietnam conflict the 
basic mode of operation has remained the same, with an emphasis on five key interrelated stages 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998, ix): awareness and notification, situation assessment, mission planning, 
execution and mission conclusion. 
2.5.2 An Example Combat Search And Rescue Mission 
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Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service Code (Evans 1999, 19) 
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For the benefit of the reader a brief synopsis of a CSAR mission is provided below: the 1991 rescue 
of Lt Devon Jones, an F-14 pilot downed near Baghdad, Iraq, during the Gulf War. This example is 
given as it will be used later in this thesis for a historical case study. This synopsis, culled from 
(Evans 1999, 133-136, National Museum of the USAF n.d., Pokrant 1999, 31-32) is intended to give 
the reader some insight into how CSAR missions are conducted. This was the first rescue of a 
downed airman during Operation Desert Storm. 
 
Lt Devon Jones and his Radar Intercept Officer, Lt Larry Slade, were tasked with flying their F-
14A+ Tomcat, call-sign “Slate 46”, on an armed escort mission to protect an EA-6B Prowler aircraft 
around the airfield at Al Asad, Iraq.  At 6.05am whilst returning to their base, approximately 30 
miles from Baghdad, Slate 46 was hit by a SA-2 SAM (Surface to Air Missile) and both Jones and 
Slade ejected at approximately 10,000 feet.  Slade used his AN/PRC-112 survival radio whilst 
parachuting down to call in a “mayday” to the orbiting AWACS airplane. The AN/PRC-112 
survival radio provides Army Search and Rescue (SAR) personnel with the capability to perform 
combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions of downed aircrew personnel. As Jones and Slade 
descended by parachute they were separated in the clouds and darkness and landed separately, 
some distance apart. 
 
Jones dug in and camouflaged himself. Meanwhile a MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter scrambled to 
crash site. Overhead Iraqi MiG-23 fighters appeared and were engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on 
Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP), the MiG-23’s retreat. At approximately 10:30 Jones hides 
from what he thought were enemy fighters, but which were actually the two F-15Cs on RESCAP. 
At approximately 10:30 Slade was discovered and detained by Iraqi forces. MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ 
helicopter returned to Arar to refuel, returning immediately to continue the search. The ‘Sandy’ A-
10A made contact with Jones via radio on SAR frequency. Jones guided the ‘Sandy’ A-10A to him 
and the ‘Sandy’ A-10A located him exactly using its Inertial Navigation System (INS). Iraqi MiG-
23s moved into the area and were engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on RESCAP, the MiG-23’s 
retreated. ‘Sandy’ A-10’s sanitised the area, MH-53J ‘Pave Low’, returned from refuelling, waited 
on the ground. MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ moved in to rescue Jones, and spotted an Iraqi truck en route to 
Jones’ position which was engaged by a ‘Sandy’ A-10A. MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ landed near the 
destroyed Iraqi truck, Jones broke cover and boarded the helicopter as shown in Figure 14, which 
returned to base. ‘Sandy’ A-10A’s stayed on station to assure the MH-53J’s safety. 
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Figure 14 – The Moment Lt Devon Jones is Rescued. (United States Air Force 1998, 2) 
 
With a historical example of a CSAR mission given we now consider the general characteristics of 
such missions, which is the focus of the next subsection. 
2.5.3 General Combat Search And Rescue Mission Characteristics 
The example given in the previous subsection 2.5.2 helps highlight the general characteristics of a 
CSAR mission. These characteristics are: 
• the relatively small number of dedicated CSAR systems used (four) and the comparatively 
larger system of systems within which they operated (within the military force deployed 
during the conflict).  
• the overall time constraints of the mission (the MH-53J scrambled immediately after 
notification to the crash site) 
• the short response time (four and a half hours) for an appropriate SoS to be formed (the 
“rescue package”) 
• the high level of collaboration and interoperability required between the various sub-
systems to effectively respond to the changing, unpredictable environment within which 
they were operating. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has considered decision making under uncertainty and seeks a descriptive model of 
military decision makers for which a decision support system can be developed. Two main 
decision making theories from economics are the Expected Utility Theory which states that people 
maximise utility as opposed to reward and Prospect Theory which characterises the general 
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behaviour of decision makers with the terms Loss Aversion and Diminishing Sensitivity. Both of 
these theories indicate that humans are innately irrational decision makers liable to be subject to a 
number of decision making fallacies. Note that this does not specify how the decision makers 
actually make the decision, rather it characterises the likely features of the decision made. A DSS 
would be useful to help negate these decision biases.  
 
Aware of these human limitations of decision making the next consideration was of how decisions 
are currently made within the military. The role of information was considered and its increasingly 
important role in redefining how superiority over an enemy can be defined in terms of decision 
making. This found that military decision making is typically time constrained and highly stressful 
which limit human decision making and can negate any informational advantage. A DSS which 
could alleviate these effects and maintain any informational advantage would be useful. 
 
The history of decision making in military operations was traced and the Military Decision Making 
Process and Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop were discussed. Emerging tenets such as 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and its impact on situational awareness and command and 
control were presented. NCW is not limited to technology and could be considered to be an 
emerging military response to the Information Age. The proliferation of decision makers leads to 
alternatives to the classical decision making theories. These alternatives mostly emanate from 
descriptive studies of decision making in naturalistic environments. Naturalistic Decision Making 
is the description of proficient decision making strategies that emphasise recognitional as opposed 
to analytical processes (Klein and Calderwood 1991, 1018). A leading theory of Naturalistic 
Decision Making is Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) strategy which has been selected as 
the most representative model of how military decision makers actually make decisions. This will 
be the decision making model that this research will seek to support. 
 
The particular military mission that the DSS will address is the Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) 
mission. This mission was chosen as it is a time sensitive reactive mission requiring a virtual SoS to 
be rapidly assembled to conduct the mission. With a practical application for this research 
established the next chapter considers the development of the DSS. 
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Chapter 3  
An Architecture of an Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter presents the initial development of a Decision Support System (DSS) to meet the 
requirements established in the first two chapters of this thesis. This chapter seeks to prove that a 
common set of metrics exist that can be used to compare missions to systems of systems, which 
will provide the foundation for the DSS developed in the following Chapter 4. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
This 
From the previous chapter(s): 
Research
 
 has established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of an Approach for a 
Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military Missions. This 
Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics. This set of common characteristics which includes 
Functional and Non-Functional characteristics, was used to inform the decision maker. The non-
functional characteristics were characterised by Attributes which are composed of Secondary Attributes 
which, in turn, are composed of Factors. The functional characteristics were captured in a Generic 
Functional Model for combat search and rescue missions. 
This chapter introduces: 
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Figure 15 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter 3 
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3.1 Characterising Missions and Systems 
The decision of which SoS to use for a particular CSAR mission is critical, as a poor selection or 
structuring of the SoS could result in the deployed SoS being incapable of achieving the mission 
objectives. However, CSAR missions in general cover a wide range of physical and tactical 
scenarios all of which have different objectives and hence it is necessary that any methodology 
used should allow differing levels of capability to be defined for each specific CSAR mission. This 
leads to an awareness that differing levels of capability can be defined for specific missions, which 
requires an SoS to be more than just functionally and structurally fit for a particular mission. It also 
requires the SoS to have appropriate operational characteristics, such as adaptability and 
interoperability, i.e. some of the so-called ‘ilities’. To develop the architecture for an approach for 
the DSS required to address the research problem previously outlined in section 1.3 a common set 
of characteristics is required which can be used to profile both the mission and the available SoS to 
allow them to be matched. 
 
The approach for the decision support system is to have sets of common characteristics from which 
comparative profiles for the mission and available SoS can be created that inform and support a 
decision maker, as illustrated in Figure 16. These profiles are implemented by the inputs on either 
side of the diagram in Figure 16. Note that at this stage we are seeking to list out the components of 
the approach and establish relations to the solution. The approach will be fully developed in the 
next Chapter where the architecture will be implemented. 
 
 
Figure 16 – An Initial Architecture of an Approach for a DSS 
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A profile is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Oxford English Dictionary 1989) 
 
In the context of this research a profile is specifically defined as a representation of the structured set of 
common characteristics of a mission or a system of systems. The assessment referred to in the lower box 
in Figure 16 is, at this initial stage of development, envisioned to be a comparative assessment 
allowing a proposed SoS Profile to be compared to the mission’s profiles and mismatches 
highlighted between the two. The assessment process will be refined and developed over the 
course of this chapter as the common characteristics are defined and in the next chapter when the 
architecture of the approach is realised in a prototype software tool.  
 
These common characteristics can be used to profile missions and SoS from both open and closed 
viewpoints. The implementation of the architecture of the approach for a DSS will determine the 
actual viewpoints taken which will likely be based on the practical issues of realising the 
developed DSS approach.  
 
The work in this chapter was conducted through group work with Professor Mike Woodhead, Dr 
Carys Siemieniuch, research associate Mr Nick Meese and another PhD student Mr John Cleveley. 
Professor Woodhead has extensive experience in both aerospace and defence while Dr Siemieniuch 
has extensive experience in organisational systems engineering. Subject matter experts from the 
military had been sought through the SEAS DTC but were unavailable for this exercise. The group 
work established the high level structure of the various characteristics which were then detailed by 
this PhD candidate before being reviewed and refined by the group. Three sets of common 
characteristics to profile missions and systems were identified: 
 
1. Functional (what the system needs to do). 
2. Non-Functional (the operational characteristics of the system). 
3. Physical Environment (the nature of the physical environment in which the system must 
operate). 
 
Of these characteristics the functional and non-functional were considered by the group to be the 
most important and hence the most critical to ascertain whether a common set of both existed to 
found the decision support system on. These characteristics and the approaches to each to develop 
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a common set of characteristics for each are explained in further detail over the next three 
subsections.  
3.2 Functional Characteristics 
To understand CSAR various analysis methods were used to build a visual representation of the 
mission, incorporating functional and non-functional characteristics. The foundation of this process 
was the consideration of two very different CSAR scenarios, described in the following sections. 
The scenarios were intentionally high level and non-specific to provide a wide scope for the top 
level requirements the analysis of them would produce. These scenarios were analysed in turn 
using Viewpoint Analysis (VPA) to identify stakeholders, identify key mission requirements (non-
functional requirements) and to create a functional, solution independent view of the scenario. 
VPA is described in more detail in section 3.2.3. The first scenario’s functions, generated by the 
VPA, were then associated to each other to form a functional structure using Functional Flow 
Diagrams (FFD). FFD are described in more detail in 3.2.4. This approach enabled an 
understanding, through visualisation, of how the CSAR system fitted together in terms of 
functions and their relationships. Note that while this exercise was conducted with knowledgeable 
civilians the aim was to produce a reasonable model which will later be verified against doctrine. 
 
The FFD’s were decomposed down several levels of functionality until it became apparent that the 
desired level of detail had been achieved.  This created a functional hierarchy for a CSAR mission 
with its associated non-functional constraints.  This FFD was then re-examined with the second 
scenario’s VPA to produce a second FFD encompassing both scenarios.  From this a generic CSAR 
FFD, or Generic Functional Model (GFM), was developed which is applicable to a variety of CSAR 
missions.  This was achieved by stripping out the mission specific language in each scenario to 
leave a set of generic stages which could cover multiple CSAR mission types.  The GFM is 
described in section 3.2.5. The GFM was verified functionally using available US CSAR doctrines, 
described in section 3.2.6. This entire approach along with the sections in which each stage is 
described in more detail is depicted in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 – Process Followed to Create a Generic Functional Model 
 
The two scenarios used in this process are described next. 
3.2.1 Scenario 1: Downed Airmen Behind Enemy Lines 
In this scenario a fighter aircraft has been hit by a surface to air missile over enemy territory in the 
desert. The pilot managed to eject and has landed in a hostile area. It is imperative that the pilot is 
found before she becomes captured by enemy forces and is used for propaganda purposes. A 
signal from the ejector seat beacon had been detected, limiting the initial search area to about 
10km2. The area where the ejector seat was detected was quite remote and there was unlikely to be 
any enemy forces in the immediate area until they could move troops in from nearby bases. This 
left a small time frame to rescue the pilot in before the enemy moved in. If the enemy did manage 
to quickly move a forward team into the area, it was likely to consist of lightly armoured vehicles 
and conscript soldiers. The downed aircraft had sensitive data and equipment on board that 
needed to be retrieved or destroyed. A diagram of this scenario is shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18 – Scenario 1 Map 
 
3.2.2 Scenario 2: Lost Unmanned Autonomous Vehicle 
In this scenario communication had been lost with an unmanned, autonomous water borne vehicle 
in hostile coastal waters. It was presumed that the vehicle had broken down. The vehicle’s last 
recorded position was known, but due to local currents the vehicle may well have drifted 
significantly from that position. If the vehicle was found by the enemy it could cause significant 
political problems, therefore it was important that the vehicle was either recovered or destroyed 
without being detected by hostile forces. The enemy had significant radar coverage and 
intelligence indicated that the enemy had coastal patrol boats in the vicinity. A diagram of this 
scenario is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 – Scenario 2 Map 
 
3.2.3 View Point Analysis 
View Point Analysis (VPA) is a semi-structured analysis process through which a set of functional 
and non-functional requirements can be generated (Burge and Woodhead 2006). VPA has its 
origins in software engineering and is a multi-perspective analysis which views problems from 
each of the stakeholders viewpoints. This can be done directly by consulting with the stakeholder 
or, in cases like this where they are unavailable by reconsidering the problem space from the 
identified stakeholders perspective. Identified stakeholders for the scenarios include the Rescue 
Target, Ministry of Defence, Civilians, Enemy Forces, the home nation Public (representing public 
opinion), Media, Suppliers, Friendly Forces, Coalition Members and Resistance Groups.  
 
VPA was used to brainstorm the key elements of a CSAR missions in terms of their functional and 
non-functional requirements. This approach helped to gain a holistic view of CSAR by considering 
the perspectives of each of the identified stakeholders in turn. The two CSAR example scenarios, as 
discussed previously, were used as a basis for the VPA and, due to the diverse nature of the two 
scenarios, helped produce a wide set of top level requirements. The two scenarios were 
intentionally left quite open, lacking the usual detail found in a real military operation, to help 
increase the scope of the top level requirements. The functional and non-functional requirements 
produced by the VPA were solution independent, i.e. they did not dictate how the scenario will be 
implemented in terms of equipment, but rather in terms of high-level functions such as ‘engage 
with enemy’ or ‘detect distress signal’. 
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The two scenarios were considered in turn. The first scenario’s VPA diagram is shown in Figure 20. 
Note that the Operations bubble has been removed due to space constraints on this page, the 
contents are shown in the VPA diagram for Operations in Appendix E.2. For completeness this 
diagram is also repeated in Appendix E.1 to provide a complete set in Appendix E for the reader to 
follow through.  
 
 
Figure 20 – Scenario 1 CSAR Mission Overview VPA Diagram 
 
The second scenario’s VPA diagram is shown in Figure 21. For completeness this diagram is also 
repeated in a larger form in Appendix E.2 to provide a complete set in Appendix E for the reader to 
follow through. 
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Figure 21 – Scenario 2 VPA 
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The two scenarios produced quite different VPA diagrams. Scenario one’s analysis highlighted 
many soft issues related to the downed airman, including supporting them in the field and 
counselling upon their return. Consideration was also given to the propaganda issues resulting 
from mission success (the rescue of the airman) and failure (the loss or capture of the airman by 
enemy forces). Hence a consideration was given to Maintain Image which encompassed these facets 
of propaganda. The second scenario’s VPA analysis highlighted more mechanistic considerations 
as the rescue was of an Unmanned Autonomous Vehicle (UAV), not a person. Hence the possible 
outcomes considered included recovering, repairing or even destroying the UAV. A number of key 
findings were made from the VPA of both scenarios, including: 
 
• A consideration of the wider strategic picture is required for CSAR. A CSAR mission 
cannot be considered in isolation, there are always high level constraints such as 
international agreements. 
• Common phases of CSAR were identified for both scenarios (which were later verified 
with US doctrine as described in section 3.2.6). Stripping out the mission specific language 
in each scenario left a set of generic stages which could cover multiple CSAR mission 
types. 
• The scenarios highlighted common issues for both human and platform recovery. For 
example, the requirement to repair the unmanned asset in Scenario 2 triggered an 
additional requirement to administer first aid to a human asset in Scenario 1. 
 
Six key functions were identified for undertaking a CSAR mission, these were: Setup Organisation, 
Operations, Maintain Image, Support, Counselling and Disposal. To provide a focus and some 
bounding to our work the Operations function was selected for further detailing, as this was the 
function that actually “performed” the CSAR mission. The VPA diagrams are shown in Appendix 
E, with the overview shown in Appendix E.1, the VPA for Operations in Appendix E.2 and the 
VPA diagram for the second scenario in Appendix E.3. 
3.2.4 Functional Flow Diagrams 
Functional Flow Diagrams (FFDs) are the product of a “top-down” structured functional modelling 
process and represent a system in terms of functions with inputs and outputs (Burge and 
Woodhead 2006). Producing FFDs allowed an understanding, through visualisation, of how the 
CSAR system fitted together in terms of functions and their relationships. An FFD 
diagrammatically represents functions (from the VPA) as ellipses with interlinking information 
flows. Each diagram is set at a particular functional level of the system, as determined by the 
hierarchy developed in the VPA. A functional ellipse can be explored in greater detail by creating a 
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new FFD at a functional level below it. The process of producing FFDs helps to ensure consistency 
in the flows between functions and sub-functions. The FFD at the highest functional level is called 
a context diagram, which shows the whole system and its interfaces with the environment.  The 
FFD for scenario 1 is shown in Figure 22 which depicts the overall CSAR system. Note the 
stakeholders used for the VPA are shown in the environment of the system (e.g. Civilians, Enemy 
Forces etc.). 
 
 
Figure 22 – Scenario 1 FFD Context Diagram 
 
Subject matter experts from the military had been sought through the SEAS DTC but again were 
unavailable for this exercise. Initially the FFDs for the first scenario were produced, based on the 
VPA for that scenario.  This model iteratively evolved over time as the team’s thinking matured, 
aided by the rapid methodology of FFDs.  When this first set of FFD’s was produced the team 
defined the areas of interest within the CSAR system, allowing certain functionality to be drilled-
down several levels until a desired level of detail had been achieved (e.g. for clarification of what 
was involved with a particular function).  These FFDs were then re-examined with the second 
scenario’s VPA to produce a second FFD encompassing both scenarios, the first iteration of a 
Generic Functional Model (GFM).  An example of one of the FFDs produced is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 – The Execute Action FFD (from Generic FFD Iteration 1) 
 
3.2.5 Developing a Generic Functional Model 
A generic CSAR functional flow diagram or Generic Functional Model (GFM) applicable to a 
variety of CSAR missions was developed by considering the two scenario specific functional 
models. This was achieved by stripping out the mission specific language in each scenario to leave 
a set of generic stages which could cover multiple mission types. The GFM represents the current 
understanding of CSAR and can be continued to be developed by appropriate subject matter 
experts. Whilst the model is generic at the higher common levels it should be noted that as the 
model becomes more detailed it becomes more mission specific. The FFDs generated for the 
different CSAR scenarios showed that whilst every CSAR mission is unique at the more detailed 
levels, there were clear commonalities at the higher levels of abstraction. The GFM captures these 
high level commonalities, enabling it to support the majority of CSAR missions and hence 
providing a starting point for the development of the architecture(s) to be used for a particular 
CSAR mission.  
 
Two iterations of the GFM are used for this research: the input of VPA 2 and then the verification 
against available doctrine as discussed in the next subsection. More iterations could and can be 
used, each iteration which considers another scenario will make the GFM more generic. However, 
as this is a wicked problem the GFM will never get to the “answer” only tend towards it. The GFM 
can therefore take additional information and incorporate it in an iteration, hence the GFM can be 
as good as the available knowledge allows. Note that there is no need to normalise the model after 
each iteration as it is normalised by inclusion in the GFM, no stand alone FFD for each iteration is 
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required, only an evolution of the existing GFM. The full Generic Functional Model is shown in 
Appendix F - The CSAR Generic Functional Model. 
3.2.6 Verification Of The Generic Functional Model 
Once the GFM reached a reasonable level of maturity it was verified through functional analysis 
using available Department of Defence CSAR doctrines. This involved analysing the available 
doctrines to elicit the core functionality referred to in them, including the relationships between 
them where possible. This functionality was then compared to the GFM and, where the functional 
analysis of the doctrines differed from the GFM, the GFM was updated. A summary of the key 
Joint Operations doctrines are discussed below. 
 
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue (U.S. Department Of 
Defense 1998) describes the fundamentals of multinational operations, reviews multinational 
command relationships, discusses the considerations during the planning and execution of 
multinational operations and covers operational considerations. 
 
Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (U.S Department Of Defense 1996) describes CSAR 
responsibilities and command relationships, explains CSAR procedures and methods, outlines 
coordination and planning procedures, defines CSAR intelligence and support requirements and 
details CSAR capabilities of the services and special operations forces. 
 
Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery (U.S. Department Of Defense 1996) provides general 
evasion and recovery considerations, covers the moral, legal, and operational guidelines for 
evasion and discusses the philosophy and considerations of recovery. 
 
This verification ensured that the GFM reflected the current military approach to the mission and 
incorporated what had been comprehensively tried, tested and learnt in the field. Differences 
between the GFM and literature were identified and improvements were made to the GFM to 
enhance its scope and functionality. The literature based verification was planned to be enhanced 
by consultation with subject matter experts but none were available within the research time. 
 
For the purposes of the decision support system the aim of the GFM was to provide a realistic and 
useable model of CSAR operations. By following a process of model verification through literature 
based doctrine analysis and, ultimately consultation with subject matter experts, a realistic and 
useable model was developed for use in this research.  This approach also helped ensure that there 
were no gaps in the developed model of required functionality.  In practice it was envisaged that 
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this model would be evolved as it is used by specialists and they add to or modify it as 
appropriate. The model may also evolve gradually over time as the functionality required by the 
mission shifts in response to the changing demands of warfare. Note that the iterative FFD 
approach combined with verification to the doctrine which introduced some normalisation of 
terminology means the functions identified in the VPA exercises would not necessarily map onto 
the FFDs and hence the generic functional model, which is the focus of the next section. 
3.2.7 The Generic Functional Model 
This initial stage of the research captured the functional requirements for conducting the majority 
of CSAR missions in a Generic Functional Model (GFM). This has been developed from a number 
of scenario-based case studies (including land and sea based missions) and verified using available 
doctrines. The GFM was developed by stripping out the mission specific language in each scenario 
to leave a set of generic stages which cover multiple CSAR mission types and which could be 
verified using available doctrines (U.S Department Of Defense 1996, U.S. Department Of Defense 
1996, U.S. Department Of Defense 1998, United States Air Force 1998).  US doctrines were 
considered because of their free availability in the public domain as opposed to the more restricted 
UK doctrines. The GFM represents a current understanding of CSAR missions which can be 
matured further by practitioners (Cleveley, Johnson, et al. 2007). While the model is generic at the 
higher common levels (e.g. “Execute Action”), the model becomes more detailed at the lower, more 
mission specific levels. This is illustrated in Figure 24 below. 
 
 An Architecture of an Approach for a Decision Support System   - 67 - 
 
Figure 24 – The Hierarchical Structure of the GFM (Iteration 2) 
 
The Functional Flow Diagrams generated for the different CSAR scenarios showed that whilst 
every CSAR mission is unique at the more detailed levels (as a wicked problem ought to be), there 
are clear commonalities at higher levels of abstraction. When a CSAR mission is initiated, the GFM 
can be used to identify the functions required to conduct the particular mission, noting that for a 
particular scenario some functions of the GFM may not be active. Understanding the required 
system functionality may contribute, along with military doctrine, to determining appropriate 
courses of action (COA) based around the purpose and objectives needed to complete a particular 
mission. A CSAR operation is a reactive mission, that is to say that the mission is only conducted 
when the event of someone/something going missing has occurred, which is inherently 
unpredictable. Given the nature of CSAR missions, they are generally time sensitive, requiring an 
immediate response to maintain a tactical advantage over the enemy and deny them time to 
organise and react. Whereas most military missions are planned some time in advance to a level of 
detail that allows a fair assessment of success, CSAR missions are not and once initiated by an 
event requiring a CSAR mission, are under severe time constraints. When such a mission is 
initiated it will be necessary to determine what resources (platforms, people, supplies etc.) are 
available to the CSAR organisation to conduct the mission. As stated previously, whilst the GFM 
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provides a high level picture of what is required functionally to complete the mission, it will be 
necessary to assess and detail this with respect to the demands of a particular mission. The GFM is 
used to determine whether an architecture is suitable by matching it’s functionality to that of the 
profiled GFM. Mismatches can be identified and will help inform the decision maker of the 
suitability of that architecture to conduct the mission. 
3.2.8 Architecting Functional Characteristics into an Approach for a DSS 
With a GFM developed which can be used to profile both missions and available SoS a 
consideration was given as to how it could be utilised in the overall concept of the architecture of 
an approach for a DSS as outlined previously in Figure 16. While the initial architecture used only 
processes it is now necessary to include inputs, outputs and components. Inputs and outputs are self 
explanatory and indicate the inputs and outputs of the architecture of an approach for a DSS. The 
components are data stores developed in this research which capture the generic characteristics of 
the missions and SoS and are used by the approach for a DSS to rapidly create specific 
characteristic profiles for particular missions and SoS. The first component developed was the 
GFM. The updated architecture of an approach for a DSS which utilises the developed GFM is 
shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS Utilising a GFM 
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still necessary to consider the entire system of systems contribution. This is of particular 
importance when dealing with emergent properties. 
 
Various authors have identified individual ‘ilities’ (Rhodes 2006) and their importance for SoS 
engineering (Saunders, et al. 2005). Whilst the ‘ilities’ have gained widespread acceptance there 
appears to be no current universally accepted set or list of definitions for them (McManus, et al. 
2007). The ‘ilities’ are not useable in their current form for performing an assessment of system 
architectures or mission requirements in general applications; instead they must be specifically 
understood for each application. A more structured, coherent and defined set of measurable 
attributes are required to characterise systems for evaluation purposes. In this research an 
approach has been adopted which enables these characteristics to be assessed in a structured way. 
This approach moves away, in most cases, from using the ‘ilities’ directly (since they are usually 
difficult or impossible to measure directly) and, instead, utilises more measurable secondary 
attributes and factors to characterise the attributes, as shown in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Relationship of Terms 
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To develop list of system attributes the VPA and FFDs of the two CSAR missions presented in 
section 3.2 and the developed GFM were studied. Careful consideration was given to the non-
functional characteristics placed on the system conducting the mission and what might influence 
or affect the importance of these characteristics for a particular mission. This exercise produced an 
initial set of attributes, secondary attributes and factors which were refined over the course of 
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further research. Further refinement of these lists was achieved through a consideration of the 
relationships between Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors. Note that this set has been 
developed specifically for CSAR missions and are believed to be the most influential attributes, 
secondary attributes and factors for this type of mission. A universal set could be developed using 
this framework, allowing common understanding between mission threads and system 
capabilities. However, this research has bounded its focus to that of CSAR mission only and hence 
the sample set developed is relatively small with 12 Attributes, 29 Secondary Attributes and 48 
Factors. The sets of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors presented, whilst usable for CSAR 
missions, are not the definitive correct answer and the framework developed could be used by the 
systems engineering community collectively to clarify, define and evolve the naming, definitions 
and relationships of the characteristics. The full proposed set of 12 system attributes and 
descriptions as developed through the group work is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – A Proposed Attribute Set 
Attribute Name Attribute Description 
Adaptability The ability of a system to change how it functions (allocation of functions) and 
what it does (what functions it executes) in response to the environment. 
Availability The ability to provide a particular functional level for the majority of time. 
Co-operability The ability to engage in co-operative behaviour in a team, e.g. by information 
sharing and mutual support. 
Credibility The impression created by a system of its intent to follow through on its 
actions. 
Decision Making 
Superiority 
The ability to make the right decision at the right time. 
Deployability The ability to get "on station" at the required functional level. 
Effectiveness The ability to do something effectively and properly, to deliver the required 
effect. 
Flexibility The allocation of functions within a system. 
Interoperability The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 
Orientability The ability to comprehend the environment. 
Survivability The ability to function during and after a natural or man-made disturbance. 
Sustainability The ability to deliver a level of performance despite any interference. 
 
An attribute is defined for the purposes of this research as a high-level system characteristic. As 
stated previously, an attribute is not normally measurable directly. These attributes are, therefore, 
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to be represented in terms of a set of relevant secondary attributes and, consequently, can be 
measured through the interpretation of appropriate secondary attributes and their contributing 
factors. Secondary attributes are normally measured through the interpretation of a subset of factors, 
but can be measured directly when they have no contributing factors. The relationship between an 
attribute and the relevant secondary attributes and factors is illustrated in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27 – Representation of an Attribute 
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Support System to be shown in Chapter 6. An example of the decomposition of Adaptability into 
one secondary attribute and its underlying factors is shown in Figure 28.  
 
 
Figure 28 – Decomposition of Adaptability Attribute 
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An example set of proposed secondary attributes for the Effectiveness attribute is shown in Table 3, 
this is followed by a description of some of the measurable factors for these secondary attributes in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 3 – Some Proposed Secondary Attributes for Effectiveness 
Secondary 
Attribute Name 
Secondary Attribute Description 
Accessibility The quality of being at hand when needed. 
Configurability The ability of a system to change its functionality through the rearrangement 
of its parts. 
Dependability The ability of a system to be relied upon or trusted by other systems. 
Integrity The wholeness of the system, everything within the system has a role or 
purpose and all inputs and outputs have somewhere to go - no internal 
conflicts. 
Lethality The ability to kill. 
Mobility The ability of a system to deliver an effect/output somewhere else (reach). 
Predictability The ability of a system to consistently produce the same expected results. 
Timeliness The ability to functionally achieve something within a predetermined or 
favourable timeframe. 
Usability How usable the system is by the operators within it (who are likely to have 
been trained/specialists) including recovery from errors.  This does not imply 
simplicity. 
Processing 
capability 
The ability to process incoming knowledge, information/data effectively, 
efficiently and in a timely manner, to reach conclusions regardless of the state 
of the information/data. 
 
Sometimes a secondary attribute is measurable itself, but more often than not it must be evaluated 
through the interpretation of measurable hard (technical) and soft (human/organisational) factors 
which are defined for the purposes of this research as low-level characteristics or properties of a 
system. A number of factors can be considered to contribute to a representation of a secondary 
attribute, as shown in Figure 27. Many of these relevant factors relate to ‘soft’ issues which are not 
necessarily objectively measurable but for which rational subjective judgement can be applied 
using, for example, the Soft Factors Modelling Tool (SFMT) that was developed in the overall SEAS 
DTC research project that this thesis contributes to (Hodgson and Siemieniuch 2009). The SFMT 
focuses on the impact of soft factors relating to cultural values on communicating and 
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implementing decisions and is described in more detail in Siemieniuch and Sinclair (2006). It 
should be emphasised that the DSS approach does not differentiate ‘soft’ from ‘hard’ issues – 
rather it recognises that the various attributes can be affected by factors from across the whole 
soft/hard spectrum. A small sample of proposed factors is shown below in Table 4 for the Mobility 
secondary attribute. Each factor can contribute, of course, to the evaluation of a number of 
secondary attributes (as shown previously in Figure 27). 
 
Table 4 – Some Proposed Factors 
Factor Name Factor Description 
Footprint The physical size and weight of the system. 
Endurance The time and distance a system can operate for on its own resources. 
Range The range at which the system can deliver effects/outputs. 
 
The full set of developed Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors are presented in Appendix 
G. 
3.3.2 Architecting Non-Functional Characteristics into an Approach for a 
DSS 
With a set of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors developed which can be used to profile 
both missions and available SoS a consideration was given as to how it could be utilised in the 
overall concept of the architecture of an approach for a DSS as outlined previously in Figure 25. An 
architecture utilising the second component identified (the developed set of attributes, secondary 
attributes and factors) was created as illustrated in Figure 29.  
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Figure 29 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS Utilising Attributes 
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captures this knowledge and allows it to be compared to the mission’s physical environment 
requirements. 
 
Table 5 – Overview of the Physical Environment Characteristics 
Characteristic Description 
Climate The type of climate the mission will be 
conducted in as according to the Köppen 
climate classification (Kottek, et al. 2006). 
Environment The type of operating environment the 
mission will be conducted in, e.g. Land, 
Sea, Air, etc. 
Predictability An indication of how likely the situation is 
to change over the course of the mission. 
Strategic Purpose The overall strategic purpose of the 
mission, e.g. offensive, defensive, 
operations other than war. 
Political Environment An indication of the hostility of the local 
populace to friendly forces and the political 
stability of the area where the mission will 
be conducted. 
 
The full set of physical environment characteristics are shown in Appendix H. 
3.4.1 Architecting Physical Environment Characteristics into an Approach 
for a DSS 
With a set of physical environment characteristics developed which can be used to profile both 
missions and available SoS a consideration was given as to how it could be utilised in the overall 
concept of the architecture of an approach for a DSS as outlined previously in Figure 29. An 
architecture utilising the third component identified (the developed set of physical environment 
characteristics) was created as illustrated in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS Utilising Common Characteristics 
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characteristics to support the decision maker in the choice of which system to use for a particular 
CSAR mission. 
3.5 An Architecture of an Approach for a Decision Support 
System 
The Decision Support System (DSS) methodology was developed by defining a generic functional 
model for CSAR missions as reported in the previous section: this established the generic 
functional characteristics that a CSAR mission is likely to require. Separately the non-functional 
characteristics were considered and a generic set of attributes, secondary attributes and factors was 
devised. A simple method was envisioned to allow these generic sets to be re-profiled to a 
particular mission by weighting the generic set elements which would allow unimportant 
characteristics to be disregarded by a zero or not applicable weighting. This will be discussed in the 
implementation of the approach in the next Chapter 4. 
 
At any time, some given resources or systems are made available to carry out a particular CSAR 
mission. These systems (human and technical) may or may not have the inherent skills and 
competencies needed to carry out the specific mission. For a given CSAR mission various 
combinations of systems can be brought together to form a SoS to carry out that mission. In order 
to assess the suitability of the available SoS alternatives, they can be assessed in terms of the same 
characteristics as used for the mission. These characteristics may be given priority weightings to 
recognise their relative importance within specific missions. The basic mission requirements and 
objectives are captured and used to profile the mission in terms of required functional, non-
functional and physical environment requirements. The mission’s functional characteristics are 
ascertained by weighting the developed generic functional model in terms of the mission 
requirements and objectives. The mission’s non-functional characteristics are captured by 
weighting the developed set of attributes, secondary attributes and factors in terms of the 
characteristics needed to achieve the mission requirements and objectives. The physical 
environment characteristics are identified by weighting the developed set of physical environment 
characteristics. 
 
Available SoS which could be used are profiled against the generic functional model, the set of 
attributes, secondary attributes and factors and the physical environment characteristics. The 
available SoS are then simply matched to the mission in terms of functional, non-functional and 
physical environment characteristics. The functional and non-functional perspectives of the 
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potential system of systems provide a capability overview of each to the decision makers, allowing 
them to compare the alternative system of systems against the mission needs. 
 
The developed approach is compatible with the Recognition Primed Decision Model identified 
previously in section 2.4, shown again in Figure 31. It supports the situation by allowing the 
decision maker to quickly profile the mission against generic models of that mission helping to 
identify oversights and errors. The main support is given to the will it work? question as the actions, 
expressed as SoS, can be directly assessed against the situation (mission). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 – Recognition Primed Decision Model (Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989, 464) 
 
The developed approach can be used from either an open or closed viewpoint. The viewpoint 
taken is dependent on the method of implementation and this will be discussed in the next Chapter 
4. An overview of the architecture of an approach to developing a DSS is shown in Figure 32 with 
the components developed in this chapter shaded. 
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Figure 32 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS Utilising Environment Characteristics 
 
Note that the assessment produced by the approach shown in Figure 32 may indicate that the 
available systems cannot be combined to complete the mission. Whilst this evaluation process will 
not give guarantee of success it will show whether a system is functionally and non-functionally 
suited to the characteristics of the mission and capable of operating in the mission’s physical 
environment. It is likely that, during a specific mission, circumstances may change or objectives 
may be altered. The outlined approach can be used at any stage of the mission, from pre-mission 
System of Systems Mission 
Attributes 
Secondary Attributes 
Factors 
Capture basic mission 
requirements and 
objectives 
(input) 
Identify available 
system of systems 
(input) 
Generic Functional 
Model 
Physical Environment 
Characteristics 
Profile available system 
of systems against 
Generic Functional 
Model 
Profile available system 
of systems against 
Attributes etc. 
Profile available system 
of systems against 
Physical Environment 
Characteristics 
Profile mission against 
Generic Functional 
Model 
Profile mission against 
Attributes, Secondary 
Attributes and Factors 
Profile mission against 
Physical Environment 
Characteristics 
Assessment of profile 
match using common 
characteristics 
 (output) 
Legend 
Process Component Input/output    
 An Architecture of an Approach for a Decision Support System   - 81 - 
planning to mission completion and post-mission evaluation, to assess the available SoS and 
identify alternative SoS to accommodate changes in circumstances or mission objectives. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the development of an architecture of an approach for a decision 
support system. This approach utilised common sets of characteristics to profile missions and 
available SoS to create comparative profiles to support the decision maker. Three key common sets 
of characteristics were identified for a decision support system: functional, non-functional and 
physical environment. These common sets were developed as no existing sets were identified. The 
functional characteristics were captured using Viewpoint Analysis and Functional Flow Diagram 
techniques to develop a Generic Functional Model which captures the functionality required to 
conduct the majority of combat search and rescue missions. The non-functional characteristics were 
identified in the literature as the ilities but no current universally accepted set of list of definitions 
could be found for them. The ilities were also unusable in their current form as they are generally 
defined for specific applications as opposed to the more abstract and commonly usable definitions 
sought for this research. They are also difficult to measure directly due to their scope. To address 
these issues a hierarchical set of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors were defined which 
can be used to profile both missions and available SoS. The Physical Environment characteristics 
were identified as important as the systems considered to conduct a mission must be capable of 
operating in the mission’s environment. A broad set of physical environment characteristics were 
identified to fulfil this need. 
 
With three common sets of characteristics identified an architecture of an approach for a decision 
support system was presented that can support the RPD model of decision making identified in 
Chapter 3 as the most representative model of how military decision makers actually make 
decisions. The next chapter will consider the implementation of this architecture of an approach for 
a decision support system. 
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Chapter 4  
Implementing an Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter outlines the prototype tool developed as an implementation of the research presented 
in the previous Chapter 3. The implementation is discussed and how the missions and systems are 
profiled is detailed. With the profiles established the method of assessment of SoS profiles against 
mission profiles is presented. A set of case studies is conducted using the developed decision 
support system and the results are reported. Finally the case studies are evaluated and the 
approach reassessed in light of these findings. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
This 
From the previous chapter(s): 
Research
 
 established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of a Parametric 
Approach for a Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military 
Missions. This Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics. This set of common characteristics which includes 
Functional and Non-Functional characteristics, was used to inform the decision maker. The non-
functional characteristics were characterised by Attributes which are composed of Secondary Attributes 
which, in turn, are composed of Factors. The functional characteristics were captured in a Generic 
Functional Model for combat search and rescue missions. 
  
The architecture has been implemented in a Software Tool. The software tool was used to conduct a set of 
literature based Case Studies of the application of this research (combat search and rescue) and the results 
evaluated. 
This chapter introduces: 
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Figure 33 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Four 
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4.1 Implementation Introduction 
As stated in previous chapters, the purpose of this research is to move beyond rigidly structured 
decision making processes that are isolated from the environment towards a dynamic, informed 
and usable approach that aids decision makers and allows system knowledge to be cumulatively 
acquired through use. The tool is a decision aid, it does not dictate to the decision maker which SoS 
to use nor does it indicate any likelihood of mission success. The tool advises the decision maker of 
potential problems with the SoS in terms of the mission’s demands that they may have not 
identified. This decision aid addresses two main problems faced by decision makers. First the tool 
addresses any lack of understanding of the systems in terms of configuration or capability changes. 
Secondly the tool provides an open viewpoint of the problem which negates the closed viewpoint 
of the overall Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model. The RPD was introduced in section 2.4 as 
the most representational model of how military decision makers actually make decisions. In the 
RPD model the decision maker chooses a solution based on previous experience which is a closed 
viewpoint. Hence the open viewpoint that this implementation aims to provide will provide a 
second opinion from another viewpoint to the decision maker. An initial architecture of an 
approach for a DSS utilising commons sets of functional and non-functional characteristics was 
developed in the previous Chapter 3. This chapter aims to realise this architecture in a prototype 
software tool. 
 
Three main aims were set to be achieved by developing this first prototype software tool: 
1. Feasibility - demonstrate that the developed DSS architecture could be implemented in a 
software tool. 
2. Validation - perform a set of historical case studies utilising the developed prototype 
software tool. 
3. Guide - guide the further development of the architecture of an approach for a DSS. 
 
We start by considering the architectural implications of implementing the developed approach. 
4.2 Developing a Prototype Decision Support System Software 
Tool 
The developed architecture for the DSS is shown in Figure 34. This considers only the SoS, not how 
they are assembled or the component systems. From an implementation perspective the developed 
architecture presents a problem in that it requires the SoS to be considered as a whole to be profiled 
by the developed sets of common characteristics. Considering the whole allows an open viewpoint 
to be taken on the SoS, but in practical terms this is difficult to realise as the developed sets of 
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characteristics must be assessed for each SoS individually. If the characteristics could be assessed at 
the system level and then combined to the chosen SoS configuration then only the systems would 
need to be profiled, not the more numerous potential SoS combinations. 
 
 
Figure 34 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS: Profiling the SoS 
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4.2.1 Shifting from the SoS to the Systems Viewpoint 
It was recognised that it would be much faster and more practical to assess systems individually 
and then somehow combine their measurements into SoS options.  This has the advantage that 
only systems need to be characterised, not the more complex whole SoS.  If a satisfactory way were 
found to combine system measures into SoS it would also allow all possible SoS combinations to be 
considered from a base set of available systems, as illustrated in Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35 – An Architecture of an Approach for a DSS: Profiling Systems 
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This architecture shown in Figure 35 is a closed reductionist approach as opposed to the needed 
open viewpoint required by the research. The individual assessment of systems leading to a 
holistic SoS is a closed reductionist approach as it considers each system in isolation and then 
amalgamates the combined measures via a simple mechanism. This mechanism simply checks that 
at least one of the component systems can achieve the required mission characteristic. This 
mechanism is detailed in subsection 4.2.4. The open properties of the system are not considered 
such that the resultant SoS is the sum of the whole, no less and no greater. However, as a starting 
point to consider a decision support system this will suffice to set the stage for later development 
work which can address a more open approach. This first prototype software tool will develop the 
characterisation approach to match missions and systems using common metrics. The feasibility 
can be tested using a closed viewpoint DSS. Once the feasibility of this approach has been 
established approaches can be investigated to allow both open and closed viewpoints on the 
metrics established in the initial prototype software tool and tested against the case studies 
previously utilised. 
4.2.2 Prototype Software Tool Implementation 
The prototype software tool was required to implement the architecture shown in Figure 35 and 
allow profiling of a mission and up to four systems against the developed sets of common 
functional, non-functional and physical environment characteristics. The prototype software would 
also need to automate the collection of systems into possible SoS combinations and generate the 
combined characteristics for each. 
 
As the prototype software tool would need to handle a lot of tabular data (as the common 
characteristics were expressed in this way) the Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet software package 
was selected to implement the tool. The developed DSS provides a structured software interface to 
input, record and compare profiles of system of systems options against mission requirements. The 
following process is followed by the user to use the prototype software tool: 
 
• A cover sheet is completed detailing the mission and outlining the actual sequence of 
events if a historical case study. 
• Mission requirements are profiled against a standard set of Functional, Non-Functional 
and Physical Environment metrics 
• Mission requirements are measured against the profiled set of Functional, Non-Functional 
and Physical Environment metrics 
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• Measurement is made of up to four systems (a limitation of the prototype tool’s 
implementation) against profiled Functional, Non-Functional and Physical Environment 
characteristics. 
 
Once the user has completed the following steps above the prototype software tool automatically: 
• Indicates a simple pass/fail status for each characteristic determined by mismatch between 
mission and system profiles 
• Generates all possible SoS combinations and highlighting of failures against mission 
requirements 
 
In the prototype software tool the mission/asset measurements are done on separate worksheets in 
Microsoft® Excel® and a final worksheet presents an overview of all the system characteristics and 
all of the system of systems pass/fail indicators in a matrix layout. The decision maker can then 
compare the two overviews and hence assess SoS against the particular mission. Throughout the 
workflow the developed prototype tool highlights mismatches between the mission requirements 
and the assets/systems and it is left to the decision maker to assess the impact of each mismatch. 
This approach is in concordance with Rittle and Webbers (1973) definition of wicked problems in 
that “solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad” (see Appendix A for the 
full definition of wicked problems). The next subsection considers the profiling of the mission and 
systems in more detail. 
4.2.3 Profiling Missions and Systems in the Prototype Software Tool 
In the context of this research a profile is specifically defined as a representation of the structured set of 
common characteristics of a mission or a system of systems, as previously defined in section 3.1. 
Profiling of missions and systems in the prototype software tool is achieved by the user 
customising the value of the characteristics for each mission to a simple comparative such as 
true/false or high/low as appropriate. Unimportant characteristics are removed from consideration 
by the user setting their value to n/a (not applicable), which will grey out the characteristic across 
the systems and system of systems. These measures are greyed out as opposed to hidden as they 
may be used by the decision maker if two systems are equally suitable to conduct the mission 
according to the other characteristics. The mission is profiled first and then the available systems. 
As the mission has been profiled first feedback can be given to the system profile as to how it 
matches the mission’s profile. This is achieved through conjunction of the two profile measures of a 
particular characteristic (a logical AND). Note that the mission may have negatives against certain 
characteristics as the characteristic sets developed are considered broad enough to cover the 
majority of CSAR missions, hence it’s unlikely that a particular CSAR mission will require all of the 
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characteristics. If the mission’s profile has a negative against a function and the system does as well 
then that is a pass as the two values match. This can be seen in an example of a functional profile 
input shown in Table 6 for a MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ Helicopter, one of the systems profiled for case 
study two later in section 4.3.2. 
 
Table 6 – Example of a Profile of Systems and Mission Against GFM 
 
Name MH-53J 'Pave Low' Helicopter 
Basic 
Configuration 
Huey Helicopter, Pilot, Co-Pilot/Navigator, Crew Chief, Medic 
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1 
Detect distress 
call 1.1 Receive distress call N fail 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N fail 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N fail 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt N fail 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N pass 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N pass 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N pass 
3 
Planning & 
Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y pass 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y pass 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N fail 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N pass 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y pass 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y pass 
  
4.2 Ingress Y pass 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y pass 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N fail 
  
4.5 Egress Y pass 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians Y pass 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target Y pass 
  
4.8 Sustain assets Y pass 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y pass 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y pass 
  
5.3 Make decision Y pass 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y pass 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N pass 
  
6.2 Debrief team N pass 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N pass 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N pass 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N pass 
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A similar input panel is completed for each system and for the non-functional (attributes, 
secondary attributes and factors) and physical environment characteristics as well, as can be seen 
in the following section 4.3. This approach allows a catalogue of systems to be created which can be 
quickly pulled into SoS configurations without needing to re-profile them in terms of the reduced 
set of characteristics that the mission is being measured with. 
4.2.4 Method of Assessment of SoS Profiles Against Mission Profiles 
With the method of inputting data to the tool described in the previous section 4.2.3 this section 
describes the assessment of SoS profiles against mission profiles. The assessment was envisioned to 
be a comparative assessment allowing a proposed SoS Profile to be compared to the mission’s 
profiles and mismatches highlighted between the two as described previously in section 3.1. In the 
developed approach the assessment of a SoS to conduct a particular mission is driven by sets of 
common characteristics that are unrelated parameters. This section describes the realisation of this 
process. To start with we consider the assessment of individual systems. 
 
The systems profile output is shown in Table 7. The table shows two FFD levels of functions from 
the GFM. The mission is profiled against each of these functions. The requirement of the function 
in order to complete the particular mission is indicated by a simple Y/N (Yes/No). If the function is 
not required the measure is greyed as it is not required by the mission and hence the available 
systems ability or inability to fulfil that function is not considered important. If the function is 
required the box is highlighted in green to emphasise its requirement and aid comparison against 
the individual systems. The individual systems are each profiled in the next columns starting with 
the MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ Helicopter. The profile is directly imported from the inputs as shown 
previously in Table 6. If the system can perform the function then it is highlighted in green, if not 
in red to aid comparative evaluation by the decision maker. Note that the functional profile is 
shown for illustrative purposes and additional profiles would be completed for the non-functional 
and physical environment characteristic sets. 
 
To enable the assessment of SoS profiles against a mission profile the individual system profiles 
must be combined into SoS profiles. The formation of SoS from individual systems is achieved 
through logical disjunction (OR) for each characteristic. Hence, if one of the component systems of 
an SoS achieves the characteristic state required by the mission then the SoS is considered to 
achieve that characteristic (even if the other component systems do not). The developed software 
tool is therefore a framework and algorithm for SoS generation from a set of available systems.  
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Table 7 - Example of a Summary Profile of Systems and Mission Against the GFM 
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1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y N N Y N 
  1.2 Collate distress information Y N N Y Y 
  1.3 Validate distress information Y N N Y Y 
  1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y N N Y N 
2 Collaborate with coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N N N N Y 
  2.2 Transfer knowledge N N N N Y 
  2.3 Negotiate assistance N N N N Y 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.2 Plan rescue Y Y N N Y 
  3.3 Select appropriate resources Y N N N Y 
  3.4 Prepare resources N N N N N 
  3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y Y Y Y Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y Y Y Y N 
  4.2 Ingress Y Y Y Y N 
  4.3 Locate rescue target Y Y Y Y N 
  4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y N Y Y N 
  4.5 Egress Y Y Y Y N 
  4.6 Deal with civilians Y Y N N N 
  4.7 Deal with rescue target Y Y N N N 
  4.8 Sustain assets Y Y N N N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.2 Monitor progress Y Y N Y Y 
  5.3 Make decision Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.4 Disseminate information Y Y Y Y Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N N N N N 
  6.2 Debrief team N N N N N 
  6.3 Evaluate mission performance N N N N N 
  6.4 Generate lessons learnt N N N N N 
  6.5 Recommend doctrine update N N N N N 
 
To consider if an SoS is suitable the three sets of characteristics (functional, non-functional and 
physical environment) are combined using logical conjunction (AND). Hence if the SoS matches 
the missions requirements for each characteristic then it is deemed suitable. An example of the SoS 
profile output of the tool is shown in Table 8. This shows only the functional profile for illustration 
proposes, additional profiles for the non-functional and physical environment characteristics 
would also be completed, as can be seen in the case studies in the following section 4.3. 
 
 Implementing an Approach for a Decision Support System   - 92 - 
Table 8 - Example of a Summary Profile of SoS and Mission Against the GFM 
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1 Detect 
distress call 
1.1 Receive distress 
call Y FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
  1.2 Collate distress 
information Y FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  1.3 Validate distress 
information Y FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  1.4 Acknowledge 
receipt Y FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
2 Collaborate 
with coalition 
2.1 Vet information 
for security N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  2.2 Transfer 
knowledge N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  2.3 Negotiate 
assistance N N N N N N N N N N N N 
3 Planning & 
Adapting 
3.1 Assess situation Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.2 Plan rescue Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.3 Select 
appropriate 
resources 
Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.4 Prepare 
resources N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  3.5 Conform to the 
laws of war Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
4 Execute 
Action 
4.1 Navigate Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.2 Ingress Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.3 Locate rescue 
target Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.4 Deal with hostile 
forces Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y 
  4.5 Egress Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.6 Deal with 
civilians Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
  4.7 Deal with rescue 
target Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
  4.8 Sustain assets Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
5 Command 5.1 Gather 
information Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.2 Monitor progress Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.3 Make decision Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.4 Disseminate 
information Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
6 Assess 
Mission 
6.1 Debrief rescued 
asset N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.2 Debrief team N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.3 Evaluate mission 
performance N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.4 Generate lessons 
learnt N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.5 Recommend 
doctrine update N N N N N N N N N N N N 
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The next section considers two historical case studies conducted with the developed software tool. 
4.3 Case Studies 
The developed architecture of an approach for a DSS is shown again in Figure 36. The last few 
subsections have detailed the implementation of this architecture in a software tool. This section 
discusses two historical case studies which were conducted using the developed software tool. 
Each case study followed the approach outlined in Figure 36 with the mission and available 
systems profiled against the developed standard sets of Functional, Non-Functional and Physical 
Environment characteristics. The final output was an assessment of the mission and SoS profile 
match. This assessment will showed the suitability or otherwise of the available SoS configurations. 
Comparing this suitability to the actual SoS used in the mission helps to validate the utility of this 
tool in addressing the overall research problem. 
 
Conducting the case studies with the developed software tool will demonstrate the feasibility of 
the approach and the success of its implementation in a software tool. Each case study will 
demonstrate the validity of the approach and serve as a guide to future development within this 
research. In addition the case studies will seek to demonstrate the profiling of missions and 
systems using common sets of characteristics, the formation of SoS profiles from the system 
profiles, the matching of mission and SoS profiles and the overall utility and value of the output of 
this exercise to a military decision maker. These will be addressed in the summary of the case 
studies in subsection 4.4. 
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Figure 36 – Implemented Architecture of an Approach for a DSS 
 
Two CSAR case studies were chosen for analysis, which were based on eyewitness accounts and 
statements. The first case study follows the 1971 rescue of a downed Navy Seawolf helicopter crew 
near Tra Vinh, Vietnam, during the Vietnam War (Evans 1999). The second case study concerned 
the 1991 rescue of Lt Devon Jones, an F-14 pilot downed near Baghdad, during the Gulf War 
(Evans 1999). For each case study the general background to the mission was noted, the sequence 
of key events was established and the key systems used identified. The systems used in the mission 
were profiled and compared to the mission’s requirements.  The systems were compiled into all the 
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possible system of systems combinations and each combination was assessed against the mission’s 
requirements using the implemented approach shown previously in Figure 35. The following two 
subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 discuss case study one and two respectively. 
4.3.1 Case Study One – Seawolf CSAR in Vietnam 
This subsection is supported by Appendix I and considers a historical CSAR rescue based in the 
Tra Vinh area of Vietnam, during the Vietnam War (Evans 1999, 75), a brief synopsis of which 
follows. 
4.3.1.1 Case Study One Narrative 
On the 3rd December 1971 a Navy Seawolf helicopter was hit by enemy fire and went down near 
Tra Vinh. A mayday call from this helicopter was received by ‘Paddy Control’, the US Air Force 
controllers who provided the majority of radar coverage for the Delta. Paddy Control contacted 
‘Dustoff Operations’, the operational command of US aero-medical evacuation missions in 
Vietnam, with an emergency CSAR mission. Captain David Freeman, a Dustoff pilot from the 57th 
Medical Detachment, scrambled immediately. It took 15 minutes for Captain Freeman to reach the 
last known radar coordinates of the Seawolf and he was vectored there by Paddy Control. Not 
knowing the status of the Seawolf’s crew and the tactical situation on the ground Captain Freeman 
flew a search pattern and the crew performed a visual search. After a couple of minutes searching 
the crew chief located the wreckage of the Seawolf which had crashed in a large open area. This 
was a tactically bad situation for the crew as they were easily visible and had little cover. Four 
airmen were identified using their personal weapons to defend the crashed Seawolf’s position 
from a squad of Vietcong. As Freeman passed overhead of the crash site he received a call on his 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio from another Seawolf which was en route to their location. The 
Seawolf gave his Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) as 5 minutes but, upon hearing Freemans 
explanation of the situation on the ground, made it 3 minutes. The best course of action had been 
decided upon by the Dustoff crew and the Dustoff landed behind the downed Seawolf which 
would act as cover. As the downed Seawolf crew broke cover and ran to the waiting Dustoff the 
supporting Seawolf arrived on station and engaged the Vietcong with its arsenal of guns and 
rockets. As the Vietcong went to ground the downed Seawolf crew boarded the Dustoff which 
exited unscathed from the way it had approached. (Evans 1999, 75-76) 
 
This historical rescue has been chosen due to the highly reactive, dynamic nature of the rescue 
operation. Taking the Dustoff Huey helicopter working with Dustoff Operations and Paddy 
Control as the starting SoS for the mission it quickly evolves to incorporate the flying Seawolf that 
provided the much needed support at the end of the mission. This case study was conducted using 
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the implemented approach described previously in this chapter and sought to understand the 
implications of the various SoS configurations against mission requirements. The step by step 
events of the historical case study are presented in Appendix I.1, Sequence of Events.  
4.3.1.2 Case Study One Functional Profile 
The full set of functional profiles are presented in Appendix I.2. The functional profiles have been 
taken from the developed GFM. The four systems profiled for this case study are: 
 
• A rescue configuration Huey helicopter (functionally profiled in Appendix I.2.1) 
• An attack configuration Huey helicopter (functionally profiled in Appendix I.2.2) 
• Air Force Controller (functionally profiled in Appendix I.2.3) 
• 57th Medical Attachment Controllers (functionally profiled in Appendix I.2.4) 
 
These systems were profiled by the researcher based on available information. A subject matter 
expert was sought to aid with this process but none were available through the SEAS DTC. Note 
that due to the specialised nature of this research the number of suitably qualified subject matter 
experts is very limited and hence approaching the SEAS DTC was the only available potential 
point of access to them. 
 
The profiled systems were combined into all possible SoS configurations, as shown in the 
functional matrix against the missions functional profile in Appendix I.2.5, Functional Profile – 
Forming Systems. The systems were combined simplistically by indicating a ‘pass’ against the 
various metrics if at least one of the component systems passed. As described previously in section 
4.2.3 no consideration was given in the tool to the cumulative effect of multiple systems with 
different attributes. 
 
The various SoS configurations assessed showed that only the combination of the rescue Huey 
(Dustoff), the attack Huey (Seawolf), the Air Force Controllers (Paddy Control) and the 57th 
Medical Attachment Controller (Dustoff Operations) provided all of the functionality that the 
mission required. Whilst simplistic the pass/fail indication of the assessment gave a clear view of 
the potential functionality gaps of a subset of this SoS. It is left to the decision maker to determine 
the impact of the missing functionality for the missions. For example, if a critical function such as 
4.7 deal with rescue target was absent (which would prevent the SoS from actually rescuing the 
downed personnel) this would be an unacceptable SoS to use for the mission. However, if an 
alternative had for example the function 1.4 acknowledge receipt absent from its profile the decision 
maker may decide to still go with this SoS over the previous example.  Down selection could be 
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improved by applying filters to critical functionality and hence discounting those SoS 
configurations which were missing them. 
4.3.1.3 Case Study One Non-Functional Profile 
The profile of the mission against the Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors and the 
individual systems and SoS configurations are shown in Appendix I.3. The research to date had 
established an initial set of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors, as shown in Appendix G. 
No methodology has been established at this stage of how to combine the various measures of the 
Factors into Secondary Attributes and again how to combine these into Attributes. For this early 
implementation a simple approach was taken whereby the hierarchy would be shown but the 
measures would only be applied at the Factor level. The decision maker would then be able to see 
any mismatches at the Factor level and to which Secondary Attributes/Attributes they contributed. 
The issue of how to combine factors up into secondary attributes and attributes would be a focus of 
the next stage of the research. Again the assessment of the mission and systems against the factors 
was conducted by the researcher as no SMEs were available to support this activity. Whilst the 
accuracy of the measures can therefore be questioned it is important to emphasise that the value of 
this research was showing that the approach developed was usable and informative, albeit subject 
to the quality of the input data. 
4.3.1.4 Case Study One Physical Environment Profile 
The profile of the mission against the physical environment and the individual systems and SoS 
configurations are shown in Appendix I.4. The mission was profiled against this established set of 
metrics to ascertain whether the mission would require the systems to operate in those conditions. 
The systems were profiled and it was found that they could operate in the physical environment 
demanded by the mission. This should be the case because as military systems they have been built 
and trained to operate in a diverse range of climates and environments. 
4.3.1.5 Case Study One SoS Profile 
When the results of the previous set of characteristics were combined the outcome showed that 
only the SoS with all four available systems could successfully complete the mission, which 
concurred with the historical narrative. 
4.3.2 Case Study Two – Rescue Of Lt Devon Jones 
This subsection is support by Appendix J, Case Study Two – Rescue Of Lt Devon Jones. This case 
study considers a historical CSAR rescue of the rescue of Lt Devon Jones, an F-14 pilot downed 
near Baghdad, Iraq, during the 1991 Gulf War. A brief synopsis of the rescue follows. 
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4.3.2.1 Case Study Two Narrative 
This synopsis, culled from (Evans 1999, 133-136, National Museum of the USAF n.d., Pokrant 1999, 
31-32), was provided as an example of a CSAR mission in subsection 2.5.2 and is repeated here for 
the readers benefit. This was the first rescue of a downed airman during Operation Desert Storm. 
 
Lt Devon Jones and his Radar Intercept Officer, Lt Larry Slade, had been tasked with flying their F-
14A+ Tomcat, call-sign “Slate 46”, on an armed escort mission to protect an EA-6B Prowler aircraft 
around the airfield at Al Asad, Iraq.  At 6.05am whilst returning to their base, approximately 30 
miles from Baghdad, Slate 46 was hit by a SA-2 SAM (Surface to Air Missile) and both Jones and 
Slade ejected at approximately 10,000 feet.  Slade used his AN/PRC-112 survival radio whilst 
parachuting down to call in a mayday message to the orbiting AWACS airplane. The AN/PRC-112 
survival radio provides Army Search and Rescue (SAR) personnel with the capability to perform 
combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions of downed aircrew personnel. As Jones and Slade 
descended by parachute they were separated in the clouds and darkness and landed separately, 
some distance apart.  
 
Lt. Jones dug in and camouflaged himself. Meanwhile a MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter scrambled 
to crash site. Overhead Iraqi MiG-23 fighters appeared and were engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on 
RESCAP (Rescue Combat Air Patrol), the MiG-23’s retreat. At approximately 10:30 Lt. Jones hid 
from what he thought were enemy fighters, but which were actually the two F-15Cs on RESCAP. 
At approximately 10:30 Lt. Slade was discovered and detained by Iraqi forces. The MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ helicopter returned to Arar to refuel, returning immediately to continue the search. The 
‘Sandy’ A-10A made contact with Lt. Jones via radio on SAR frequency. Lt. Jones guided the 
‘Sandy’ A-10A to him and the ‘Sandy’ A-10A located him exactly using its Inertial Navigation 
System (INS). Iraqi MiG-23s moved into the area and were engaged by the two USAF F-15Cs on 
RESCAP, the MiG-23’s retreated. The ‘Sandy’ A-10 sanitised the area around Lt. Jones. The MH-53J 
‘Pave Low’ moved in to rescue Lt. Jones, and spotted an Iraqi truck en route to Lt. Jones’ position. 
The ‘Sandy’ A-10A engaged the Iraqi truck. MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ landed near the destroyed Iraqi 
truck, Lt. Jones broke cover and boarded the helicopter, which returned to base. ‘Sandy’ A-10A’s 
stayed on station to assure the MH-53J’s safety.  The step by step events of the historical case study 
are presented in Appendix J.1, Sequence of Events. 
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4.3.2.2 Case Study Two Functional Profile 
The functional profiles are presented in Appendix J.2. The functional profiles have been taken from 
the developed GFM. The four systems profiled for this case study are: 
 
• A MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter (functionally profiled in Appendix J.2.1) 
• An F-15C ‘Eagle’ tactical fighter aircraft (functionally profiled in Appendix J.2.2) 
• A ‘Sandy’ A10A close support aircraft (functionally profiled in Appendix J.2.3) 
• The USAF Rescue Coordination Centre (functionally profiled in Appendix J.2.4) 
 
These systems were profiled by the researcher based on available information. As with the 
previous case study a subject matter expert was sought to aid with this process but none were 
available through the SEAS DTC.  The profiled systems were combined into all possible SoS 
configurations, as shown in the functional matrix against the missions functional profile in 
Appendix J.2.5. 
 
When combined into the various SoS configurations with a simple pass/fail indication of the 
combined as discussed the results showed that both the SoS configuration with all of the available 
systems and the SoS configuration with the Pave Low, Sandy A10A and USAF Rescue 
Coordination Centre were functionally capable of conducting the mission. 
4.3.2.3 Case Study Two Non-Functional Profile 
The profile of the mission against the Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors and the 
individual systems and SoS configurations are shown in Appendix J.3. As described previously the 
measures were made only at the Factors level for the assessment of the systems which were then 
automatically combined into the various SoS combination configurations. 
4.3.2.4 Case Study Two Physical Environment Profile 
The profile of the mission against the physical environment and the individual systems and SoS 
configurations are shown in Appendix J.4. The mission was profiled against this established set of 
metrics to ascertain whether the mission would require the systems to operate in those conditions. 
The systems were profiled and, as with the previous case study it was found that they could 
operate in the physical environment demanded by the mission. Again, it was realised this should 
be the case because as military systems they have been built and trained to operate in a diverse 
range of climates and environments. 
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4.3.2.5 Case Study Two SoS Profile 
When the results of the previous measures were combined the outcome showed that either the 
combination of all four available systems or the combination of the Pave Low, Sandy A10A and 
USAF Rescue Coordination Centre could successfully complete the mission. This result is arguably 
incorrect as considering the historical narrative to the mission the functionality of the F15C’s was a 
decisive factor in the mission’s success. 
4.4 Evaluation of Prototype Software Tool 
A first prototype DSS software tool has been developed and tested using a set of historical CSAR 
case studies. This section evaluates the case studies in terms of the objectives of the exercise; 
namely the demonstration of: 
• profiling of missions and systems using common sets of characteristics 
• formation of SoS profiles from the system profiles 
• matching of mission and SoS profiles 
• utility and value of the output of this exercise to a military decision maker. 
 
The following subsections consider these in turn before concluding with a way forward for this 
research. 
4.4.1 Profiling Missions and Systems 
This section captures the main points identified during the course of conducting the case studies 
regarding the profiling of missions and systems.  
 
An issue was identified with how the profiles are generated. The case studies found that the 
system of systems used for each mission were functionally and non-functionally capable of the 
mission’s requirements. The first case study could not have been achieved with a system of 
systems comprising of a subset of the systems originally used, whereas the second case study 
could have been completed due to a duplication of required capabilities in the systems. However, 
this is not a clear conclusion as the findings of the second set of case studies was inconsistent with 
the historical narrative of the mission. The indication from this is that the profiles used do not 
capture the key elements of the mission. Of particular concern is the functional set of 
characteristics. One of the difficulties was profiling the functionality to each system. The functional 
allocation of SoS driving the developed approach is unable to consider precedence, interoperation 
and concurrency between component systems. This inability means that the SoS cannot be 
considered from an open viewpoint which the research problem requires. The VPA methodology 
used to profile the functionality required by the missions has intertwined functionality with 
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implementation. A more robust methodology that disentangles the functionality from 
implementation needs to be found. 
 
The second finding was that the Physical Environment characteristics were of little benefit in either 
case study. Still, as a decision support system these characteristics are significant in that if the 
decision maker should get it wrong it could have serious implications for the conduct of the 
mission. These should still be considered as a guard function against poor system selections. 
4.4.2 Forming SoS Profiles from System Profiles 
The current methodology is exceedingly simplistic in combining systems into SoS configurations. 
An improved SoS assessment methodology must be found to overcome the current limitation that 
for a system to fail against a metric, all of the constituent systems must fail. In addition the 
relationships between systems must be better identified to allow more precise assembly of SoS and 
identification of key relationships required to conduct CSAR missions. This requires a significant 
shift in the methodology employed thus far in this research. 
4.4.3 Matching of Mission and SoS Profiles 
The matching of the mission profile to available SoS profiles seemed clumsy and long winded. 
There is a need to differentiate between in theatre parts of the system of systems and remote parts.  
This is important as certain metrics (especially in the Non-Functional and Physical Environment 
classes) will only apply to in theatre parts of the system.  The current assessment method only 
requires part of the system of systems to have the required capability (and hence not necessarily 
the part in theatre). 
4.4.4 Utility and Value of the Developed Approach 
The decision that the developed DSS supports is complex and it needs to present the decision 
maker with an accurate and clear picture to help inform rather than dictate. Current military 
decision making processes, such as the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) do not provide 
clear visibility of the capability of system of systems to the decision maker, as previously discussed 
in section 2.3.2. Whilst simplistic the developed DSS does provide clear indications of the 
suitability of each system of systems, in capability terms, against mission requirements. The 
transition from theoretical to the practical implementation of the DSS was deemed to be a partial 
success by the researcher insofar that the tool provided some useful insights and visibility of the 
system of systems performance against mission requirements. However, the DSS also provided a 
number of examples of questionable or factually incorrect information. This was compounded as 
the generated profiles are verbose and do not allow assessment ‘at a glance’ as RPD would require. 
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An improved graphical representation of how each SoS profile compares to the mission profile is 
required, perhaps as a footprint/radar plot as shown in Figure 3 on page 15. 
4.4.5 Reconsidering an Approach for a Decision Support System 
Some problems have been identified with the approach for a DSS developed so far in this research. 
The approach relies on three sets of common characteristics: functional, non-functional and 
physical environment. For the approach to be implemented profiles of individual systems must be 
combined into SoS profiles due to the time required to assess each SoS separately which would not 
be fast enough to support the RPD model of decision making. The developed approach utilises 
disjunction to evaluate across systems to form SoS profiles for each of the sets of characteristics and 
conjunction to assess across systems as a whole. However, this is an inherently closed viewpoint 
and fails to capture or address the relationships between systems.  
 
While value has been found in the develop sets of common characteristics a different approach is 
required in order to address the research problem. An approach based on models as opposed to a 
parametric approach has been identified as a potential way forward to support the required open 
viewpoint. A model driven approach may be a more rigorous and repeatable way of addressing 
the required open viewpoint. The functional profiling is of particular concern and will be the focus 
of the next architecture. The Non Functional and Physical Environment characteristics will not be 
considered, but as the components developed to date are reusable they can be integrated into the 
updated approach at a later stage. The next chapter considers what such a model driven approach 
might be in the context of this research. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has documented the implementation of an approach for a decision support system. 
To achieve this the architecture had to be developed to allow it to be implemented. This required a 
shift from the SoS to the system viewpoint, so rather than assessing whole SoS configurations only 
the individual component systems would be assessed and then assembled into all possible SoS 
configurations. The implementation of the software tool in Microsoft® Excel® was detailed, 
including the mechanism for profiling missions and systems within the tool. With the profiling 
established the method of assessment of SoS profiles against mission profiles was discussed. A set 
of two historical case studies was conducted using the developed tool. These case studies were 
evaluated and a number of issues were found. The overall concern with the developed parametric 
approach was the assembly of systems into SoS and the root of the problem was that the 
functionality had become entangled with the systems. Due to this coupling there was a lack of 
relationships between component systems and hence these were not taken into account. A more 
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robust methodology that disentangles the functionality from implementation needed to be found. 
The model driven approach has been identified as a potential way forward to achieve the required 
open viewpoint and address the SoS relationship problems. The next Chapter considers such a 
model driven approach. 
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Chapter 5  
A Model Driven Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter presents the concepts that will be used to address the issues found in the previous 
chapter with the original parametric approach. This chapter develops a model driven approach to 
address these issues. The chapter starts by discussing the structure of language and introduces 
logical modelling. Model Driven Architecture is discussed, particularly the hierarchical model 
structure and the role of model transformations. A mathematical approach to model 
transformations is discussed and incorporated into a integrated model driven approach for this 
research. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
The move towards a model driven approach requires a fundamental shift in this research and 
hence not all of the research contribution logical model shown in the previous chapters for the 
parametric approach can be reused. The model driven approach is revolutionary as opposed to the 
evolutionary progress shown in this thesis so far. Hence the model built up over the last few 
chapters around the parametric approach is reduced back down to a core model around which the 
model driven approach will be built on over the next chapters. 
 
This Research
 
 established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of a Model Driven 
Approach for a Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military 
Missions. This Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics which informs the decision maker.  
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Figure 37 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Five 
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5.1 Developing a Model Driven Approach 
The previous chapter established the need for an alternative approach for a decision support 
system. The approach for a DSS developed to date had addressed the functional, non functional 
and physical environment characteristics of the missions and systems/SoS. The most pressing 
issues to resolve was the separation of functional from implementation (which the original VPA 
methodology had intertwined) and the consideration of the SoS from an open viewpoint, 
particularly precedence, interoperation and concurrency between component systems. A model 
driven approach has been identified as potentially overcoming the issues found with the 
parametric approach developed so far in this research. This chapter starts by introducing the key 
concepts which will be combined into the model driven approach that the second prototype tool 
will implement. A model driven approach requires precision (provided by the model) and 
comprehensibility, which is normally expressed in natural language. This chapter begins by 
considering the structure of natural language. 
5.2 The Structure of Language 
This subsection introduces the key concepts of transformational grammar which provides a 
foundation for subsequent sections. Humans communicate audibly and in writing using natural 
language, such as English. Linguists have found that our “ability and experience in using our 
language system to represent and communicate is so extensive that we are able to reflect on the 
process itself to the extent that we have consistent intuitions about that process” (Bandler and 
Grinder 1975, 25). For our discussion to follow there are three categories of linguistic intuitions to 
be aware of: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccxxxxxx 
(Bandler and Grinder 1975, 25-27) 
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These consistent intuitions have been captured in a meta-model, which is the model of 
transformational grammar.  Transformational grammar is a specific approach to give a set of rules 
that will correctly predict which combinations of words will form grammatical sentences in natural 
language. Such approaches are known as generative grammar in theoretical linguistics (Chomsky 
1966, 51). Transformational grammar has its roots in Chomsky’s work (Chomsky 1957) where he 
presented his idea that natural language sentences have “linguistic levels” (Chomsky 1957, 11) 
with two levels of representation – the surface structure which is how natural language is 
communicated through speech or writing, and the deep structure which represents the core 
semantic relations of a sentence. The meta-model allows the deep structure to be elicited from a 
natural language sentence by following the three linguistic intuitions previously presented. 
Consider the sentence “the man bought a car.” We can identify this sentence as fitting the first 
linguistic intuition of well-formedness. The second linguistic intuition, the constituent structure of 
the sentence can be revealed as “the man / bought / a car”. This is shown in linguistics as a tree 
structure and is the surface structure of the sentence, as shown in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38 – Sentence Surface Structure 
 
With the surface structure captured as a tree structure the deep structure can be elicited by 
following our third linguistic intuition as to what the complete representation of the sentence’s 
meaning or logical semantic relation would be. This is the deep structure of the sentence and is 
shown as a tree structure in Figure 39. 
 
 
 Figure 39 – Sentence Deep Structure 
the man buy for money some from someone 
a car 
the man bought a car 
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This approach has produced two distinct models of the same sentence – a surface structure model 
and a deep structure model. Linguists can explicitly state how these two different models are 
connected through a process called transformation. The transformation states the relationship 
between the deep structure model and the surface structure model.  Transformations between 
models are a key feature of Model Driven Architecture as will be discussed later. In summary, 
transformation grammar is “an explicit model of the process of representing and of communicating 
that representation of the world” (Bandler and Grinder 1975, 37).  
 
How can transformational grammar be applied to an approach for a decision support system? 
Recognising the intrinsic ambiguity of natural language and the need to move beyond the surface 
structure considered for the first part of this research, transformational grammar provides a 
starting point to move towards the precise deep structure. This deep structure is a model and 
hence transformational grammar provides an approach to create the required deep structure 
models from a natural language sentence’s surface structure. Transformational grammar therefore 
enables a model driven approach to be utilised by providing an approach to move from the natural 
language of the original sources for this research to models. Subsection 5.4 will introduce Model 
Driven Architecture (MDA) which is a model driven approach and it is briefly introduced here to 
illustrate the link to the transformational grammar presented in this subsection. MDA can be 
reduced to a simple pattern as Richard Mark Soley, Chairman and CEO of the Object Management 
Group (OMG), shows below: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Soley 2004, slide 29) 
 
Note that just like transformational grammar, MDA uses “multiple syntaxes” (surface structures), a 
model which underlies that semantic (deep structure) and transformations to move between these 
models. If transformational grammar is to be utilised as the input to MDA how should the deep 
structure models of the sentences be represented? We have seen already how linguists use tree 
structures, but these are unsuitable for engineering applications. To help address this gap the next 
subsection introduces Logical Modelling which uses the Unified Modelling Language (UML) to 
model the sentences and, it shall be seen, provide an input into MDA. 
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5.3 Logical Modelling 
Logical modelling, like the deep structure of transformational grammar, seeks to ”extract the 
relations that comprise the defined term by using a modelling language to derive a minimal model 
of the relations (i.e. one that adds no new meaning) but that is complete and captures the intended 
meaning of the term (i.e. all intended relations have been captured)” (C. Dickerson 2008). The 
modelling language of choice is the Unified Modelling Language (UML) which is used to capture 
key words of the sentence (nouns) and the relationships between these keywords (verbs). For 
systems architecting the need to move from the tree structure preferred by linguists to logical 
models using UML is founded in Brooks’ work: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Brooks 1995, 234 (6.3)) 
 
Brooks’ quote above is from a software engineering perspective. To move this to a systems 
architecting perspective we can substitute the word design for concept and the term prose 
definition for natural language definition. Now just like transformational grammar we have two 
different models – the formal definition of a concept (the deep structure) and the natural language 
definition (the surface structure). If the formal definition can be derived from the comprehensible 
natural language through transformation then the natural language can be used for reasoning. 
Hence, “conceptual integrity of the formal definition of a specific term is preserved by concordance 
between precision and comprehensibility” (C. Dickerson 2008). The Logical Modelling approach 
will be described in detail when it is applied in section 6.3. For now it is suffice to say that it builds 
on the concept of Transformational Grammar and provides an approach that meets the specific 
needs of engineering. With an approach identified that can move from source materials into 
precise models we now consider a model driven approach that can utilise these models. 
5.4 Model Driven Architecture 
The Model Driven Architecture (MDA) is a standard developed by the OMG (Object Management 
Group) which has been an international, open membership, not-for-profit computer industry 
consortium since 1989. The MDA standard is captured in the MDA Guide v1.0.1 (Miller and 
Mukerji 2003). The OMG viewpoint of the MDA is for software development and is described by 
them as follows: 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Miller and Mukerji 2003, 2-2) 
 
The above quote captures a key principle of MDA: separating the specification of the operation of a 
system from the details of the way that system uses the capabilities of its platform. Note that this principle 
is independent of software development. This is an example of how a principle from MDA can be 
applied to the systems engineering domain that this research addresses. This principle also directly 
addresses the main issue found with the parametric approach: the entangling of functionality with 
implementation. The MDA is an approach to systems development that seeks to separate the 
technology based implementation from the core solution of the problem. This is the separation of 
function from implementation that the first approach lacked. The aim of this is to establish a 
platform independent model which captures the functionality required in such a way that the 
ultimate implementation of that functionality can be migrated across technology. In MDA the term 
system architecture is defined as follows: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Miller and Mukerji 2003, 2-3) 
 
MDA has three key viewpoints: the Computational Independent Viewpoint, Platform Independent 
Viewpoint, and the Platform Specific Viewpoint. The Computational Independent Viewpoint 
focuses on the environment of the system and requirements for the system. The details of the 
structure and processing of the system are hidden or as yet undetermined. The Platform 
Independent Viewpoint focuses on the operation of a system while hiding the details necessary for 
a particular platform. It shows that part of the complete specification that does not change from 
one platform to another. The Platform Specific Viewpoint combines the platform independent 
viewpoint with an additional focus on the detail of the use of a specific platform.  
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From these viewpoints MDA specifies three models: the Computational Independent Model (CIM), 
Platform Independent Model (PIM), and the Platform Specific Model (PSM). In UML requirements 
are captured with use cases which call out high level interactions between the system and its 
environment. Use cases can be used to identify high level functions that the system must perform. 
In the model driven approach described in section 5.5 and applied in Chapter 6 section 6.5 the CIM 
will be captured using high level functions. This is also in line with the GFM developed in the 
initial approach. The PIM will capture the relationship of the flows between the functions 
identified in the CIM. This will identify the operation of the SoS while hiding the details necessary 
for a particular platform. 
 
In MDA the system is specified in the Platform Model (PM) which captures the technical concepts 
of the system’s implementation and represents the different parts of the system and the services it 
provides. The relationship between these models is illustrated in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40 – MDA Model Hierarchy 
 
Whilst these models from the various viewpoints are useful by themselves the real power of MDA 
is the ability to move between models whilst maintaining the conceptual integrity of the system, 
this is achieved through model transformations which is focus of the next subsection. The arrows 
shown in Figure 40 depict the ability to transform between models, which is the subject of the next 
subsection. 
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5.4.1 Model Transformations 
Model transformation is the key to MDA and “is the process of converting one model to another 
model of the same system” (Miller and Mukerji 2003, 2-1). This process in MDA is illustrated in 
Figure 41. 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41 – MDA Model Transformation, adapted from (Miller and Mukerji 2003, 2-7) 
 
Model transformation is enabled through the use of an MDA mapping which “provides 
specifications for the transformation of a PIM into a PSM for a particular platform” (Miller and 
Mukerji 2003, 3-2). There are two distinct approaches to mapping: (i) type mappings and (ii) 
instance mappings. Most mappings normally consist of a combination of these approaches. Type 
mappings are rule based mappings that are used to specify “a mapping from any model built 
using types specified in the PIM language to models expressed using types from a PSM language” 
(Miller and Mukerji 2003, 3-2). As general rule based operators, type mappings are very difficult to 
define. Hence, instance mappings are more commonly used as they are easier to define. Instance 
mappings are used to specify how a particular element from the PIM should be transformed into 
the PSM by using defining marks. A mark “represents a concept in the PSM, and is applied to an 
element of the PIM, to indicate how that element is to be transformed” (Miller and Mukerji 2003, 3-
3). While a type mapping is a general rule based transformation, instance mappings are point to 
point transformations and hence are easier to define because their scope is very specific. Model 
transformation can be thought of as part of the design and development process (Raistrick, et al. 
2004). The role of transformations in MDA allowing the move from the PIM to PSM and then code 
(which is the PM) is shown in Figure 42. 
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xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42 – A Simple View of the MDA Approach for Software Development (Jones, et al. 2007) 
 
While MDA prescribed transforms to move between models through mapping, and particular 
types of mapping, it does not prescribe a mechanism to achieve this in practise. This concept of 
transformation was introduced with transformational grammar back in subsection 5.2. Just as we 
sought a more rigorous approach to modelling the surface and deep structures of natural language 
beyond transformational grammar, now we seek a more rigorous approach to model 
transformation, which is the focus of the next subsection. 
5.4.2 A Mathematical Approach to Model Transformation 
This subsection presents a novel way of automating MDA transformations using an approach 
described in Dickerson and Mavris (2009). The importance of this mathematical approach is that it 
adds a logical foundation to model transformation, and it will be shown in so doing to enable the 
maintenance of conceptual integrity throughout the design process. A more detailed explanation of 
the transformations is presented in Appendix L 
 
The logical modelling approach introduced previously in subsection 5.3 produces a UML model of 
natural language sentences as its output. This UML diagram explicitly exposes the relationships 
between the keywords in the natural language sentence. These keywords are system parameters. 
These relationships can be depicted using a square matrix, such as the 𝑀U matrix in Figure 43. The 
𝑀U matrix represents the system parameters from the logical model (expressed as 𝑦1… 𝑦𝑚) with the 
ticks indicating a relationship between the parameters. Note that these relationships are one way 
and the matrix is read row-column, so for example the bottom left relationship in the 𝑀U matrix 
indicates that 𝑦𝑚−1 is related to 𝑦2 (but not that 𝑦2 is related to 𝑦𝑚−1). This can be expressed using 
 A Model Driven Approach for a Decision Support System   - 114 - 
the notation 𝑦𝑚−1𝑀𝑦2 which means that 𝑀U has associated 𝑦𝑚−1 with 𝑦2. The matrix 𝑀U shows that 
𝑦2 is related to 𝑦𝑚−1 by the upper right tick (𝑦2𝑀𝑦𝑚−1). 
 
  
Figure 43 – Relationship Matrix 
 
The MDA transforms one parametric model (with a particular viewpoint of the system) into 
another parametric model (with a different viewpoint of the system). This transform is specified 
using instance mappings which are easier to define than their type mapping counterparts, as 
previously described in subsection 5.4.1. These instance mappings can be specified using another 
matrix attached to 𝑀U which delineates the mapping of the 𝑦1…𝑦𝑚 onto another set of keywords, 
for example 𝑥1… 𝑥𝑛. This is illustrated in Figure 44 which shows the relationship matrix 𝑀U, the 
mapping matrix 𝑄 and a second relationship matrix N. The relationships established between 
𝑦1… 𝑦𝑚 are mapped onto a second set of parametrics (𝑥1… 𝑥𝑛) in 𝑄. By tracing through these 
relationships the relationships between 𝑥1… 𝑥𝑛 can be derived as shown in 𝑁U. For example, from 
the 𝑄 matrix we can determine the following relationship: 
 
𝑦𝑚−1𝑀𝑦2 
 
and mapping 𝑦𝑚−1 and 𝑦2 onto 𝑥 using the 𝑄 matrix we find: 
 
𝑦𝑚−1𝑄𝑥3 and 𝑦2𝑄𝑥2 or 𝑦2𝑄𝑥𝑛 
 
Therefore, 
 
If 𝑦𝑚−1𝑀𝑦2 then 𝑥3𝑁𝑥2 and 𝑥3𝑁𝑥𝑛 
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Note how two relationships in 𝑁U are produced from one relationship in 𝑀U due to the double 
relationship of 𝑦2 in 𝑄. Thus with the 𝑀U and 𝑄 matrices complete the 𝑁U matrix can be derived from 
them. Therefore any parametric system model (e.g. 𝑀U) can be transformed into another parametric 
system model (e.g. 𝑁U) given a mapping matrix (such as 𝑄). The mathematics behind these matrix 
operations underline the validity of this approach and is described in more detail in Dickerson and 
Mavris (2009), a brief summary of which follows. Consider the 𝑄U matrix again and the notation 
𝑦𝑄𝑥. This notation can be extended to 𝑅𝑄 which describes how 𝑄 transforms a subset 𝑅 of 𝑀U into a 
subset 𝑅𝑄 of 𝑁U. The subset 𝑅, in general, represents a mathematical relation on the underlying set 
of parameters. 𝑅𝑄 is defined as follows: for each pair of parameters (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦𝑘) that belong to the 
mathematical relation 𝑅, if 𝑦𝑖𝑄𝑥𝑗 and 𝑦𝑘𝑄𝑥𝑙  then the pair (𝑥𝑗, 𝑥𝑙) belongs to the mathematical 
relation 𝑅𝑄 in 𝑁U. Figure 44 illustrates such a model transformation. The model 𝑀U has three 
relationships, i.e. 𝑅 = {(𝑦2,𝑦𝑚−1), (𝑦2,𝑦𝑚), (𝑦𝑚−1,𝑦2)}. Note that the first and third relationships are 
symmetric. 
 
 
Figure 44 – Relationship and Mapping Matrices 
 
The model transformation 𝑄 acts on three values of the parameters in 𝑀U: 𝑦2, 𝑦𝑚−1 and 𝑦𝑚. The 
action of 𝑄 on 𝑦2 is doubled valued, so combined with the symmetric relationship between 𝑦2 and 
𝑦𝑚−1 this maps to two symmetric relationships in the model 𝑁U (a total of four individual 
relationships). The double-valued action of 𝑄 on 𝑦2 and single-valued action on 𝑦𝑚 transforms the 
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other relationship that 𝑦2 has with 𝑦𝑚 into two relationships in 𝑁U. Therefore, 𝑄 transforms the three 
relationships in 𝑀U into the six relationships 𝑅𝑄 in 𝑁U depicted in the figure. 
 
Recall that MDA seeks, among other things, to separate the technology of the solution from the 
processes required by problem. With the model transformation shown in Figure 44 this concept 
can be given a more precise meaning. The problem (expressed as flows) would be modelled by 𝑀U 
and the solution (expressed as systems) would be modelled by 𝑁. The structure of the problem, as 
represented by the matrix 𝑀U, is reflected into the solution 𝑁U by the transformation 𝑄. In Figure 44, at 
the level of relationships, 𝑅 is precisely all the pairs (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦𝑘) that are related in 𝑀U, and the reflection 
of 𝑅 is represented by the mathematical relation 𝑅𝑄 in 𝑁U.  
 
With the mathematics behind this process and hence its validity established the next logical step to 
take was to try and automate this transformation process in a software tool. A software tool was 
developed as a concept demonstrator to show that one system parameter model can be 
transformed automatically into another system parameter model given a transformation matrix. 
This software tool was successfully implemented in Microsoft Excel and is described in more detail 
in the next Chapter 6 in section 6.2. Experimentation with the tool verified that it was transforming 
the matrices correctly and a screen capture of the software tool is shown in Figure 45. 
 
 
Figure 45 – Matrix Transformational Tool 
 
The successful implementation of the tool provides a way to rapidly perform model 
transformations. To move this tool beyond automated model transformations and into a more 
integrated engineering tool it needed its functionality extending to provide deeper insights. An 
integrated model driven approach utilising the concepts discussed so far was sought, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
5.5 An Integrated Model Driven Approach 
This chapter has introduced a number of key concepts: Transformational Grammar, Logical 
Modelling, Model Driven Architecture and model transformations. In this subsection a coherent 
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and complete approach will be presented pulling together all of the concepts discussed into a 
complete approach. 
 
Transformational Grammar has been presented as a specific approach of generative grammar in 
theoretical linguistics. Transformational Grammar identifies two levels of representation of natural 
language sentences – the surface structure and the deep structure. Linguists can explicitly state 
how these two models are related through a process called transformation. An approach to elicit 
the deep structure from the surface structure of natural language in a model usable by an 
engineering process was required as the tree structure used by linguists was not appropriate. The 
Logical Modelling approach, which creates both surface structure and deep structure models of 
natural language using the Unified Modelling Language (UML), was identified as appropriate for 
this research. In the engineering domain the Model Driven Architecture has been identified as an 
approach which implements the model transformation concepts of Transformational Grammar for 
engineering applications. Model Driven Architecture is a realisation of the principles of structured 
analysis and design and achieves separation of the problem specification from the solution through 
the logical separation of the Computational Independent Model (CIM)/ Platform Independent 
Model (PIM) and Platform Specific Model (PSM) models. A lower Platform Model (PM) as 
specified by the MDA has been considered but is beyond the scope of this research and the 
approach has been bounded to the CIM/PIM/PSM models. MDA prescribes model transforms to 
move between these models and we have presented a methodology to achieve this whilst 
maintaining conceptual integrity through the use of mathematical matrix transforms. This has been 
captured in a developed software tool. Whilst this process provides a solution in the form of the 
PSM (or even PM) it does not provide a repeatable input methodology to the CIM. We now present 
a method for moving from a logical model created from a natural language sentence of the systems 
requirements into a CIM and in so doing move towards a complete model driven approach. 
 
A logical model is not appropriate for inputting into a CIM as the keywords it has identified are 
not necessarily system attributes. A methodology is thus required to transform the logical model 
into a form suitable for inputting into the MDA approach. The methodology developed takes the 
logical model and transforms it into a flow diagram (Yourdon 1988). The flow diagram contains 
information for both processes (CIM) and flows (PIM), as illustrated in Figure 46. The flow 
diagram can then be used to populate the CIM, CIM-PIM Transform and in turn the PIM, as 
illustrated again in Figure 46. The method will be shown in full when it is applied in the next 
Chapter 6, section 6.4. 
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Figure 46 – Flow Diagram Input into MDA 
 
The process starts in Figure 46 with the flow diagram which is determined by the analysis of 
doctrines and tactics. This will be achieved through the logical modelling of doctrines and tactics in 
section 6.3 which in turn will be transformed into a flow diagram in section 6.4. The CIM, CIM-PIM 
Transform and PIM can be determined from the flow diagram and this will be shown in section 
6.5. With the set of flows established these can be mapped to systems in the PIM-PSM Transform. 
This is new information introduced in the form of the commanders intent. This, and the 
subsequent stages, will be shown for each of the case studies repeated in Chapter 7. The PIM can 
then be transformed using the PIM-PSM Transform into the PSM from which the interoperation 
diagram can be determined. Appendix M shows a user manual which details how the process 
shown in Figure 46 can be used in practice. 
 
Figure 46 illustrates the relationship between the MDA models – the CIM, PIM and PSM. Consider 
the discussion back in Chapter 1 section 1.2.4 on capability. To recap, capability moves away from 
a means based perspective to a combined ways and means perspective. Figure 46 shows such a 
perspective, the ways being shown by the CIM and PIM, the means by the PSM. This is illustrated in 
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Figure 47. Hence this approach may help define and deliver mission defined capability 
requirements. 
 
Figure 47 - Flow Diagram Input into MDA showing Input, Ways and Means 
 
With an input from logical models into the MDA approach established the next consideration is 
how to support the decision maker. The original approach shown previously in Figure 36 and 
repeated here in Figure 48 for readability was a linear parametric approach. 
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Figure 48 – Implemented Architecture of an Approach for a DSS 
 
The available systems and the mission were profiled against each of the developed common sets of 
characteristics in turn, the system profiles were combined simplistically into SoS profiles and these 
were then compared to the mission profile. The lack of consideration of relationships between 
component systems and the intertwining of functions with implementation were issues with this 
first approach. The model driven approach combining the elements discussed in this chapter is 
shown in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49 – An Architecture of a Model Driven Approach for a DSS Utilising CIM, PIM, PSM 
 
The model driven approach captures the Commanders Intent and identifies the available systems. 
The Commanders Intent is modelled as a PSM (SoS). The available systems to flow relationships 
are established and, using the CSAR PIM, the PIM is transformed into a Mission Viewpoint PSM 
(SoS). The Commanders Intent PSM and Mission Viewpoint PSM are compared and through this 
comparison an assessment of the model match is made. 
 
The main advantages of the model driven approach is that it is a rigorous and repeatable and 
removes much of the inherent ambiguity contained in the previous approach. It allows an open 
viewpoint to be taken through the capturing of relationships and the transformation down from 
the conceptual level rather than assembly up from the implementation level. Open viewpoints are 
of course wicked and the developed model driven approach helps address this by bounding the 
higher conceptual level through its representation as processes and flows with defined 
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relationships between them. These relationships and the ability to transform between model levels 
help ensure the conceptual integrity of the approach. The ability to bound the problem through an 
independent model representation that can be transformed into interoperable solutions allows an 
open viewpoint to be maintained. 
 
Note that in the model driven approach only the functional characteristics are considered as 
opposed to the functional, non-functional and physical environment characteristics considered in 
the previous parametric approach.  
 
The development of this approach which forms the basis of the second implementation of an 
approach for a decision support system is presented in the next Chapter 6. Consider again the 
original statement of the problem that this research addresses: 
 
Is there a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole 
from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission? 
Statement of Research Problem 
 
The original aims of this research were to provide a decision support tool for decision makers to 
help them decide which SoS to use for a particular CSAR mission. This approach aids that by 
allowing automated generation of SoS through model transformation of the mission requirements 
while preserving an open viewpoint. In addition it allows automated comparison of available SoS 
options against the mission requirement through comparative transformations. Therefore, this 
software tool builds on the first prototype DSS software tool by providing a methodology that 
ensures conceptual integrity through an MDA approach whilst minimising the decision makers 
workload by using automated model transforms for both option generation and comparison. This 
integrated model driven approach will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 6. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has introduced a number of key concepts: Transformational Grammar, Logical 
Modelling, Model Driven Architecture and model transformations. Transformational Grammar has 
been presented as a specific approach of generative grammar in theoretical linguistics. 
Transformational Grammar identifies two levels of representation of natural language sentences – 
the surface structure and the deep structure. An approach to elicit the deep structure from the 
surface structure of natural language in a model usable by an engineering process was required as 
the tree structure used by linguists was not appropriate. The Logical Modelling approach, which 
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creates both surface structure and deep structure models of natural language using the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML), was identified as appropriate for this research. In the engineering 
domain the Model Driven Architecture has been identified as an approach which implements the 
model transformation concepts of Transformational Grammar for engineering applications. Model 
Driven Architecture is a realisation of the principles of structured analysis and design and achieves 
separation of the problem specification from the solution through the logical separation of the 
Computational Independent Model (CIM)/ Platform Independent Model (PIM) and Platform 
Specific Model (PSM) models. This separation of the operation of a system from the details of the 
way that system uses the capabilities of its platform addresses the issue found with the parametric 
approach where the functionality and implementation had become intertwined. 
 
A lower Platform Model (PM) as specified by the MDA has been considered but is beyond the 
scope of this research and the approach has been bounded to the CIM/PIM/PSM models. MDA 
prescribes model transforms to move between these models and we have presented a methodology 
to achieve this whilst maintaining conceptual integrity through the use of mathematical matrix 
transforms. This has been captured in a developed software tool. Whilst this process provides a 
solution in the form of the PSM (or even PM) it does not provide a repeatable input methodology 
to the CIM. A method to achieve this has been presented to allow Logical Models to be converted 
into flow diagrams which in turn can be converted into a CIM and PIM. A coherent and complete 
approach pulling together all of the concepts discussed has been presented which forms a model 
driven approach. The next Chapter 6 discusses the implementation of the architecture of this 
approach. 
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Chapter 6  
Second Implementation of an Approach for a 
Decision Support System  
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter presents the development and implementation of the second prototype Decision 
Support System (DSS) software tool. This software tool implements the model driven approach 
introduced in the previous Chapter 5 which seeks to disentangle functionality from 
implementation, an issue with the first approach for a DSS. To enable the tool’s development a 
logical model of combat search and missions is created from available doctrines. This logical model 
is converted to a flow diagram from which a CIM and PIM are identified for combat search and 
rescue missions. The methodology for profiling systems is presented and finally the evaluation 
process is discussed. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
This 
From the previous chapter(s): 
Research
 
 established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of a Model Driven 
Approach for a Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military 
Missions. This Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics which informs the decision maker.  
 
In the model driven approach the system of systems is captured in a Platform Specific Model, the common 
characteristics are captured in a Platform Independent Model and the combat search and rescue mission is 
captured in a Computational Independent Model. These models can be related by Model 
Transformation. The architecture has been implemented in a Software Tool. 
This chapter introduces: 
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Figure 50 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Six 
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6.1 Second Implementation Introduction 
This chapter documents the implementation of the revised architecture of a model driven approach 
for a decision support system. Like the first tool this second prototype tool will be used to 
demonstrate that the concepts presented can be implemented in a practical tool which will be used 
to conduct a second set of case studies. This chapter aims to realise this architecture in a prototype 
software tool. 
 
Three main aims were set to be achieved by developing this second prototype software tool: 
1. Feasibility - demonstrate that the second developed DSS architecture could be 
implemented in a software tool. 
2. Validation - perform a set of historical case studies utilising the developed second 
prototype software tool. 
3. Guide - guide the further development of the architecture of an approach for a DSS. 
 
These aims will be addressed through the development of the tool in this Chapter and the 
evaluation of the tool in the next Chapter 7. 
6.2 Developing a Second Prototype Decision Support System 
Software Tool 
The development of the second prototype DSS software tool presented many challenges which had 
to be met to achieve the basic implementation that this research sought. The initial motivation for 
the tool was to simply automate model transformation. 
 
The first challenge was to develop a software tool which would automate the process of model 
transformation from one model matrix and a transform matrix into another model matrix. Take the 
example illustrated below in Matrix 1 which has a model matrix (𝑀U) and a transform matrix (𝑄) 
completed.  
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Matrix 1 – A Model Transformation Matrix from M to N Transformed by Q 
            
N 
 
       
      x1 
       
      x2 
       
      x3 
       
       
       
      xn-1 
       
      xn 
y1 y2   ym-1 ym  x1 x2 x3  xn-1 xn        y1       
 
      y2       
              
              
       ym-1       
 
      ym       
 M 
           
Q 
  
The software tool has been developed in Microsoft Excel 2007 and uses Visual Basic code to 
automate the transformation. The software follows the following steps to transform 𝑀U to 𝑁U 
through 𝑄: 
• Determine relationships in 𝑀 
• Determine relationships in 𝑄 
• Scan through 𝑀U relationships and for each match to relationships in 𝑄. If a mapping can 
be found capture in the 𝑁U relationship. 
 
This software tool was enhanced with a feature that allowed the 𝑁U matrix to either be determined 
or, if prefilled, to check the accuracy of 𝑁U. To enable the accuracy to be checked code was written to 
shade in the cells in green (correct) or red (incorrect or, if blank, missing relationship). The updated 
tool and the cell shading on 𝑁U can be seen in Matrix 2. 
 
Matrix 2 – Completed Model Transformation Tool (from M to N Transformed by Q) 
      
N       x1 
       
      x2 
       
      x3 
       
       
       
      xn-1 
       
      xn 
y1 y2   ym-1 ym  x1 x2 x3  xn-1 xn  
      y1       
 
      y2       
              
              
       ym-1       
 
      ym       
 M 
           
Q 
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This initial developed tool identified an interesting feature of model transformation, that of the 
degree of the relationship imposed by the transformation. Each relationship in 𝑁U may be unique 
(created by a single mapping of 𝑀U via 𝑄) or may be shared (𝑀U and 𝑄 create multiple relationships 
on a single relationship in 𝑁U). Unique relationships are not a problem, but shared relationships are 
as the generated relationships need not necessarily be the same. The number of generated 
relationships on a shared relationship is expressed as degrees (so two degrees would imply that 
two generated relationships were put on a single relationship in 𝑁U.  Such conflicts need to be at 
least highlighted to allow resolution. To achieve this a warning indicator was implemented in the 
code to highlight such conflicts. The issue of degrees will be addressed more thoroughly in a later 
version of the tools development. 
 
An observation of this initial software tool is that while 𝑁U can be generated from 𝑀U and 𝑄 there is 
an opportunity to include an additional transformation matrix to allow 𝑀U to be generated from 𝑁U. 
𝑄 cannot be used to transform 𝑁U to 𝑀U as the relationships captured within 𝑄 are not necessarily 
symmetrical. Hence another transform matrix is required (additionally this also maintains the 
row/column reading formalism for these matrices). The inclusion of this additional transformation 
matrix (𝑃) completes the transformation circle from 𝑀U to 𝑁U and back to 𝑀U and is shown in Matrix 
3. 
 
Matrix 3 – Extended Model Transformation Tool 
P 
           
N 
      x1       
      x2       
      x3       
             
      xn-1       
      xn       
y1 y2   ym-1 ym  x1 x2 x3  xn-1 xn 
      y1       
      y2       
             
             
      ym-1       
      ym       
M 
           
Q 
 
This allows either 𝑁U to be derived from 𝑀U and 𝑄 or 𝑀U to be derived from 𝑁U and 𝑃, but it also 
allows the resultant model to be reflected back onto the original model to understand any 
implications or conflicts that could result from the generated relationships. The code that allows 
model transformation in the software tool is detailed in Appendix N. 
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With the underlying code mechanics established a model for CSAR missions had to be created. The 
GFM created for the previous parametric approach was not usable due to the lack of relations 
between the functions. A logical model was required, and the creation of such a model is detailed 
in the next section. 
6.3 Logical Modelling of CSAR 
This section will outline an approach to deriving a logical model for CSAR from a sentence sourced 
from the literature that provides the starting model from which the surface structure of CSAR may 
be derived. This in turn will be used to derive the deep structure of the sentence that can be utilised 
in a Model Driven Architecture (MDA) approach to provide an input/output matrix which will 
serve as a CIM-PIM Transform and allow a CIM to be derived from the precedence order 
established within that matrix. Thus, by extending logical modelling with the transformational 
grammar theory on which it is based, a formulised and repeatable methodology is presented to 
allow a sentence to be transformed into a CIM and PIM that can be used for exploration of 
solutions at the PSM and, eventually, PM levels. 
 
The objective of Logical Modelling is presented through a direct quote: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(C. Dickerson 2008) 
 
To model a term the first step is to identify a sentence from appropriate literature that contains a 
definition of the term of interest. It may be that sentences defining the term of interest, but with 
different content and structure, will be available from multiple sources (or may occur within one 
source). In such cases collecting these sentences together will help identify which are most 
complete and hence most suitable to start with for logical modelling. The remaining sentences may 
be referred to after an initial logical model has been produced to ensure that the logical model is 
complete and captures the intended meaning of the term of interest. This term of interest, the one 
we will logically model to capture its intended meaning, is referred to as the defined term. The 
defined term for this research is CSAR operations.  
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A sentence was found from the available US doctrine that provides a definition for the defined 
term: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Executive Summary, Page ix (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
 
To create a logical model for this sentence the defined term is first identified and highlighted 
within the sentence using a bold font which is underlined with no italics. The rest of the sentence is 
placed into italics: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Starting Sentence 
 
With the defined term and a sentence defining it identified the next stage of Logical Modelling is to 
list out the key words that give it meaning. The key words will be undefined and their meaning 
will be determined by relations between the words, which will be represented graphically, using 
the class diagram from the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (Object Management Group 2007). 
Modelling approaches like this have been used before, e.g. (Hatley, Hruschka and Pirbhai 2000, 
IEEE Computer Society 2000). The key words in the definition are identified and highlighted within 
the sentence using a bold font which is not underlined with italics: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Keywords in Starting Sentence - Sentence 1 
 
Whilst not used at this stage note that other words in the definition would be shown in a bold font 
with no italics and additional words not in the definition would be shown in a smaller font with no 
bold nor italics. A matrix illustrating the use of font weights and accents for each word type within 
a logical model is shown in Table 28 – Logical Modelling Natural Language Notations in Appendix 
K, Logical Modelling . 
 
With the defined term and key words identified a class diagram can be produced using the 
graphical notation that nouns are placed into boxes, verbs and relations are placed on lines and 
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that solid boxes and lines are used for key words and other words from the definition, otherwise 
dot-dash graphics are used  (C. Dickerson 2008). The initial Logical Model is shown in Figure 51. 
 
 
Figure 51 – First Logical Model of Combat Search and Rescue 
 
The logical model presented in Figure 51 appears to be incomplete. The model shows that a CSAR 
Operation reports that the Person is Isolated but, logically, this seems incorrect. A CSAR Operation 
would be initiated by the report of an isolated person. This can be clarified through inclusion of 
supporting sentences. A search through the doctrine failed to find a suitable sentence containing 
the term of interest report. However, the literature refers to multiple terminology apparently as 
equivalents. For example: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Executive Summary, Page ix (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
 
Comparing these five stages with those established in Starting Sentence we see that the terms 
reporting and awareness and notification appear to be equivalents. This equivalence will allow the 
transformation of sentences containing these equivalent terms into ones which refer to the context 
we are interested in: the role of reporting in a CSAR Operation. 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 Stages of a CSAR Operation, Page III-1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
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Using the above sentence and making the language of the sentence compatible with the defined 
term’s sentence (substituting CSAR Operation for rescue process) the following sentence can be 
modelled: 
 
Notification
Sentence 2 
 of a downed aircraft or isolated person begins the rescue process [CSAR 
Operation]. 
 
The model of the preceding Sentence 2 produces the logical model shown in Figure 52.  
 
 
Figure 52 – Logical Model of Notification 
 
This is still incomplete as the model does not capture what or whom does the notification which 
begins the CSAR Operation. Another supporting sentence provides this information: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Stages of a CSAR Operation, Page III-2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
 
This sentence has been chosen as a supporting sentence as whilst no sentence directly links 
notification back into the structure of the defined term’s sentence, this sentence does imply 
notification through the phrase forward the details which from the surface structure of the sentence 
refers to information about isolated personnel.  
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Sentence 3 
 
Notification 
CSAR 
Operation 
begins 
Isolated Person 
of 
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Sentence 3 is modelled in Figure 53 below. Note the implied relationship shown that notification 
contains information about isolated personnel. 
 
 
Figure 53 – Identifying the Source of Notification 
 
The interpretation of notification as details of information about isolated personnel is further 
reinforced by another supporting sentence: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Stages of a CSAR Operation, Page III-1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
 
This sentence provides information of the ultimate source of the notification information, that of 
the Joint Search and Rescue Centre. This is a specific US facility that plays a pivotal role in US Combat 
Search and Rescue doctrines (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996) (United States 
Air Force 1998). For the purposes of this research a more generic, non-specific organisation will be 
referred to as the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Organisation. This phrase is substituted into the 
logical model presented in Figure 53 in the updated logical model below, Figure 54. 
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Figure 54 – Generalising the Notification Recipient 
 
Whilst Figure 54 captures the source of the notification it implies that it is a passive process 
without involvement from the isolated personnel. This can be clarified through another supporting 
sentence: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 Stages of a CSAR Operation, Page III-1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998) 
 
Using the above sentence the following sentence can be modelled: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Sentence 4 
 
Note that at this level of logical modelling the specifics are not important and hence the multiple 
platforms that an isolated personnel might contact (wingman, escort aircraft, etc.) have been 
captured through the most generic phrase in the sentence, friendly forces, which allows us to 
integrate this information into the logical model shown in Figure 54. The updated logical model is 
shown in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55 – Establishing Isolated Personnel Relationships 
 
The logical model shown in Figure 55 appears to be complete and so it can be integrated with 
Figure 52 – Logical Model of Notification, as shown below in Figure 56. 
 
 
Figure 56 – Integrating a Logical Model of Notification 
 
With the notification logical model established as shown in Figure 56 this was integrated with the 
First Logical Model of Combat Search and Rescue shown previously in Figure 51. The integrated 
model is shown in Figure 57 and addresses the original issue that the CSAR operation reported an 
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isolated person. Through the logical exercise the updated reporting model and its relationships 
with the CSAR system have been established. 
 
 
 Figure 57 – Second Logical Model of Combat Search and Rescue 
 
The updated logical model of CSAR (shown in Figure 57) is now complete and incorporates the 
original CSAR logical model with the extended reporting/notification logical model. However, the 
logical model for CSAR contains unnecessary details for the current purpose of the architecture. In 
the original CSAR logical model we sought to clarify the report relationship. To achieve this 
required an in depth consideration through further logical modelling to understand the underlying 
concepts and relationships. With these established and captured we can now reduce the logical 
model of the defined term CSAR Operations
Figure 56
 by bounding the extended logical model of 
notification, as shown in , as the term report from the original logical model. Recall that 
the terms reporting and awareness and notification have been established as equivalents. The Report 
function’s logical model can now be separated from the CSAR logical model and is shown in 
generic form in Figure 58. 
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Figure 58 – A Logical Model for Report 
 
With the report relationship substituted for its logical model a final logical model for CSAR can be 
produced and is shown in Figure 59. 
 
 
Figure 59 – Final Logical Model of Combat Search and Rescue 
 
The final logical model for CSAR shown in Figure 59 captures the essential model of CSAR 
missions. For the software tool we need to understand the processes and flows within this model. 
To do this we need to transform this logical model into a flow diagram, which is the focus of the 
next subchapter. 
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6.4 Logical Model to Flow Diagram Transform 
For the logical model established in the previous subchapter to be of utility in the second version of 
the DSS software tool we need to represent it in terms of processes and flows. This process moves 
from the specific problem context to a domain independent viewpoint of the system which forms 
the CIM. This ultimately allows greater flexibility as instead of considering context specific 
problem spaces we move towards a higher level representation which, beyond the scope of this 
research, can be used to match and group problems to seek common solutions. The benefits of this 
can be further explored through Executable Architectures allowing translation of disparate 
problem contexts with common solution models. This is explored in later in this thesis in Chapter 
8, subsection 8.4. 
 
The process discussed in this section is the transformation approach used for this research. There 
are different ways of creating process and flow diagrams. The process and flow diagram must be 
the end result of whatever approach is used as the Integrated Model Driven Approach requires this 
as an input (see Figure 46). Hence, the approach presented is an exemplar. For the purposes of this 
research it doesn’t matter whether the output of this exemplar is right or wrong as the Integrated 
Model Driven Approach is the constant being tested. In practise the resultant process and flow 
diagram would be reviewed by appropriate subject matter experts and iteratively maintained to 
ensure an accurate and timely representation of CSAR missions.   
 
The first stage to transform the logical model to a flow diagram is to recognise that each relation in 
the logical model is a process. These processes are identified and captured as a bubble on the 
relationship line and the relationship words are removed, as shown in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60 – Identifying Processes within the Logical Model 
 
With the processes identified the context can be removed from the diagram. While the sequence of 
keywords in Figure 60 sets precedence of the processes there is no indication of precedence 
between keywords. For example it can be seen that Report occurs before Locate, but the precedence 
between Locate, Support, Recover, and Communicate is not clear. An interpretation is required where 
multiple processes occur between keywords and an assessment made of precedence. The 
interpreted sequence is shown in the process diagram shown in Figure 61. 
 
  
Figure 61 – A Process Model of CSAR Operations 
 
The processes identified in Figure 61 can be given precise definitions to support future activities: 
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Report – the process of reporting the isolated personnel as requiring CSAR. 
Locate – the process of locating the position of the isolated personnel. 
Support – the process of supporting the isolated personnel with information. 
Communicate – the process of communicating with the isolated personnel. 
Recover – the process of physically recovering the isolated personnel. 
Return – the process of returning the isolated personnel to their unit and families. 
 
With the process diagram captured the final stage of the transformation is to identify flow between 
the processes. This is achieved through interpretation of the original logical model to identify the 
subject of the flows and the type of flow. The completed flow diagram for CSAR operations is 
shown in Figure 62. 
 
Figure 62 – A Flow Diagram for CSAR Operations 
 
The model shown in Figure 62 leads to a realisation that in the definition of CSAR missions the 
element the decision maker is concerned with is not the entire model, rather it is a sub model 
incorporating the processes between the starting Report and ending Return processes, but not 
including them. The Report process must be done to initiate the mission and hence the need for the 
military decision maker to decide what SoS to employ for the mission. The Return process occurs 
once the personnel has been safely recovered and hence is beyond the scope of the decision makers 
consideration as it does not impact the SoS to be used. As defined this boundary is illustrated in 
Figure 63. 
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Figure 63 – SoS Boundary for CSAR Operations 
 
With the flow diagram established for CSAR operations this can now be captured in the developed 
DSS software tool, which is the subject of the next subsection. 
6.5 Determining the CIM and PIM for CSAR 
The flow diagram established in the previous section contains the complete set of information 
necessary to generate the CIM and PIM and hence necessarily contains the information for the 
CIM-PIM transform. The CIM captures the processes and their relationships and the PIM captures 
the flows and their relationships. This is illustrated in the example shown in Figure 64 (note the 
relationships shown are illustrative and should not be confused with the relationships shown 
previously in Figure 63). 
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Figure 64 – The Role of the Flow Diagram to Determine the CIM and PIM 
 
Note how the flow diagram, contains the complete set of information for the CIM, PIM and the 
transformation between these models as described previously in section 5.5. The CIM contains the 
processes whilst the PIM contains the flows. The established process relationships for the CIM are 
shown in Matrix 4. As with the relationship matrices presented in previous Chapters this is read 
row/column, so for example the Report process is related to Locate, Communicate and Support.  
 
Matrix 4 – CIM Relationship Matrix for CSAR 
 
R
ep
or
t 
Lo
ca
te
 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
Su
pp
or
t 
R
ec
ov
er
 
R
et
ur
n 
Report  
   
  
Locate     
 
 
Communicate     
 
 
Support   
 
 
 
 
Recover      
 
Return       
 
The CIM only captures part of the established Flow Diagram for CSAR as shown previously in 
Figure 62. The other information in Figure 62 are the flows between the processes. The 
relationships have been defined by the flow sequences shown in Figure 62. The PIM relationships 
are show in Matrix 5. 
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Matrix 5 – PIM Relationship Matrix for CSAR 
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Isolated personnel details  
    
 
Situation information      
 
Isolated personnel position      
 
Isolated personnel status      
 
Support information  
 
    
Rescued personnel       
 
This provides a generic model for CSAR operations which can now be utilised to conduct a repeat 
set of historical case studies in the next chapter. 
6.6 Methodology for System Profiles 
Two profiles are required by this process – a profile of the systems and a profile of the systems as 
utilised by the commander (expressed as commanders intent). In either case to profile the systems 
they were considered as “black boxes” and the flows crossing the determined system boundary 
were identified, as illustrated in Figure 65. This explicit bounding of the system and consideration 
of only the flows makes assessment far easier as the internals of the system are no longer of 
interest, only those which penetrate the boundary. 
 
 
 
 
 
xxx 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65 – Bounding a System to Establish Flows 
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6.7 The Evaluation Process 
With a CIM and PIM captured the tool is ready to evaluate CSAR operations. The overall 
methodology for this is shown in Figure 66 and considers two viewpoints on the system – the 
mission viewpoint and the commanders viewpoint.  
 
 
Figure 66 – An Architecture of a Model Driven Approach for a DSS Utilising CIM, PIM, PSM 
 
The mission viewpoint represents the mission’s requirements as established through logical 
modelling and the transformation of the logical model into a flow diagram which serves as an 
input into the CIM. This is used as the baseline of what is needed to conduct the mission as 
expressed as processes (in the CIM) and flows (derived in the PIM). The mission viewpoint can be 
seen in the second set of case studies presented in the next chapter in section 7.2.1 for Case Study 
One and section 7.3.1 for Case Study Two. 
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The Commanders Viewpoint captures the commanders intended SoS configuration to conduct the 
mission. This SoS is constructed by the commander as described by the RPDM within a conceived 
operational procedure. The Commanders Viewpoint can be seen in the second set of case studies 
presented in the next chapter in section 7.2.2 for Case Study One and section 7.3.2 for Case Study 
Two. The DSS provides support to the decision maker on their selection and configuration of the 
SoS based on an procedure independent model. This support is based on the process & flow 
perspective which approximates to the functional perspective found in the original DSS. To clarify, 
the DSS does not consider how the SoS and the individual systems within it are utilised to conduct 
the mission in terms of operational conduct. Rather, the DSS serves the decision maker by 
comparing the selected systems and the inter-system relationships defined to form an SoS to an 
implementation independent model of CSAR missions. This model is independent of both 
technology (i.e. hardware) and conduct (the devised plan for the mission). To expand on the 
concept of a conduct independent model consider a military mission. The commander will select a 
range of systems to form an SoS to conduct a mission (expressed as the commanders intent). The 
conduct will specify tactics, techniques and procedures, a plan of how the commander envisions 
the mission to play out. This conduct will always implement the same basic processes and flows 
and these have been captured as an implementation independent model in the Mission Viewpoint. 
The Commanders Viewpoint is captured at the SoS level in a PSM and system to flow relationships 
are captured as a PSM/PIM transform matrix. By completion of these two models the PSM can be 
transformed to a PIM. This allows comparison of the Mission Viewpoint to the Commanders 
Viewpoint at the PSM level.  
 
The PSM shows the structure of the interconnection of the systems comprising the SoS. The 
Commanders Viewpoint shows the intended configuration of the systems and, by visualising the 
relationships, helps inform the decision maker of the structure of the SoS. For example, such 
visualisation helps show whether the system is distributed with a number of mutually 
interconnected systems, or centralised with a single system or clusters of systems connecting to the 
other systems in the SoS. The Mission Viewpoint PSM shows the recommended configuration of 
the SoS based on all possible interconnections of the systems. By comparing the two, the decision 
maker can identify options that they may have not considered to utilise. The comparison of the 
PSM can be seen in the second set of case studies presented in the next chapter in section 7.2.3 for 
Case Study One and section 7.3.3 for Case Study Two. 
 
The next section considers how this approach supports the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) 
model. 
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6.8 Supporting Recognition Primed Decision Making 
The initial architecture of an approach for a DSS developed and implemented in the first prototype 
software tool supported Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) making through trying to provide a 
compatible support approach. The model driven approach implemented in this chapter provides 
an opportunity for closer integration with the RPD. The implemented approach recognises that 
with a decision maker using RPD and a mission requirement captured separately there will be two 
viewpoint at different ends of the MDA model spectrum. The mission viewpoint will produce a 
CIM/PIM while the RPD will produce a PIM. This leaves the question of how these two views can 
be reconciled. The methodology developed allows the two viewpoints to be compared and 
assessed at the same model level as shown in Figure 67. 
 
 
Figure 67 – DSS Tool Evaluation Process 
 
The next chapter repeats the case studies originally conducted with the first prototype DSS 
software tool with the new DSS software tool. The transform shown in Figure 67 will be applied to 
the second set of case studies in the next Chapter 7, for the first case study in Matrix 8 and for the 
second case study in Matrix 18. The comparison in Figure 67 will similarly be shown in Matrix 15 
for case study one and Matrix 22 for the second case study. 
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6.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the development of the second implementation of an approach for a 
decision support system. The development of the underlying software tool was detailed, 
particularly the implementation of model transformations. As this approach required precise 
models the Generic Functional Model (GFM) developed for the first software tool was not 
appropriate. A logical model of the Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) mission was created from 
available doctrine which required multiple sentences and models of these sentences to be 
combined into a single model. With a logical model for CSAR missions established this was then 
converted into a flow diagram. The flow diagram in turn could be used to determine a 
Computational Independent Model (CIM) and Platform Independent Model (PIM) for CSAR 
missions. These are the two main components for the model driven approach developed in the 
previous Chapter 5. The methodology for profiling systems was presented and finally the overall 
evaluation process. With the full approach outlined and a software tool developed the next 
Chapter 7 evaluates the developed tool with a repeat of the case studies conducted with the 
original parametric approach. 
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Chapter 7  
Evaluation of Second Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter revisits the case studies conducted earlier in this thesis using the new model driven 
approach developed in Chapter 5 and implemented in a software tool in Chapter 6. The two case 
studies originally conducted in Chapter 4 with the original parametric approach are repeated. For 
each of the case studies a Mission Profile and Commanders Intent Profile is generated. These 
profiles are compared and conclusions drawn. Finally, in light of the revisited case studies an 
overall evaluation of the tool and the model driven approach is given. 
Research Contributions of Chapter 
This 
From the previous chapter(s): 
Research
 
 established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of a Model Driven 
Approach for a Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military 
Missions. This Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics which informs the decision maker.  
 
In the model driven approach the system of systems is captured in a Platform Specific Model, the common 
characteristics are captured in a Platform Independent Model and the combat search and rescue mission is 
captured in a Computational Independent Model. These models can be related by Model 
Transformation. The architecture has been implemented in a Software Tool.  
 
The software tool was used to conduct a set of literature based Case Studies of the application of this 
research (combat search and rescue) and the results evaluated. 
This chapter introduces: 
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Figure 68 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Seven 
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7.1 Revisiting the Case Studies 
This section reconsiders the case studies conducted in Chapter 4 with the methodology developed 
in the previous Chapter 6. The methodology adds rigour and precision to the techniques 
developed in the first part of this research to profile missions and systems using a common set of 
characteristics. The previous chapter used logical modelling to establish a precise model of CSAR 
operations which was an evolution of the Generic Functional Model (GFM) developed earlier in 
this research. The logical model was used to determine the Computational Independent Model 
(CIM) and Platform Independent Model (PIM) for CSAR Operations. The creation of these models 
enabled a Model Driven Architecture (MDA) approach to be used for the Decision Support System 
(DSS). The software tool implementation of the DSS was rewritten to support these enhancements. 
In this chapter the original case studies will be repeated with this new enhanced methodology and 
the findings analysed against the historical evidence and also compared and contrasted with the 
findings from the first DSS software tool. 
 
As with the first implementation three main aims were set to be achieved by developing this 
second prototype software tool: 
1. Feasibility - demonstrate that the developed DSS architecture could be implemented in a 
software tool. 
2. Validation - perform a set of historical case studies utilising the developed prototype 
software tool. 
3. Guide - guide the further development of the architecture of an approach for a DSS. 
 
These aims will be addressed the evaluation of the second implementation in section 7.4. 
7.1.1 Generated Mission to System Profile 
With the CIM and PIM profiles for CSAR operations established in the previous chapter the DSS 
tool can be used to profile the mission and systems and transform the established PIM to a specific 
mission PSM. An overview of the PIM to PSM model transform and comparison with the 
Commanders Viewpoint (the RPDM generated PSM) is outlined below in Figure 69. The 
Commanders Viewpoint is the PSM generated by the Recognition Primed Decision model as 
identified as the most representative model of how military decision makers actually make 
decisions as discussed previously in section 2.4. 
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Figure 69 – Model Transformation Sequence 
 
The rest of this chapter reconsiders the case studies conducted in Chapter 4 with the methodology 
developed in the previous Chapter 6. 
7.2 Case Study One Revisited – Seawolf CSAR in Vietnam 
This subsection revisits the case study previously conducted in subsection 4.3.1, Case Study One – 
Seawolf CSAR in Vietnam. The narrative for this case study was previously given in subsection 
4.3.1.1. This case study was repeated using the methodology shown previously in Chapter 6 and 
sought to understand the implications of the various SoS configurations against mission 
requirements. The four systems profiled for this case study are: 
• A rescue configuration Huey helicopter 
• An attack configuration Huey helicopter 
• Air Force Controller 
• 57th Medical Attachment Controllers 
 
Consider the developed flow diagram for CSAR operations developed in section 6.4 and shown 
again in Figure 70. 
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Figure 70 – Developed Flow Diagram for CSAR Operations 
 
This developed flow diagram for CSAR operations is a template for conducting CSAR operations 
and modified diagrams will be developed for this case study based on the roles and interactions of 
the systems available in this case study. There are two viewpoints which are modelled by the DSS. 
The first is the mission viewpoint of the system profiles which captures the possible flows and 
relationships between the systems. The second viewpoint is that of the commander’s intent which 
captures the systems profile as the decision maker wants to utilise them. The following two 
sections determine profiles for these two viewpoints, the mission and commanders intent 
respectively. 
7.2.1 Mission Profile 
The purpose of this subsection is to profile all the possible connections between the available 
systems which are modelled as flows. When the mission has been profiled and transformed into an 
implementation independent model the profiles established in this section will provide the 
transformation into the implementation. The purpose of this is twofold: firstly to highlight the 
possible interconnections between systems that the decision maker is not currently utilising (SoS 
awareness) and secondly to provide a mapping of the systems to flows to allow multiple SoS 
configurations to be assessed. This mapping can be used when comparing the mission generated 
SoS to the decision makers SoS to trace capability gaps back to the SoS relationships. The flows 
were determined by considering available references. In actual use the profile would be completed 
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by subject matter experts to accurately reflect the system to flow relationships. The full set of 
determined possible connections is illustrated in Figure 71. 
 
 
Figure 71 – Possible Flows between Systems 
 
The system to flow relationships can be determined from Figure 71 and are captured in Matrix 6. 
These relationships were determined by the author based on available technical documentation 
about these systems and the role they fulfil when crewed. The relationships indicate that the 
system can create the flow and does not imply that it must create that flow. For example, the attack 
configuration Huey Helicopter has the “isolated personnel position”, “isolated personnel status” and 
“situation information” flows. 
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Matrix 6 – Determined System to Flow Relationships 
 
Is
ol
at
ed
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
de
ta
ils
 
Si
tu
at
io
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Is
ol
at
ed
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
po
si
tio
n 
Is
ol
at
ed
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
st
at
us
 
Su
pp
or
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
R
es
cu
ed
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) 
 
     
Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration) 
 
   
  
Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control"  
 
 
   
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - 
"Dustoff Operations"       
 
With the system to flow relationships captured in Matrix 6 the system to system relationships as 
determined by the flows can be found from Figure 71, as captured in Matrix 7. 
 
Matrix 7 – Indicated PSM System to System Relationships 
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Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration)  
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Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration)     
Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control"     
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - 
"Dustoff Operations" 
 
   
 
We now seek deeper insight into the system to system interconnections as informed by the 
transformation of the PIM flow to flow model (as determined in Matrix 5) into a PSM system to 
system model utilising the model transform determined in Matrix 6. The full transformation is 
shown in Matrix 8. The PIM is shown in the bottom left with the transform shown bottom right 
and the resultant PSM from the transformation shown top right. 
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Matrix 8 – PIM to PSM Transformation 
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Isolated personnel details 
  
  
     
 Situation information   
  
     
 Isolated personnel position    
 
     
 Isolated personnel status   
  
 
 
    
Support information  
   
      
Rescued personnel  
    
The resultant PSM system to system model, determined by the transformation shown in Matrix 8, 
is shown in Matrix 9. This profile may highlight missing relationships or help guide future 
development of the systems by identifying relationships useful for conducting particular missions. 
Note that the transformed PSM SoS relationships are more interconnected than the indicated 
relationships captured in Matrix 7. From Matrix 9 it can be observed that the Huey Helicopter 
(Attack Configuration) only has relationships with the Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) 
and the Air Force Controllers and Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) are highly coupled. 
There are no relationships back to the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers which implies a 
possible gap and indicated that its role may be redundant from the process and flow viewpoint. 
This is further supported as the only flow the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers is duplicated by 
the Air Force Controllers.  
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Matrix 9 – Transformed PSM System to System Relationships 
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Matrix 9 is the implied model as determined by the PIM flow to flow relationships transformed 
using the flow to system matrix. This only considers the full complement of systems used in the 
mission and does not consider subsets as SoS. To investigate the profiles of different SoS 
configurations on the PSM a transformation from PSM to PIM is required, as illustrated in Matrix 
10. 
 
Matrix 10 – PSM to PIM Transformation 
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The PSM to PIM transformation matrix shown in Matrix 10 allows different SoS configurations to 
be transformed to a flow to flow relationship matrix. The example shown is the minimal SoS 
configuration found whose PIM covers the model required for CSAR as shown in Matrix 5. As 
indicated previously the role of the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers seemed redundant, the 
profile generated by Matrix 10 shows this to be the case. The relationships can be determined by 
another PIM to PSM transformation as shown in Matrix 11. 
 
Matrix 11 – PIM to PSM with Minimal SoS Transformation 
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The transformed PSM determined in Matrix 11 and shown in Matrix 12 is the resultant Mission 
Profile for this particular mission. This will be compared to the Commanders Intent Profile, which 
will be determined in the next subsection. 
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Matrix 12 – Mission Profile PSM 
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Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration)     
Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration)     
Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control"     
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - 
"Dustoff Operations"     
 
7.2.2 Commanders Intent Profile 
The narrative for the mission, previously given in subsection 4.3.1.1, is reconsidered in Table 9 and 
the flows (as identified from an initiator to a recipient) matched to the events. 
 
Table 9 – Sequence of Events and Flow Mappings for Case Study One 
No Description Flow Initiator Recipient 
1 Paddy Control contacts Dustoff 
Operations with an emergency 
scramble mission - a Navy Seawolf 
helicopter had given a mayday call 
near Tra Vinh indicating that it had 
been hit by enemy fire and was going 
down. 
Isolated personnel 
details 
Paddy Control Dustoff 
Operations 
2 Captain David Freeman, a Dustoff 
pilot from the 57th Medical 
Detachment, and his crew scramble. 
Isolated personnel 
details 
57th Medical 
Attachment 
Controllers 
“Dustoff 
Operations” 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
3 Paddy vectors Freeman to the 
coordinates where they had last seen 
the downed Seawolf on RADAR. 
Isolated personnel 
position 
Paddy Control Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
4 Freeman takes approximately 15 
minutes to get there. 
   
5 Freeman starts a search pattern which 
involves flying north to south with the 
crew visually searching for the 
crashed helicopter or a signal from 
their crew.  At this stage Freeman 
does not know if anyone has survived 
or the tactical situation. 
   
6 Within a couple of minutes the crew 
chief spots and points out the 
wreckage of the helicopter.  An initial 
assessment of the situation by 
Isolated personnel 
position 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
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No Description Flow Initiator Recipient 
Freeman and his crew is: 
7 The downed Seawolf is in an open 
area, easily visible and with plenty of 
room next to it for the Huey to land. 
Situation 
information 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
8 The downed Seawolf looks in good 
physical condition with little external 
damage. 
   
9 From a tactical perspective the 
location is bad as the open area is 
difficult to defend with little cover. 
   
10 Freeman makes a low pass over the 
helicopter and sees four airmen.  They 
are huddled next to the downed 
Seawolf and holding off a squad of 
Vietcong with their personal weapons.  
The downed Seawolf has a 50-calibre 
machine gun mounted on it but it was 
facing the wrong way and could not 
be swung around for defence. 
Isolated personnel 
status 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
11 Freeman gets a call on UHF radio 
from another Seawolf helicopter which 
had responded to the emergency call.  
The pilot told them he was five 
minutes away and would give them 
gun cover whilst they made the 
pickup. 
Situation 
information 
 
 
Situation 
information 
Huey Helicopter 
Attack 
Configuration 
 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
 
Huey Helicopter 
Attack 
Configuration 
12 Whilst waiting for the Seawolf to 
arrive the Dustoff crew decide on 
what appeared to be the best plan of 
action. 
   
13 Freeman approaches the crash site 
facing the enemy location and, using 
the downed helicopter as cover, land 
within 20-25 yards of where the 
downed crew were making their 
stand.  As the downed crew ran 
towards the rescue helicopter the 
Seawolf arrived and fired on the 
enemy position with machine gun fire 
and rockets.  This caused the Viet 
Cong to cease-fire and dig in, allowing 
the downed crew to scramble onto 
the Dustoff and Freeman exited the 
way that they came in without taking 
any hits. 
Rescued personnel Huey Helicopter 
Rescue 
Configuration 
CSAR Operation 
 
From Table 9  a modified diagram showing the flows between the CSAR systems can be drawn, as 
shown below in Figure 72. Note how the systems do not map one to one onto the processes as 
shown in Figure 70, but rather as distinct processes defined by their flows. The process used in this 
case study will seek to understand the relationship between this system of systems to the mission’s 
flow diagram and in so doing identify any gaps or shortfalls in the capability of that SoS. 
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Figure 72 – Case Study One Flow Diagram 
 
With the commanders intent captured in Figure 72 the relationships between the available systems 
and the flows can be captured as shown in Matrix 13. These relationships are captured by 
identifying the systems which originate the flows (the recipients will be passively identified 
through the system-to-system relationships later on in this process).  
 
Matrix 13 – RPDM System to Flows Relationships 
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Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration)  
     
Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration)  
 
    
Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control"       
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - 
"Dustoff Operations" 
 
 
 
   
 
(Numbers refer to the sequence in Table 9) 
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For the decision makers viewpoint the Figure 72 diagram can be used to determine the 
relationships between the systems which are captured in Matrix 14. These are the implied 
relationships which would be validated to ensure the requirements of the mission, as expressed in 
the CIM and PIM, are realised. The validation of these relationships is beyond the scope of the 
technical information available as ultimately it would require a review by subject matter experts to 
review who are unavailable for this research. However, the generated profile from the historical 
narrative will suffice for comparison with the mission viewpoint PSM and the purposes of this case 
study. 
 
Matrix 14 – Commanders Intent Profile PSM 
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Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control"     
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - 
"Dustoff Operations" 
 
   
 
With the Commanders Intent Profile established this can be compared to the Mission Profile, 
which is the focus of the next subsection. 
7.2.3 Profiles Comparison 
The PSM profiles from the mission viewpoint and the commander viewpoint are compared in 
Matrix 15.  
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Matrix 15 – PSM Profile Comparison 
Mission Viewpoint  Commanders Viewpoint 
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Huey Helicopter 
(Rescue Configuration) 
  
  
 
   
Huey Helicopter (Attack 
Configuration) 
 
   
   
 
Air Force Controllers - 
"Paddy Control" 
 
  
 
    
57th Medical 
Attachment Controllers 
- "Dustoff Operations" 
 
   
 
The most notable feature comparing the mission viewpoint and the commanders viewpoint is that 
the mission viewpoint does not utilise the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers at all. Looking back 
at the commanders viewpoint of the systems illustrated in Figure 72 it can be seen that the role of 
the 57th Medical Controllers is redundant in the context of this particular CSAR Operation. It can be 
seen from Matrix 15 that the commanders viewpoint of the SoS to be used is based around the 
Huey Rescue Helicopter. This is shown by the relationships from it to all other systems and vice 
versa. In contrast the mission viewpoint suggests a decentralised and more interconnected SoS 
with more relationships between the reduced set of systems. 
 
In terms of relationship differences between the two viewpoints the mission viewpoint removes all 
relationships on the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers, as discussed previously. A new 
relationship from the transformed mission viewpoint PIM to PSM is from the Air Force Controllers 
to the Huey helicopter (attack configuration). In Figure 71, which shows all of the possible flows 
between systems, there are no flows between the Air Force Controllers and the Huey helicopter 
(attack configuration). However, it can be seen that the flow isolated personnel position is routed 
from the Air Force Controller via the Huey helicopter rescue configuration to the Huey helicopter 
attack configuration. An opportunity has been identified to direct this flow from the originator (Air 
Force Controllers) direct to the recipients without an intermediary. Hence the commanders 
viewpoint only allows communication between the Huey helicopter rescue configuration and the 
Huey helicopter attack configuration. This means that all information from the Air Force 
Commanders must be relayed by the Huey helicopter rescue configuration to the Huey helicopter 
attack configuration. The mission viewpoint has identified an opportunity to communicate directly 
from the Air Force Controllers to the Huey helicopter attack configuration and in so doing 
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relieving the Huey helicopter rescue configuration from having to relay that information. This was 
identified through the transformed mission viewpoint PIM to PSM. Note that this does not 
impinge on the agile force structure of the commanders intent, it simply reinforces it by 
unburdening the rescue configuration Huey helicopter from relaying messages from the Air Force 
Controllers to the attack configuration Huey helicopter. 
 
The second new relationship is a reflexive relationship on the Air Force Controllers. This new 
relationship provides the insight that the systems role may have increased beyond a peripheral 
system into a more central role requiring self reference to fulfil more than one process. This 
indication points to a specific relationship that may require further analysis to understand the 
implications of that relationship. 
7.2.4 Case Study One Revisited Conclusions 
The reanalysis of this case study using the updated DSS has shown that the SoS used to conduct 
the mission was suitable in terms of flows and processes. The analysis has revealed that the 
involvement of the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers was redundant and higher levels of 
capability may have been realised by decentralising the SoS away from the rescue configuration 
Huey helicopter to a smaller, more interoperable SoS. This disagrees with the finding from the first 
consideration of this case study in 4.3.1 that only the combination of all four available systems 
could successfully complete the mission. Revisiting the results generated by the first DSS tool show 
that the Dustoff Operations fulfilled the select appropriate resources and prepare resources functions 
within the Planning & Adapting functional grouping of the original generic functional model 
(GFM). Considering the boundary of the problem space the DSS considers, as identified in the 
developed flow diagram for CSAR Operations previously shown in Figure 63, these functions are 
not within the remit of the SoS to conduct the mission. The precise profiling of the SoS boundary 
through this model clearly delineates between the conduct of the mission and the support 
infrastructure pre and post mission. The model driven approach for a DSS has revealed the 
underlying processes required for conduct of the mission and provided scope for simplification 
and greater networking within the reduced SoS. The results of this case study has falsified the 
parametric approach and identified improvements that could be made on the commanders intent.  
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7.3 Case Study Two Revisited – Rescue Of Lt Devon Jones 
This subsection revisits the case study previously conducted in subsection 4.3.2, Case Study Two – 
Rescue Of Lt Devon Jones. The narrative for this case study was previously given in subsection 
4.3.2.1. This case study was repeated using the methodology shown previously in Chapter 6 and 
sought to understand the implications of the various SoS configurations against mission 
requirements. 
 
The four systems profiled for this case study are: 
• MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter 
• F-15C ‘Eagle’ tactical fighter aircraft 
• ‘Sandy’ A10A close support aircraft 
• AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) 
 
As with the previous case study the developed flow diagram for CSAR operations developed in 
section 6.4 will be used as a template for conducting CSAR operations and modified diagrams will 
be developed for this case study based on the roles and interactions of the systems in this case 
study. The developed DSS tool required two input profiles, the Standard Flow Profile and the 
Commanders Profile which are the focus of the next subsections. 
7.3.1 Mission Profile 
As for the previous case study the Standard Flow Profile is used to capture all the possible 
connections between the available systems by modelling flows. While the flows were explicitly 
shown as inter systems flows in the previous case study a different graphical approach will be 
used for this case study due to the higher level of flow interconnections. Rather than showing the 
flows as dedicated lines as for the first case study only the flows that each system can produce 
have been identified. This is a more efficient approach as the relationships between individual 
systems do not need to be captured, this will be determined by the DSS. The flows have been 
modelled by capturing flow originators as illustrated in Figure 73. 
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Figure 73 – System Flow Profile 
 
From Figure 73 the identified system to flow relationships can be expressed as a matrix, as shown 
in Matrix 16. 
 
Matrix 16 – Mission System to Flow Relationships 
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AWACS       
F-15C RESCAP  
 
    
20th SoS Crew MH-53J “Pave Low”  
     
A-10A “Sandy” RESCAP  
    
 
 
From Figure 73 the identified system to flow relationships can be expressed as a matrix, as shown 
in Matrix 16. Note that the F-15C RESCAP to 20th SoS Crew MH-53J Pave Low relationship is 
implied in Figure 73 but not explicitly shown for layout reasons. Essentially every system can have 
a relationship with any other system. This is in contrast to the more stovepiped systems considered 
in Case Study One.  
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Matrix 17 – Mission Viewpoint System to System Relationships 
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The relationships shown in Matrix 17 are all of the possible relationships, but which ones are 
required by the CSAR mission? To determine this requires the established PIM for CSAR missions, 
captured previously in Matrix 5, to be transformed using the systems to flow relationships 
established in Matrix 16. The overall transformation is shown in Matrix 18. 
 
Matrix 18 – PIM to PSM Transformation 
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    
 
Isolated personnel details  
   
     
 Situation information 
 
   
     
 Isolated personnel position 
  
  
     
 Isolated personnel status 
  
  
 
 
    
Support information 
  
  
      
Rescued personnel 
  
 
  
The PSM determined by the transform of the CSAR PIM is a subset of the possible system 
connections captured previously in Matrix 17. Note how there are no relationships back on the 
AWACS. As the AWACS is the only system that produces the isolated personnel details flow this is 
acceptable. Thus the PSM determined in Matrix 18 is the Mission Profile PSM, as shown separately 
in Matrix 19. 
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Matrix 19 – Mission Profile PSM 
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This completes the necessary standard flow profile for input into the DSS tool. As an aside, note 
that the only consideration here is what flows the systems are capable of producing. These would, 
in practise, be evaluated by subject matter experts and, more importantly, maintained by them as 
the systems are upgraded and improved. Much like the first approach this one also supports a 
catalogue of systems which can be iteratively maintained and provides a ready source of system 
profiled to speed up the approach. This second profile required for input into the DSS is the 
commanders intent profile which is the focus of the next subsection. 
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7.3.2 Commanders Intent Profile 
The narrative for the mission, previously given in subsection 4.3.2.1, is reconsidered in Table 10 
and the flows (as identified from an initiator to a recipient) matched to the events. 
 
Table 10 – Sequence of Events and Flow Mappings for Case Study Two 
No Description Flow Initiator Recipient 
1 AWACS receives mayday call from 
Slade as he parachutes down after 
ejecting from his aircraft. 
   
2  Jones and Slade land some distance 
away from each other 
   
3  Jones digs in and camouflages 
himself 
   
4  MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter 
scrambled to crash site 
Isolated personnel 
details 
AWACS MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’  
F-15C ‘Eagle’  
‘Sandy’ A10A 
5 Iraqi MiG-23 fighters appear, engaged 
by two USAF F-15Cs on RESCAP 
(Combat Air Patrol), MiG-23’s retreat 
Situation 
information 
F-15C ‘Eagle’ MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’  
6 At approximately 10:30 Jones hides 
from what he thinks are enemy 
fighters, actually the two F-15Cs on 
RESCAP 
   
7 At approximately 10:30 Slade is 
discovered and detained by Iraqi 
forces 
   
8 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter returns 
to Arar to refuel, returning 
immediately to continue search 
   
9 ‘Sandy’ A-10A makes contact with 
Jones via radio on SAR frequency 
Support information ‘Sandy’ A10A ‘Sandy’ A10A 
10  Jones guides the ‘Sandy’ A-10A  to 
him, ‘Sandy’ A-10A locates him exactly 
using its INS 
Isolated personnel 
position 
 
Isolated personnel 
position 
‘Sandy’ A10A 
 
 
‘Sandy’ A10A 
‘Sandy’ A10A 
 
 
MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
11 Iraqi MiG-23s move into area, 
engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on 
RESCAP (Combat Air Patrol), MiG-23’s 
retreat 
Situation 
information 
F-15C ‘Eagle’ MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’  
12 ‘Sandy’ A-10’s sanitise the area, MH-
53J ‘Pave Low’, returned from 
refuelling, waits on the ground 
Situation 
information 
‘Sandy’ A10A MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
13 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ moves in to rescue 
Jones, spots an Iraqi truck en route to 
Jones’ position 
Situation 
information 
 
MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
‘Sandy’ A10A 
14  ‘Sandy’ A-10A engages Iraqi truck Situation 
information 
‘Sandy’ A10A MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
15 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ lands near 
destroyed Iraqi truck, Jones breaks 
cover and boards the helicopter, 
helicopter returns to base 
Rescued personnel 
 
 
Isolated personnel 
status 
MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
 
MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
CSAR Operation 
 
 
MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
16 ‘Sandy A-10A’s stay on station to 
assure the MH-53J’s safety 
Situation 
information 
‘Sandy’ A10A MH-53J ‘Pave 
Low’ 
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The mapping of flows to systems established through the sequence of events shown in Table 10 are 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 74.  
 
 
Figure 74 – Case Study Two Flow Diagram 
 
With the commanders intent captured in Figure 74 the relationships between the available systems 
and the flows can be captured as shown in Matrix 20. These relationships are captured by 
identifying the systems which originate the flows (the recipients will be passively identified 
through the system to system relationships later on in this process). 
 
Matrix 20 – RPDM System to Flow Relationships 
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Finally the system-to-system relationships are determined by considering Figure 74 in terms of the 
relationships between the systems which are captured in Matrix 21. 
 
Matrix 21 – RPDM System to System Relationships 
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With the Mission Profile and Commanders Intent Profile established the profiles can be compared, 
which is presented in the next section. 
7.3.3 Profiles Comparison 
The PSM profiles are shown for comparison in Matrix 22. It can be seen that the Commanders 
Viewpoint Profile is identical to the Mission Profile and hence the appropriate relationships 
between systems have been utilised for the mission.  
 
Matrix 22 – PSM Profile Comparison 
Mission Viewpoint  Commanders Viewpoint 
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In practice this comparison would be used as validation of the commanders intent and give 
support to the decision maker that the SoS formed is as complete as can be and meets the missions 
requirements. 
7.3.4 Case Study Two Revisited Conclusions 
The reanalysis of case study two using the updated DSS has shown that the SoS used to conduct 
the mission was ideally suited in terms of flows and processes. The analysis has revealed that no 
subset of the systems involved could have been used. This disagrees with the (incorrect) findings 
of the original DSS which indicated that the F-15C RESCAP was redundant. In practice the analysis 
produced by the model driven approach for a DSS shown in this subsection would be taken as 
support for the Commanders Intent. 
7.4 Evaluation of Model Driven Approach 
The two case studies have been repeated with the updated model driven approach as implemented 
in a second prototype software tool. 
 
There were three findings from the model driven approach for case study one, the Seawolf CSAR 
in Vietnam. The first finding was that one of the component systems, the 57th Medical Attachment 
Controllers, was unnecessary. The parametric approach had not identified this redundant system 
and had incorrectly indicated that all of the systems were required to conduct the mission. This 
result alone falsifies the parametric approach. The second finding was a new relationship from the 
Air Force Controllers to the Huey helicopter (attack configuration). An opportunity had been 
identified to avoid utilising a pivotal system, the Huey helicopter (rescue configuration) as a 
message relay. The mission viewpoint had identified an opportunity to communicate directly from 
the Air Force Controllers to the Huey helicopter attack configuration and in so doing relieving the 
Huey helicopter rescue configuration from having to relay that information. This was identified 
through the transformed mission viewpoint PIM to PSM. Note that this does not impinge on the 
agile force structure of the commanders intent, it simply reinforces it by unburdening the rescue 
configuration Huey helicopter from relaying messages from the Air Force Controllers to the attack 
configuration Huey helicopter. The third new relationship identified was a reflexive relationship 
on the Air Force Controllers. This provided an indication that the systems role may have increased 
beyond a peripheral system into a more central role requiring self reference to fulfil more than one 
process. This was in contrast to the parametric approach which had incorrectly indicated that all of 
the systems were needed. The results of this case study have falsified the parametric approach and 
identified improvements that could be made on the commanders intent. 
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The model driven approach for Case Study Two found that all of the component systems were 
required to conduct the mission which was the same as the commanders intent. The parametric 
approach found that the not all of the systems were required, which was incorrect and falsified this 
approach. The model driven approach identified that all systems were required and verified the 
relationships between them from the functional perspective. However, the model driven approach 
only utilised the functional set of characteristics, no consideration was given to the non-functional 
and physical environment characteristics as the original parametric approach did. This is discussed 
further below in the feasibility of this approach. 
 
At the start of this second set of case studies three main aims were set to be achieved by developing 
the second prototype software tool: 
1. Feasibility - demonstrate that the developed DSS architecture could be implemented in a 
software tool. 
2. Validation - perform a set of historical case studies utilising the developed prototype 
software tool. 
3. Guide - guide the further development of the architecture of an approach for a DSS. 
 
The feasibility of the model driven approach has been demonstrated through the case studies 
which have successfully applied the approach. The findings from the case studies were more 
informative and insightful than those from the original parametric approach. This is due to the 
model driven approach which has separated the systems and functionality. These were intertwined 
in the previous parametric approach and made forming and assessing alternate SoS difficult. The 
model driven approach has separated the systems and functionality through the use of Model 
Driven Architecture (MDA) which establishes a platform independent model that captures the 
functionality required in such a way that he ultimate implementation of that functionality can be 
migrated across technology. Through the success of the second set of case studies the model driven 
approach has not be falsified for functional characterisation of missions and SoS. However, unlike 
the original parametric approach no consideration of the non-functional and physical environment 
characteristics was made with the model driven approach. Hence while the model driven approach 
has not been falsified by the functional profile (which the parametric approach was falsified 
against) it may yet be falsified against the non functional and physical environment characteristics. 
 
A number of ideas were generated from the development of the second implementation using the 
architecture of a model driven approach for a DSS. These will be discussed in more detail in the 
Future Work section (8.4) of the next Chapter 8. 
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The utility and value of this approach in supporting the commanders decision through the RPD 
model has been shown through the case studies findings. The DSS is not intended to be 
prescriptive, rather its role is more of a guard function to protect against oversights and errors. 
 
In line with the research methodology outlined previously in section 1.5 the epistemology used in 
this research is critical rationalism. In line with this the developed architecture of an approach for a 
DSS cannot be proved, but rather its use can be demonstrated and through that demonstration it can 
be falsified. The first developed prototype tool and the parametric approach it was based on was 
falsified. This tool, within the limits of the two case studies conducted, has not been. 
7.5 Towards Generic Mission Models 
This section explores an extension of the Model Driven Approach discovered through analysis of 
the case studies. Consider the Mission Viewpoint system to flow profiles shown previously for case 
study one in Matrix 6 and for case study two in Matrix 16 and shown as a side by side comparison 
in Matrix 23.  
 
Matrix 23 – Mission Viewpoint System to Flow Profile Comparison 
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Note in Matrix 23 that while the composition of systems is different for each case study there 
appears to be a pattern with respect to their relationships to the flows. It can be seen for example 
that both the 57th Medical Attachment Controllers and AWACS only have a single relationship to 
the isolated personnel details flow. Similarly it can be seen that the Huey Helicopter (Rescue 
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Configuration) and 20th SoS Crew MH-53J “Pave Low” have the same relationship flows. It can 
also be seen that the Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration) and both the F-15C RESCAP and A-
10A “Sandy” RESCAP have a level of commonality between them. 
 
This implies that there may be a level of commonality between the two different case study 
instantiations of the CSAR mission in terms of system to flow relationships. This indicates that the 
findings of the GFM developed in the parametric approach were correct in so far that there exists a 
level of commonality at the higher levels between all CSAR missions. It should be stressed that this 
is an unproven hypothesis and further testing will be required to validate this. If shown to be true 
then the original GFM may be reusable for future work. 
 
The utility of this finding, once confirmed, is that verification of a SoS is only needed once against 
the functional perspective through the identification and allocation of roles (as defined by flow 
relationships). The clear identification of the role of a system by its relationships to flows gives the 
commander a view on what they can do with available systems. This will also enable automated 
profiling of systems for identified mission roles. An extension of this research thread would 
consider the allocation of the previously developed primary and secondary attributes and factors 
onto the commander’s intent to differentiate between functionally identical SoS. 
 
Within the boundary of CSAR missions it appears that a generic functional viewpoint of the 
mission has been generated. My belief is that I have tamed of some elements of the CSAR wicked 
problem by representing some elements of CSAR in an objective manner. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has revisited the case studies conducted earlier in this thesis using the new model 
driven approach developed in Chapter 5 and implemented in a software tool in Chapter 6. The two 
case studies originally conducted in Chapter 4 with the original parametric approach were 
revisited using a model driven approach. For each of the case studies a new Mission Profile and 
Commanders Intent Profile were generated. These profiles were compared and a set of conclusions 
made on the analysis. These conclusions revealed deeper insights into the structure of the SoS for 
the mission than the parametric approach could identify. This analysis approach offered a 
significant improvement on the previous set of case studies conducted with the original DSS tool. 
Finally, in light of the revisited case studies an overall evaluation of the tool and the model driven 
approach was given. The tool was judged to have been a success, validating the model driven 
approach and the demonstration through the case studies did not result in a falsification of the 
approach. 
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Chapter 8  
Summary and Conclusion 
Outline of Chapter 
Section 8.1 of this Chapter summarises the research conducted in this thesis and discusses the 
development of the architecture of the approach for a decision support system that was used. The 
parametric and model driven approaches developed in this research are reviewed in subsections 
8.1.2 and 8.1.3 respectively. The approaches are demonstrated through case studies in subsection 
8.1.4. The research is reviewed against the objectives in section 8.2 and against the research 
problem in section 8.3. The research contributions of this research are discussed in section 8.4 and 
further work opportunities identified in section 8.5. Finally the research and this thesis is drawn to 
an end with a conclusion in section 8.6. 
Overview of the Contributions of this Research 
This Research
 
 established a Problem and Objectives to develop an Architecture of a Model Driven 
Approach for a Decision Support System. The approach matches System of Systems to Military 
Missions. This Research references a Literature Review. 
The decision support system supports the Decision Maker through the Recognition Primed Decision model. 
The Application for this research is the Combat Search and Rescue military mission.  
 
The decision support system supports a Decision Maker by characterising military missions and system of 
systems with a set of Common Characteristics which informs the decision maker.  
 
In the model driven approach the system of systems is captured in a Platform Specific Model, the common 
characteristics are captured in a Platform Independent Model and the combat search and rescue mission is 
captured in a Computational Independent Model. These models can be related by Model 
Transformation. The architecture has been implemented in a Software Tool.  
 
The software tool was used to conduct a set of literature based Case Studies of the application of this 
research (combat search and rescue) and the results evaluated. 
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Figure 75 – Logical Model of Research Contributions of Chapter Eight 
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8.1 Summary of Research 
This chapter evaluates the research conducted and reported in this thesis. The two areas of focus 
are firstly on the developed decision support system and secondly on the case studies conducted 
using the decision support system. 
 
This thesis started with a discussion of the nature of systems problems and the need for an open 
viewpoint to explain a system by viewing it as part of a larger whole and explaining its role in 
terms of that larger whole. This was linked to General Systems Theory which sought to provide a 
common language to discuss systemic problems by combining modelling and communication; 
modelling to provide precision while communication provided comprehensibility. An overview of 
the definition of system and system of systems was covered and led to a discussion of wicked problems. 
A bridge was formed between the open system viewpoint of the architect and the closed system 
viewpoint of the engineer, which provided a common language that General Systems Theory 
sought. This allowed the wicked planning problem of the whole to be addressed using an open 
system viewpoint while still maintaining a bridge to the closed system viewpoint required to solve 
individual problems. Overall this approach was an application of a “synthetic mode of thought” to 
systems problems (Ackoff 1974, 3) and hence was a systems approach. A practical application for the 
research was discussed and a need identified for this approach within the military domain. From 
this the research problem was stated: 
 
Is there a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole 
from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission? 
Statement of Research Problem 
 
A number of objectives were set to help answer this research problem as outlined in detail in 
section 1.6. These objectives are listed below, for the description of each see section 1.6: 
 
Objective 1: Review General Decision Making 
Objective 2: Review Military Decision Making 
Objective 3: Identify a Decision Making Model to Support 
Objective 4: Identify a Practical Application for this Research 
Objective 5: Develop an Architecture of an Approach for a Decision Support System 
Objective 6: Implement the Developed Approach 
Objective 7: Conduct a Set of Case Studies with the Implemented Approach 
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The following subsections 8.1.x summarise the research and do not speak to the objectives directly. 
The objectives will be addressed in section 8.2 where it will be shown how the research achieves 
the objectives. Subsection 8.1.1 summarises the decision making research which covers objectives 1 
to 4. Objectives 5 and 6 were to develop and implement an architecture of an approach for a 
decision support system. These are covered by the two distinct approaches developed in this 
research, a parametric approach which is discussed in subsection 8.1.2 and a model driven 
approach discussed in subsection 8.1.3. Subsection 8.1.4 summarises the case studies which covers 
objective 7. 
8.1.1 Decision Making Summary 
Decision making under uncertainty was considered in section 2.2 and a descriptive model of 
military decision makers was sought for which a decision support system could be developed. Two 
main decision making theories from economics were the Expected Utility Theory which states that 
people maximise utility as opposed to reward and Prospect Theory which characterises the general 
behaviour of decision makers with the terms Loss Aversion and Diminishing Sensitivity. Both of 
these theories indicated that humans are innately irrational decision makers liable to subject to a 
number of decision making fallacies. Note that these do not specify how decision makers actually 
make decisions, rather it characterised the likely features of the decision made. A decision support 
system would be useful to help negate these decision biases. 
 
How decisions are currently made within the military was reviewed in section 2.3, starting with 
the role of information was considered and it’s increasingly important role in redefining how 
superiority over an enemy can be defined in terms of decision making. This found that military 
decision making is typically time constrained and highly stressful which limit human decision 
making and can negate any informational advantage. A decision support system which could 
alleviate these effects and maintain any informational advantage would be useful. 
 
The history of decision making in military operations was traced in subsection 2.3.1 and the 
Military Decision Making Process was discussed in subsection 2.3.2 and the Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act Loop was discussed in subsection 2.3.3. Emerging tenets such as Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) and its impact on situational awareness and command and control were presented 
in subsection 2.3.4. The proliferation of decision makers led to alternatives to the classical decision 
making theories as discussed in section 2.4. These alternatives mostly emanated from descriptive 
studies of decision making in naturalistic environments. Naturalistic Decision Making is the 
description of proficient decision making strategies that emphasise recognitional as opposed to 
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analytical processes. A leading theory of Naturalistic Decision Making is Klein’s Recognition 
Primed Decision (RPD) strategy which was selected as the most representative model of how 
military decision makers actually make decisions and the decision making model that this research 
would support. 
 
The Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) mission was selected as the particular military mission 
that this decision support system would support in section 2.5. This mission was chosen as it is a 
time sensitive reactive mission requiring an SoS to be rapidly assembled to conduct the mission. 
With a practical application for this research established the next chapter considers the approaches 
developed for a decision support system. 
8.1.2 Parametric Approach Summary 
The first parametric approach sought to understand how military missions and system of systems 
could be understood in similar and comparable terms by using common sets of characteristics. 
Three different sets of common characteristics were identified: functional, non-functional and 
physical environment. Sets of characteristics for each were identified using various techniques 
through group work. The functional characteristics were captured through the development of a 
Generic Functional Model (GFM) using Functional Flow Diagrams (FFD) and Viewpoint Analysis 
(VPA), as discussed in section 3.2. The development of the GFM aimed to capture the high level 
functionality required by the majority of CSAR missions and was verified through available 
doctrines as discussed in section 3.2.6. The non-functional characteristics are often referred to as the 
ilities, but they are poorly defined, difficult to measures and specifically understood for particular 
systems and hence they were not usable in their current form. A hierarchical set of terms and 
definitions were developed to overcome these limitations: Attributes, Secondary Attributes and 
Factors as presented in section 3.3. The physical environment characteristics were captured in 
section 3.4 in a set which aimed to capture the pertinent environmental features of the mission that 
could be measured for available systems as well. With the three common sets of characteristics 
developed the overall approach to allow missions and SoS profiles to be matched was developed in 
section 3.5. In the context of this research a profile was specifically defined in section 3.1 as a 
representation of the structured set of common characteristics of a mission or a system of systems. The 
parametric approach was implemented in a prototype software tool in section Chapter 4. This tool 
implemented the mechanisms to create comparable mission and system profiles, as detailed in 
section 4.4.1 and the method for combining systems into SoS was defined in section 4.4.2. 
 
A set of case studies were conducted using the developed parametric approach as presented in 
section 4.3. The findings from the case studies were incorrect and not useful to a decision maker, as 
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discussed in section 4.4. The principle issue with the approach was the intertwining of systems and 
functionality. This made it difficult to combine system profiles into SoS profiles. An identified way 
forward was to shift from a parametric approach to a model driven approach, the development of 
which is the focus of the next subsection. 
8.1.3 Model Driven Approach Summary 
A number of key concepts were discussed in the development of a model driven approach, 
principally these were Transformational Grammar, Logical Modelling, Model Driven Architecture 
and model transformations. Transformational Grammar was presented in section 5.2 as a specific 
approach of generative grammar in theoretical linguistics. Transformational Grammar identifies 
two levels of representation of natural language sentences – the surface structure and the deep 
structure. An approach to elicit the deep structure from the surface structure of natural language in 
a model usable by an engineering process was required as the tree structure used by linguists was 
not appropriate. The Logical Modelling approach, which creates both surface structure and deep 
structure models of natural language using the Unified Modelling Language (UML), was identified 
in section 5.3 as appropriate for this research. In the software engineering domain the Model 
Driven Architecture has been identified as an approach which implements the model 
transformation concepts of Transformational Grammar for engineering applications. As discussed 
in section 5.4 principles from MDA can be applied to the systems engineering domain that this 
research addresses. 
 
Model Driven Architecture is a realisation of the principles of structured analysis and design and 
achieves separation of the problem specification from the solution through the logical separation of 
the Computational Independent Model (CIM)/ Platform Independent Model (PIM) and Platform 
Specific Model (PSM) models. A lower Platform Model (PM) as specified by the MDA has been 
considered but is beyond the scope of this research and the approach has been bounded to the 
CIM/PIM/PSM models. MDA prescribes model transforms to move between these models, as 
described in section 5.4.1, and a methodology was presented in section 5.4.2 to achieve this whilst 
maintaining conceptual integrity through the use of mathematical matrix transforms. This has been 
captured in a developed software tool. Whilst this process provides a solution in the form of the 
PSM (or even PM) it does not provide a repeatable input methodology to the CIM. A method to 
achieve this was presented in section 5.5 to allow Logical Models to be converted into flow 
diagrams which in turn can be converted into a CIM and PIM. A coherent and complete approach 
pulling together all of the concepts discussed was presented in section 5.5 which formed a model 
driven approach. This approach was implemented in a software tool as described in Chapter 6. 
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With a model driven approach developed a set of case studies were conducted using the 
implemented tool which is the focus of the next subsection. 
8.1.4 Model Driven Approach Case Study Summary 
A set of case studies were conducted with the developed model driven approach, as described in 
Chapter 7. The evaluation of the case studies was shown in Chapter 8. 
 
The model driven approach findings of case study one were that not all of the systems were 
needed and that unused relationships were identified between and on systems within this reduced 
SoS. This was in contrast to the parametric approach which had incorrectly indicated that all of the 
systems were needed. The results of this case study falsified the parametric approach and 
identified improvements that could be made on the commanders intent. 
 
The model driven approach for Case Study Two found that all of the component systems were 
required to conduct the mission which was the same as the commanders intent. The parametric 
approach found that the not all of the systems were required, which was incorrect and again 
falsified the parametric approach. The model driven approach identified that all systems were 
required and verified the relationships between them. 
 
The concise nature of the PSM models used for comparison made this set of case studies easier to 
interpret compared to the verbose output of the parametric approach. The main issue with the 
parametric approach, the intertwining of functionality with systems was addressed through the 
use of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) which establishes a platform independent model that 
captures the functionality required in such a way that the ultimate implementation of that 
functionality can be migrated across technology. Hence the functionality is separated from 
implementation.  
 
In line with the research methodology outlined previously in section 1.5 the epistemology used in 
this research is critical rationalism. In line with this the developed architecture of an approach for a 
DSS cannot be proved, but rather its use can be demonstrated and through that demonstration it can 
be falsified. The first developed prototype tool and the parametric approach it was based on was 
falsified. This tool, within the limits of the two case studies conducted, has not been. 
8.1.5 Model Driven Approach Limitations 
As implemented in this research the model driven approach developed has a number of 
limitations, both in the context of this research and in general. First and foremost the model driven 
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approach only considered the functional set of characteristics and not the non-functional and 
physical environment characteristics as established in Chapter 3. The reasoning behind this was 
that the functional characteristics had been the undoing of the original parametric approach and, 
due to time constraints, were the only ones considered for implementation in the model driven 
approach. To be used in the model driven approach both the non-functional and physical 
environment characteristics would need to be logically modelled to provide a logical pathway 
from the high level characterisation that the mission can be described by down to the lower system 
level where these characteristics can be met by individual systems. There would be significant 
reuse of the original characterisation work done in Chapter 3, it would be restructured and 
strengthened through logical modelling. The original functional characterisation work done was 
not reused for the model driven approach developed in Chapter 5 as the complexity of the model 
required too much time to logically model. Hence a more lightweight model was developed from 
available literature in line with how the original Generic Functional Model was created. However, 
this does not preclude the Generic Functional Model being logically modelled in the future to 
provide a more detailed and comprehensive basis for the developed model driven approach.  
8.2 Reviewing the Research Objectives 
In section 1.6 a number of objectives were set for this research. This section reviews the research 
conducted against the objectives and, ultimately, against the research problem originally stated in 
section 1.3. Each objective is listed as a separate subheading and reviewed accordingly. 
8.2.1 Objective 1: Review General Decision Making 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.2. Decision making under uncertainty was 
considered and two main decision making theories from economics were described, the Expected 
Utility Theory which states that people maximise utility as opposed to reward and Prospect Theory 
which characterises the general behaviour of decision makers with the terms Loss Aversion and 
Diminishing Sensitivity. The review of general decision making indicated that humans are innately 
irrational decision makers liable to be subject to a number of decision making fallacies. 
8.2.2 Objective 2: Review Military Decision Making 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.3. The role of information in military decision 
making was considered and it’s increasingly important role in redefining how superiority over an 
enemy can be defined in terms of decision making. This found that military decision making is 
typically time constrained and highly stressful which limits human decision making and can 
negate any informational advantage. The history of decision making in military operations was 
traced and the Military Decision Making Process and Observe, Orient, Decide and Act Loop were 
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discussed. Emerging tenets such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and its impact on situational 
awareness and command and control were presented.  NCW is not limited to technology and 
could be considered to be an emerging military response to the Information Age. The proliferation 
of decision makers leads to alternatives to the classical decision making theories. These alternatives 
mostly emanate from descriptive studies of decision making in naturalistic environments. 
Naturalistic Decision Making is the description of proficient decision making strategies that 
emphasise recognitional as opposed to analytical processes. Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision 
(RPD) strategy which is a leading theory of Naturalistic Decision Making was presented. The 
review of military decision making identified a number of existing decision making models, 
emerging military tenets and alternative decision making models which may better represent 
current and future military decision makers. 
8.2.3 Objective 3: Identify a Decision Making Model to Support 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.4. A leading theory of Naturalistic Decision 
Making is Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) strategy which has been selected as the most 
representative model of how military decision makers actually make decisions. The RPD model 
was identified as the decision making model that this research supported. 
8.2.4 Objective 4: Identify a Practical Application for this Research 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 2, section 2.5. To consider how to support effective military 
decision making a practical application was required.  To ensure that the research would be 
valuable and applicable to the SEAS DTC a military mission was an obvious context to use.  The 
majority of combat missions were deemed unsuitable due to security issues, especially with access 
to information.  The Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) mission was identified as the practical 
application as there is a quantity of literature (including United States military doctrines) available 
within the public domain.  A review of this literature indicated that the mission involved decision 
making in a variety of situations at various levels of authority, making it suitable for this research.  
CSAR is also an approved SEAS DTC vignette for research.  Whilst the overall outcome of the 
research was focused on CSAR, the less specific outcomes should be valid and applicable to a 
number of other mission types. 
8.2.5 Objective 5: Develop an Architecture of an Approach for a Decision 
Support System 
Two different approaches were developed to meet this objective. Firstly a parametric approach was 
developed in Chapter 3. A number of issues were identified with the parametric approach, 
principally the entanglement of functionality with implementation. This was addressed through 
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the development of a model driven approach in Chapter 5. The model driven approach 
implemented the principles of MDA which specifically separates functionality from 
implementation. As the approach of choice in this research the developed model driven approach 
achieved this objective. 
8.2.6 Objective 6: Implement the Developed Approach 
Two different implementations were developed to meet this objective, one for the parametric 
approach as described in Chapter 4 and a second implementation for the model driven approach as 
discussed in Chapter 6. The implementation of both approaches was achieved using the Microsoft 
Excel software package with additional coding completed in the Visual Basic for Applications 
programming language. 
8.2.7 Objective 7: Conduct a Set of Case Studies with the Implemented 
Approach 
Two different sets of case studies were completed, the first using the implemented parametric 
approach in section 4.3 and the second set using the model driven approach in Chapter 7. Both sets 
used the same two historical CSAR case studies. These were the Seawolf CSAR in Vietnam, as 
described in the detailed narrative in subsection 4.3.1.1, and the rescue of Lt. Devon Jones, as 
described in subsection 4.3.2.1. These case studies were conducted firstly using the implemented 
parametric approach and secondly using the implemented model driven approach. 
8.3 Reviewing the Research Problem 
With all the objectives achieved it is seen that the research problem, as stated originally in section 
1.3, has been solved through the demonstration of the model driven approach to the two specific 
case study examples. Thus it has been shown that a decision support system does exist: 
 
There is a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole 
from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a 
particular military mission. 
Solution of Research Problem 
 
This research has shown that a model driven approach addresses this research problem. The 
analysis of a system of systems as part of a larger whole is achieved through the MDA approach of 
a CIM, PIM and PSM. These models separate the requirements from the functionality from the 
implementation. Hence it allows the larger whole (the mission itself) to be used to generate a SoS 
profile for analysis against the commanders intent. The mission viewpoint provides the open 
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viewpoint while the commander’s intent provides a closed viewpoint. The transformation between 
PIM and PSM allows rapid model generation to support the RPD model of decision making. The 
RPD model was identified by this research as the most representative model of how military 
decision makers actually make decisions. The overall approach allows a particular military mission 
to be captured as a model through an approach which starts with logical modelling and ends with 
a CIM and PIM, as described previously in section 5.5. In summary this research has shown that 
there is a decision support system that can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a 
larger whole from both open and closed viewpoints in order to support the decision of which 
systems to use to conduct a particular military mission. 
8.4 Significance of Research 
This section outlines the significance of the research reported in this thesis to the wider academic 
community. Three main areas of contribution have been identified, each of which draws from 
different parts of this thesis. The first area is the identification of limitations of a traditional systems 
engineering approach as discussed in subsection 8.4.1. The second area is the identification of a 
need for both open and closed viewpoints on a wicked problem as discussed in subsection 8.4.2. 
Finally, the third area is the demonstration of a practicable model driven approach as discussed in 
subsection 8.4.3. 
8.4.1 Limitations of a Traditional Systems Engineering Approach 
Two distinct approaches were developed in this research for a decision support system. The first 
approach was a parametric approach and was representative of a traditional systems engineering 
approach. A number of limitations were identified with this approach, some at the time of 
evaluation and many more when compared to the later developed model driven approach. These 
limitations are discussed in turn in this subsection. 
 
The primary limitation of the parametric approach which necessitated the development of a model 
driven approach was the entanglement of functionality with systems. Each systems profile 
captured the functionality that the system could perform. This functionality then became 
intimately linked with the underlying platform and caused difficulty in separating them for the 
assessment of alternate SoS configurations. 
 
The parametric approach did not capture any relationships between systems meaning that the 
combining of systems into SoS was understood as only an additive rather than an integrating 
function. 
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Overall the parametric approach was found in practice to be verbose, overly detailed and time 
consuming. In essence it resembled the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), as previously 
described in subsection 2.3.2, more than the agile, faster Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) 
decision making model described in section 2.4 that this research sought. 
8.4.2 Need for Closed and Open Viewpoints on a Wicked Problem 
This research has established the need to take both open and closed viewpoints on a wicked 
problem. A closed viewpoint is not well suited for dealing with uncertainty and therefore 
inappropriate for wicked problems. An open viewpoint can be used to address the uncertainty of 
wicked problems. 
 
The CSAR mission viewpoint is open. By association the commander’s intent is open. However, 
the commander’s RPD model, which is a proposed solution, is necessarily from a closed viewpoint. 
As a human, the decision making process which leads to the solution is prone to error; see the 
decision making fallacies described in section 2.2 and the examples given in Appendix C. It was 
shown from the perspective of selecting SoS to conduct CSAR missions that if only an open 
viewpoint is taken then the structure of the SoS to be utilised will be all the possible connections 
implied by the models/transforms from the open perspective. The closed viewpoint captures the 
structure of the SoS from an internal perspective and may be a superset or subset of the open 
viewpoint but can be compared and moderated by the open viewpoint. Without the open 
viewpoint there is no comparison and hence no indication of how appropriate the proposed SoS 
actually is. 
 
The need established for both an open and closed viewpoint requires a tighter coupling of the 
commander’s intent with the mission viewpoint. The model driven approach developed in this 
research achieves this through model transformation which preserves the structure and 
relationships of models. 
8.4.3 Demonstration of a Practicable Model Driven Approach 
The model driven approach developed in this research has been demonstrated as practicable 
through two case studies. This approach has been shown to work through the chosen epistemology 
of critical rationalism, i.e. the approach cannot be proven but rather can be shown not to be falsified. 
This research has demonstrated the model driven approach through two case studies which did 
not result in a falsification of the approach.  
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The model driven approach has been shown to handle the particular wicked problem of CSAR 
missions. This approach addresses both open and closed viewpoint from a bottom up and top 
down approach through MDA model levels. These models separate the functionality from the 
implementation. Hence it allows the larger whole (the mission itself) to be used to generate a SoS 
profile for analysis against the commanders intent. The mission viewpoint provides the open 
viewpoint while the commander’s intent provides a closed viewpoint. The transformation between 
PIM and PSM provides tighter coupling between the mission viewpoint and commander’s intent 
viewpoint and allows rapid model generation to support the RPD model of decision making. 
 
The combination of a model driven approach with the RPD model provides the decision maker 
agility through a support system that is compatible with their own decision making process while 
informing them of the suitability of their choice compared to the mission viewpoint profile.  
8.5 Further Work 
Three main opportunities for further work have been identified both for applying this research and 
for technical extensions of the architectural approach. 
 
Firstly, the research conducted in this thesis it should be possible to develop a tool that could 
support the end user decision makers. While this research was focused on the CSAR mission it 
could be applied to other mission types to provide support to the decision makers who must 
assemble system of systems to achieve their objectives. 
 
As discussed in section 7.5 my belief is that I have tamed some elements of the CSAR wicked 
problem by representing elements of it in an objective manner. This is a prime area for extending 
this research, particularly as the GFM developed in the original parametric approach can be 
reused. As part of this extension the reuse of the primary and secondary attributes and factors 
developed for the parametric approach can also be investigated. It is envisioned at this early stage 
that these would be of use in differentiating between functionally identical SoS through non-
functional profiling of the commanders intent.  
 
The third opportunity identified for further work is the use of executable architectures. Executable 
architectures are simply architectures which contain some lower level model elements that allow 
them to be simulated. This in turn allows the architecture to be tested at a conceptual level to 
ensure it behaves as intended. For the practical application of this research it would be useful to be 
able to simulate the chosen architecture to help with the imagine action stage of the RPD model. To 
explain what executable systems architecture is it is worth reiterating what systems architecture is: 
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Object Management Group 2007) 
 
This specification of the parts and connectors of the system and the rules for the interactions of the 
parts using the connectors is realised through the use of models. In an executable architecture these 
models have been created utilising a standardised specification language that can be run as a 
program through the use of specialist simulator software. Whilst UML and MDA have been 
specified by the Object Management Group (OMG), there is no current specification for executable 
architectures and the specification language underlying them. Due to the unavailability of a 
standard for executable architectures a case study using a custom solution by Kennedy Carter is 
presented in Appendix O. This case study demonstrates model reuse through architectural 
patterns which is highly applicable to CSAR missions where the same conceptual model (as 
exposed through the development of the GFM) needs to be implemented with different systems for 
different applications. The architectural translation is detailed in Appendix P. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis has developed and demonstrated a novel approach for a decision support system that 
can be used to analyse a system of systems as part of a larger whole from both open and closed 
viewpoints in order to support the decision of which systems to use to conduct a particular 
military mission. The view of problem solving taken in this thesis is most like the approach used 
by John von Neumann which he himself describes below: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
The Mathematician by John von Neumann (von Neumann 1947, 196) 
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The conclusion to this entire research is thus: wicked problems do not have an exhaustively 
describable set of potential solutions, but that is not to say they are unapproachable. To tackle 
wicked problems requires an approach that is elegant in its ‘architectural’ and structural makeup. I 
believe that this research has developed such an approach, one that combines the generally closed 
viewpoint of engineering with an open viewpoint as required by wicked problems. The model 
driven approach developed in this research encapsulates the characteristics of the wicked problem 
while delivering a few simple guiding motivations to reduce the apparent arbitrariness of the particular 
situation of the problem and in so doing brings simplicity to apparent complexity. 
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Chapter 9  
Glossary 
ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre 
ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 
ASR Air Seas Rescue 
AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System 
C2 Command and Control 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CIM Computational Independent Model 
COA Course Of Action 
CSAR Combat Search And Rescue 
DoD (United States) Department of Defence  
DSS Decision Support System 
DTC Defence Technology Centre 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
FFD Functional Flow Diagram 
GFM Generic Functional Model 
GST General Systems Theory 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
INCOSE International Council On Systems Engineering 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Centre 
MDA Model Driven Architecture 
MDA Model Driven Architecture 
MDMP Military Decision Making Process 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
NCW Network Centric Warfare 
NEC Networked Enabled Capability 
OMG Object Management Group 
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
PIM Platform Independent Model 
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PM Platform Model 
PSM Platform Specific Model 
RADAR Radio Detection And Ranging 
RCC Rescue Coordination Centre 
RESCAP Rescue Combat Air Patrol 
RPD Recognition Primed Decision 
S/AS (Semi) Autonomous Systems 
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SAR Search And Rescue 
SEAS Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems 
SFMT Soft Factors Modelling Tool 
SoS System of Systems 
UAV Unmanned Autonomous Vehicle 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UK United Kingdom 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
US United States 
USAF United States Air Force 
VPA Viewpoint Analysis 
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Appendix A  
Wicked Problems 
Rittel and Webber (1973) specify ten characteristics of wicked problems: 
 
1. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
2. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
5. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
6. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
7. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
8. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
9. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
10. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Appendix B  
Characterising System-of-Systems 
There is currently no universally accepted definition for system of systems (SoS). A number of 
authors have proposed characterisations for systems of systems.  
 
Maier states the following five characteristics that differentiate a system of systems from a system. 
 
1. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
2. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
5. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
Maier (Maier 1996) 
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Boardman and Sauser differentiated between systems and system of systems as presented below in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11 – Differentiating a System from a System of Systems (Boardman and Sauser 2006, 121) 
Element  System  System of Systems  
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxx 
xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Appendix C  
Decision Making Examples 
To illustrate human fallacies with respect to decision making a couple of famous puzzles are 
presented in this Appendix.  The first problem, the Monty Hall Problem examines vertical 
paradoxes in individual decision making.  The second problem examines a phenomenon of 
groupthink, where group members go along with what they believe is the consensus. 
C.1 The Monty Hall Problem 
It has been suggested that this problem first appeared in Joseph Bertrand’s Calcul des probabilités 
published in 1888 and is now probably best known as the Monty Hall Problem.  Monty Hall was 
the presenter of an American TV show called Let’s Make A Deal which was used as the setting for 
more modern retellings of the problem.  Whilst the scenario changes the structure and outcome of 
the problem are the same.  For clarity and eloquence the scenario presented here is the version 
preferred by the psychological illusionist and showman Derren Brown. 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(Brown 2006, 261-262) 
 
This is the most simple of decisions to make as there are only two clear courses of action to choose 
between.  The reader is encouraged to make their own decision now. 
 
The most common answer is that an individual would stick.  Many reasons are quoted, but 
generally it is because it seems right and comfortable to stick because of the tacit assumptions 
already made (Granberg and Mueser 1999, 32).  The correct answer is that you should switch, 
every time.  The probability of initially picking the box with the ring in it is 1
3
 , so you have a 
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probability of 2
3
 of having your finger on an empty box.  An empty box is removed, leaving just the 
two.  One of these boxes has the ring in it and two out of three times it’ll be the box that you have 
not got your finger on. 
 
This problem was posed to Marilyn Vos Savant’s Sunday Parade column and she gave the answer 
as above which attracted nearly 10,000 Reponses from readers often vehemently disagreeing with 
her (Farina n.d.). The reason why you should switch is based on the fact, as given in Brown’s 
example, that the host knows which box the ring is in. 
 
Whilst a good brain teaser and an excellent way of annoying friends and strangers alike this does 
show a great fallacy with human decision making when presented with such cognitive traps.  Such 
predispositions to erroneously understandings of probability means that people, with the best of 
intentions and in simple either/or decision situations, can make the wrong decision. 
 
As a side note, and pure conjecture, I wonder if part of the reason for sticking with the ring box 
you originally selected is because you have already made the decision and hence no further 
decision is required.  By selecting a ring box you have already decided which box has the ring in it 
and, although another box has been removed, it does not alter the state of the box with your finger 
on it which you believe contains the ring.  To switch your selection of which box to select would be 
to show that your first decision was incorrect.  As your original decision has not been proved 
wrong yet what is the point in changing you mind when you may have been right? 
 
Having considered an example of individual decision making let us now consider decision making 
by a group of decision makers. 
C.2 The Abilene Paradox 
This refers to an anecdote in a paper written by the management expert Jerry Harvey (Harvey 
1988).  It is an example of groupthink, which is where group members conform to what they 
believe is the group’s consensus rather than their own opinions.  An abbreviated anecdote of the 
Abilene Paradox is quoted below : 
  
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 Appendices     - 211 - 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
As Harvey stated in his paper, “The inability to manage agreement, not the inability to manage 
conflict, is the essential symptom that defines organizations caught in the web of the Abilene 
Paradox” (Harvey 1988, 66).  Groupthink has been blamed for a number of disasters, perhaps most 
famously the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster.  Janis developed a set of eight symptoms to test 
groupthink (Janis 1982): 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Groupthink (Janis 1982, 174) (abbreviated) 
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Appendix D  
The Military Decision Making Process 
The purpose of this Appendix is to present the details of the Military Decision Making Process 
(MDMP) and in so doing illustrate its complexity and time consuming nature. 
D.1 Step 1 - Receipt of Mission. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
D.2 Step 2 - Mission Analysis. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 Appendices     - 214 - 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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D.3 Step 3 - Course of Action Development. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
D.4 Step 4 - Course of Action Analysis. 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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Appendix E  
CSAR View Point Analysis 
This Appendix presents the View Point Analysis diagrams produced as part of this research. 
E.1 CSAR Overview 
 
  
Figure 76 – CSAR Overview VPA 
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E.2 CSAR Operations Focus 
 
Figure 77 – CSAR Operations Focus VPA (part one) 
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Figure 78 – CSAR Operations Focus VPA (part two) 
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E.3 VPA For Scenario 2 
  
Figure 79 – Scenario 2 VPA 
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Appendix F  
The CSAR Generic Functional Model 
This section of the Appendix presents the Generic Functional Model, developed as part of this 
research. The Generic Functional Model aimed to capture the functionality required by the combat 
search and rescue mission. The full set of Functional Flow diagrams that constitute the Generic 
Functional model are presented in the course of this Appendix starting with the highest level 
Context Diagram.  
 Appendices     - 223 - 
F.1 The Context Diagram 
 
Figure 80 – Context FFD 
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F.2   Level 0 (Operations) 
 
Figure 81 – Level 0 (Operations) FFD 
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F.3 Level 1 (Detect Distress Call) 
 
Figure 82 – Level 1 (Detect Distress Call) FFD 
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F.4 Level 2 (Collaborate With Coalition) 
 
Figure 83 – Level 2 (Collaborate With Coalition) FFD 
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F.5 Level 3 (Planning & Adapting) 
 
Figure 84 – Level 3 (Planning & Adapting) FFD 
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F.6 Level 3.1 (Assess Situation) 
 
Figure 85 – Level 3.1 (Assess Situation) FFD 
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F.7 Level 3.2 (Plan Rescue) 
 
Figure 86 – Level 3.2 (Plan Rescue) FFD 
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F.8 Level 4 (Execute Action) 
 
Figure 87 – Level 4 (Execute Action) FFD 
  
D
ia
gr
am
 4
: E
xe
cu
te
 a
ct
io
n
4.
1 
N
av
ig
at
e
4.
2 
In
gr
es
s
4.
3 
Lo
ca
te
 re
sc
ue
 ta
rg
et
4.
7 
D
ea
l w
ith
 re
sc
ue
 ta
rg
et
Lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
sc
ue
 ta
rg
et
O
rd
er
s 
&
ta
ct
ic
s
4.
4 
D
ea
l W
ith
 H
os
til
e 
Fo
rc
es
R
es
ou
rc
es
O
rd
er
s 
&
ta
ct
ic
s R
es
ou
rc
es
P
re
pa
re
d
re
so
ur
ce
s
O
rd
er
s 
&
ta
ct
ic
s
R
es
ou
rc
es
D
el
iv
er
y 
of
 e
ffe
ct
Fi
el
d 
da
ta
W
ea
th
er
Te
rr
ai
n
Lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
sc
ue
 ta
rg
et
4.
5 
E
gr
es
s
D
ea
l w
ith
 c
iv
ili
an
s
4.
8 
S
us
ta
in
 A
ss
et
s
Lo
ca
tio
n
da
ta
Id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
ci
vi
lia
n
Id
en
tif
ie
d
Re
sc
ue
as
se
t
O
rd
er
s 
& 
ta
ct
ics
Fie
ld 
da
ta
C
om
ba
ta
nt
M
is
si
on
A
ss
et
s
D
es
tru
ct
io
n 
co
nf
irm
at
io
n
Returned asset
N
av
ig
at
io
n 
In
fo
C
ur
re
nt
 L
oc
at
io
n
Re
co
ve
red
 A
ss
ets
 Appendices     - 231 - 
F.8.1 Level 4.7 (Deal With Rescued Assets) 
 
Figure 88 – Level 4.7 (Deal With Rescued Assets) FFD 
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F.8.2 Level 4.8 (Sustain Assets) 
 
Figure 89 – Level 4.8 (Sustain Assets) FFD 
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F.9 Level 5 (Command) 
 
Figure 90 – Level 5 (Command) FFD 
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F.10 Level 6 (Assess Mission) 
 
Figure 91 – Level 6 (Assess Mission) FFD 
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Appendix G  
Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors 
This Appendix presents the full set of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors developed as 
part of this research. 
 
Table 12 – Full Proposed Set of Attributes, Secondary Attributes and Factors 
Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
Adaptability The ability of a 
system to change 
how it functions 
(allocation of 
functions) and 
what it does (what 
functions it 
executes) in 
response to the 
environment. 
Mobility The ability of a 
system to deliver 
an effect/output 
somewhere else 
(reach) 
Footprint The physical size 
and weight of the 
system 
    Endurance The time and 
distance a system 
can operate for on 
its own resources. 
    Range The range at 
which the system 
can deliver 
effects/outputs 
Availability The ability to 
provide a 
particular 
functional level for 
the majority of 
time 
Maintainability The ability of a 
system to be 
retained in, or 
restored to, a state 
in which it can 
perform its 
required functions. 
Testability How easily / 
comprehensively 
the system can be 
tested, either by 
an external party 
or by self test. 
 
 
  Supportability A measure of how 
easy a system is to 
support (i.e. the 
extent, complexity 
and size of its 
reach-back 
architecture) 
 
 
  Durability A measure of how 
long lasting the 
system is in its 
normal operating 
environment. 
 
 
Reliability The degree of 
certainty in the 
system to be 
functionally fit 
Redundancy Duplication of 
critical functions to 
enable 
continuation in 
case of subsystem 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
failure. 
Cooperability The ability to 
engage in co-
operative 
behaviour in a 
team, e.g. by 
information 
sharing and 
mutual support. 
Compatibility The ability of a 
system to work 
harmoniously with 
others systems 
under specific 
conditions to fulfil 
relevant 
requirements 
without causing 
unacceptable 
interactions. 
Commonality How much the 
system has in 
common with 
other systems to 
enable them to 
work together 
(protocols, 
communications, 
etc) 
 
 
Seamlessness The ability to 
function 
consistently and 
coherently with 
other systems. 
  
 
 
Sharability The extent to 
which information 
can be shared 
between and 
across a system 
without loss of 
fidelity. 
Ambiguity The ambiguity of 
the information 
provided by a 
particular system. 
 
 
  Sharing The ability and 
willingness to 
share info etc 
between agents 
within and across 
sub systems 
 
 
Sociability/ ability 
to interact 
Describes how well 
the humans in the 
system get along 
together and muck 
in - thinking about 
team spirit? A def I 
found is: The 
relative tendency 
or disposition to be 
sociable or 
associate with 
one's fellows 
Good 
communicator 
The ability to listen 
and respond 
appropriately and 
to communicate 
meaning in the 
most appropriate 
media 
 
 
  Trustability Both the ability to 
trust and be 
trusted 
 
 
  Conflict 
management 
The ability to 
handle and dispel 
conflict  
 
 
  Collaborability The willingness 
and ability to 
collaborate and/or 
cooperate with 
others 
 
 
  Transparency The degree to 
which an agent is 
willing/able to be 
clear about goals / 
tasks / objective s 
/ boundaries etc 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
 
 
  Social 
orientation  
Ability  to orient 
oneself in terms of 
dealing with other 
agents depending 
on cues in the 
external 
environment i.e. 
external to the 
agent in question 
Credibility The impression 
created by a 
system of its intent 
to follow through 
on its actions 
Acceptability The 
satisfactoriness of 
utilising a system 
through 
conformance to 
approved 
standards (+ 
ethical standards?) 
Legitimacy The systems 
adherence to the 
relevant laws 
governing its 
actions. 
    Believability The wider (public) 
perception of the 
system's validity. 
    Transparency The degree to 
which an agent is 
willing / able to be 
clear about goals / 
tasks / objectives / 
boundaries etc 
    Trustability Both the ability to 
trust and be 
trusted 
      
 
 
Accountability The ability for a 
system to be 
accountable for its 
actions 
Responsibility A measure of how 
answerable a 
system is to 
someone for 
something or 
being responsible 
for its conduct. 
 
 
  Transparency The degree to 
which an agent is 
willing / able to be 
clear about goals / 
tasks / objectives / 
boundaries etc 
 
 
  Trustability Both the ability to 
trust and be 
trusted 
Decision 
Making 
Superiority 
The ability to make 
the right decision 
at the right time 
Awareness The system's 
knowledge of the 
battlespace 
Bandwidth The bandwidth 
available to the 
system for 
communications. 
    Capacity The amount of 
information that a 
system can 
process 
    Newness  Ability to deal with 
new information 
    Predictability Will follow orders  
and CONOPS to 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
produce same or 
expected results 
    Physical 
orientation 
Ability to orient 
oneself in physical 
space depending 
on cues in the 
external 
environment i.e. 
external to the 
agent in question    
    Cognitive 
orientation 
Ability to process 
external cues to 
develop a mental 
picture of the 
current situation 
    Social 
orientation 
Ability  to orient 
oneself in terms of 
dealing with other 
agents depending 
on cues in the 
external 
environment i.e. 
external to the 
agent in question 
  Implications The ability to apply 
situational 
awareness to 
derive or edit a 
strategic or tactical 
overview of a new 
or on-going 
mission  
Physical 
orientation  
Ability to orient 
oneself in physical 
space depending 
on cues in the 
external 
environment i.e. 
external to the 
agent in question 
    Cognitive 
orientation  
Ability to process 
external cues to 
develop a mental 
picture of the 
current situation  
    Social 
orientation  
Ability  to orient 
oneself in terms of 
dealing with other 
agents depending 
on cues in the 
external 
environment i.e. 
external to the 
agent in question 
    Assess 
implications 
Ability to assess 
implications of SA 
and derive a 
strategic or tactical 
plan or take 
account of 
implications in 
current mission 
plan 
  Decision Making  Risk tolerance the ability to 
manage risk at the 
appropriate level 
for the mission 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
    Time variance Ability to deal with 
variable time 
pressures 
    Decide Ability and 
willingness to 
make decisions 
when required and 
take responsibility 
for them 
     Autonomy The ability to act 
autonomously 
within any 
boundaries set for 
permitted and 
obligatory actions 
  Error 
Management 
 Retrieval Ability to recognise 
when a wrong 
decision was made 
or it was based on 
wrong information, 
made at wrong 
time and then can 
decide appropriate 
action to retrieve 
position  or 
remedy error 
    Cognitive 
preparedness 
Ability to 
demonstrate a 
mindset that 
expects unpleasant 
surprises and deals 
with them 
    Flexibility in 
action  
Ability to deploy 
different modes of 
adaption in 
different 
circumstances as 
an individual agent 
Deployability A measure of what 
is required to get 
"on station" at the 
required functional 
level 
Mobility The ability of a 
system to deliver 
an effect/output 
somewhere else 
(reach) 
  
 
 
Recoverability The ability of a 
system to be 
undeployed 
  
Effectiveness To do something 
effectively and 
properly, to deliver 
the required effect. 
Accessibility The quality of 
being at hand 
when needed 
  
 
 
Configurability The ability of a 
system to change 
its functionality 
through the 
rearrangement of 
its parts. 
  
 
 
Dependability A measure of how 
worthy the system 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
is of reliance or 
trust by other 
systems. 
 
 
Integrity The wholeness of 
the system, 
everything within 
the system has a 
role or purpose 
and all inputs and 
outputs have 
somewhere to go - 
no internal 
conflicts 
  
  Lethality The ability to kill Deadliness The likelihood of 
mortality occurring 
from an effect of 
the system. 
  Mobility The ability of a 
system to deliver 
an effect/output 
somewhere else 
(reach) 
  
  Predictability The ability of a 
system to 
consistently 
produce the same 
expected results. 
  
  Timeliness The ability to 
functionally 
achieve something 
within a 
predetermined or 
favourable 
timeframe. 
  
  Usability How usable the 
system is by the 
humans within it 
(who are likely to 
have been 
trained/specialists) 
including recovery 
from errors.  This 
does not imply 
simplicity. 
  
  Processing 
capability 
The ability to 
process incoming 
knowledge, 
information / data 
effectively, 
efficiently and in a 
timely manner, to 
reach conclusions 
regardless of the 
state of the 
information / data 
Speed The ability to 
process 
information rapidly 
    Ambiguousness The ability to deal 
with ambiguous 
info etc 
    Complexity The ability to deal 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
with complex info 
etc 
    Contradictions The ability to deal 
with contradictory 
info etc 
    Uncertainty 
(Value) 
The ability to deal 
with info etc with 
is not clear in 
terms of its 
content, meaning 
or source 
    Incompleteness 
(Quality) 
The ability to deal 
with info etc with 
is not complete in 
terms of its 
content or 
meaning 
    Objectivity The ability to 
objectively analyse 
technical data 
    Prioritisation The ability or 
possession of 
sufficient expertise 
to prioritise 
incoming info etc 
    Sharing The ability and 
willingness to 
share info etc 
between agents 
within and across 
sub systems 
Flexibility The allocation of 
functions within a 
system 
Configurability The ability of a 
system to change 
its functionality 
through the 
rearrangement of 
its parts. 
  
  Interchangeability The ability to 
allocate functions 
to multiple 
subsystems 
without needing to 
alter the 
subsystems 
themselves. 
  
Interoperability The ability to 
operate in synergy 
in the execution of 
assigned tasks. 
Compatibility The ability of a 
system to work 
harmoniously with 
others systems 
under specific 
conditions to fulfil 
relevant 
requirements 
without causing 
unacceptable 
interactions. 
Commonality How much the 
system has in 
common with 
other systems to 
enable them to 
work together 
(protocols, 
communications, 
etc) 
  Sharability The extent to 
which information 
Ambiguity The ambiguity of 
the information 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
can be shared 
between and 
across a system 
without loss of 
fidelity. 
provided by a 
particular system. 
Orientability The ability to 
comprehend the 
environment 
    
Survivability The ability to 
function during 
and after a natural 
or man-made 
disturbance 
Resilience The degree to 
which a system 
can recover from a 
perturbation in its 
environment. 
Stability A measure of how 
much variation a 
system 
experiences in 
normal operating 
conditions. 
    Durability A measure of how 
long lasting the 
system is in its 
normal operating 
environment. 
  Robustness The degree of 
tolerance that a 
system has to 
continue 
functioning when 
subjected to 
perturbations in its 
environment. 
  
  Security A measure of a 
systems protection 
against the 
unauthorized use 
of and prevent 
unauthorized 
access to the 
systems and it's 
subsystems. 
  
  Susceptibility The extent to 
which a system is 
likely to be found, 
targeted and hit. 
  
  Vulnerability The consequences 
of being hit 
  
Sustainability The ability to 
deliver a level of 
performance 
despite any 
interference 
Degradability The degree of 
functional 
impairment a 
system will suffer 
when exposed to 
the environment 
for prolonged 
periods 
  
  Dependability A measure of how 
worthy the system 
is of reliance or 
trust by other 
systems. 
Trustworthiness How much a 
system can be 
trusted by another 
system. 
  Resilience The degree to 
which a system 
can recover from a 
Stability A measure of how 
much variation a 
system 
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Attribute 
 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
 
Secondary 
Attribute 
Definition 
 
Factor 
 
Factor Definition 
 
perturbation in its 
environment. 
experiences in 
normal operating 
conditions. 
    Durability A measure of how 
long lasting the 
system is in its 
normal operating 
environment. 
  Robustness The degree of 
tolerance that a 
system has to 
continue 
functioning when 
subjected to 
perturbations in its 
environment. 
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Appendix H  
Physical Environment Characteristics 
This Appendix presents the full set of Physical Environment Characteristics developed as part of 
this research. 
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Table 13 – Physical Environment Characteristics 
ID Group ID Subgroup Description ID Element Description ID(4) Description 
          
1 Climate 
(Köppen 
climate 
classification) 
1.1 GROUP A: 
Tropical/megathermal 
climates 
Tropical climates with abundant 
precipitation during a portion of 
the year. Mean monthly climates 
must exceed 18ºC; precipitation 
exceeds evaporation. 
1.1.2 Tropical rain 
forest climate 
   
     1.1.3 Tropical monsoon 
climate 
   
     1.1.4 Tropical wet and 
dry or savannah 
climate 
   
  1.2 GROUP B:  
Dry (arid and 
semiarid) climates 
Arid and semiarid climates of 
the low and middle latitudes. 
Evaporation exceeds 
precipitation. 
     
  1.3 GROUP C:  
Temperate / 
mesothermal climates 
Mild and humid climates 
primarily in the lower middle 
latitudes. Mean monthly 
temperature of the coldest 
month must be between 18 and 
–3ºC; at least one month must 
have a mean temperature of 10 
ºC or higher. 
1.3.1 Mediterranean 
climates 
   
     1.3.2 Humid subtropical 
climates 
   
     1.3.3 Maritime 
Temperate 
climates or 
Oceanic climates 
   
     1.3.4 Maritime 
Subarctic climates 
or Sub polar 
Oceanic climates 
   
  1.4 GROUP D: 
Continental/micro 
thermal climate 
Found in the upper middle 
latitudes and sub polar regions 
of the northern hemisphere. 
1.4.1 Hot Summer 
Continental 
climates 
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ID Group ID Subgroup Description ID Element Description ID(4) Description 
Humid continental climates with 
cold winters; mean monthly 
temperature of coldest month 
below -3ºC; mean monthly 
temperature of the warmest 
month must be 10ºC or higher. 
     1.4.2 Warm Summer 
Continental or 
Hemiboreal 
climates 
   
     1.4.3 Continental 
Subarctic or 
Boreal (taiga) 
climates 
   
     1.4.4 Continental 
Subarctic climates 
with extremely 
severe winters 
   
  1.5 GROUP E: Polar 
climates 
Cold climates of the northern 
latitudes. All months must 
average below 10ºC. 
1.5.1 Tundra climate    
     1.5.2 Ice Cap climate    
2 Environment 2.1 Land Mission environment is on land 2.1.1 Relief A profile of the relief 
of the terrain in the 
environment 
2.1.1.1 Mountainous 
        2.1.1.2 Hills / Valleys 
        2.1.1.3 Plains 
     2.1.2 Vegetation A profile of the 
vegetation in the 
environment 
2.1.2.1 Tundra 
        2.1.2.2 Plains 
        2.1.2.3 Desert 
        2.1.2.4 Forest 
        2.1.2.5 Jungle 
  2.2 Sea Mission environment is at sea 2.2.1 Sea Conditions The conditions at sea 2.2.1.1 Beaufort wind 
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ID Group ID Subgroup Description ID Element Description ID(4) Description 
whilst the mission is 
conducted 
force scale (1-12) 
        2.2.1.2 Sea Temperature 
(degrees 
centigrade) 
  2.3 Littoral Mission environment is based 
around the coast - consider both 
Land and Sea cases above 
     
3 Predictability 3.1 Predictable Situation is predictable, few if 
any variables present 
     
  3.2 Unpredictable Situation is unpredictable due to 
variables present in the 
battlespace 
     
  3.3 Static Situation is considered to be 
static - unlikely to change in the 
near future (whilst the mission 
is conducted) 
     
  3.4 Changing Situation is considered to be 
changing, sources of volatility 
present in the environment 
     
4 Strategic 
Purpose 
4.1 Offensive Dominance over the opposition 
is the primarily strategic 
purpose 
     
  4.2 Defensive Resistance to the opposition is 
the primary strategic purpose 
     
  4.3 OOTW Strategic purpose is an OOTW 
(Operation Other Than War) 
     
5 Political 
Environment 
5.1 Local Hostility A measure of the local hostility 
to friendly systems 
10.1.1 Friendly Locals will provide 
help and assistance 
 
      10.1.2 Benign Locals will provide 
help and assistance 
on request 
 
      10.1.3 Low Locals may provide 
help and assistance 
on request; locals 
may pose a threat to 
friendly assets 
 
 
 Appendices     - 248 - 
ID Group ID Subgroup Description ID Element Description ID(4) Description 
     10.1.4 Medium Locals unlikely to 
provide help and 
assistance; locals 
likely to pose a threat 
to friendly assets 
 
      10.1.5 High Locals highly unlikely 
to provide help and 
assistance; locals 
highly likely to pose a 
threat to friendly 
assets 
 
   5.2 Political Stability A measure of the stability of the 
environment's political system 
10.2.1 Despotism Locality controlled by 
a single authoritarian 
body 
 
      10.2.2 High Locality controlled by 
a recognised political 
power whose control 
is unchallenged 
 
      10.2.3 Medium Locality controlled by 
a recognised political 
power whose control 
is unlikely to change 
 
      10.2.4 Low Locality controlled by 
a political power 
whose control is likely 
to change 
 
 
   
  10.2.5 Anarchy Locality not 
controlled by any 
political power, either 
controlled by multiple 
competing powers or 
none at all 
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Appendix I  
Case Study One – Seawolf CSAR in Vietnam 
I.1 Sequence of Events 
The first aeromedical helicopter evacuation unit in Vietnam was the 57th Medical Detachment 
from Fort Meade, Maryland.  The name “Dustoff” was derived from the radio call-sign given to 
this unit, which flew 5 Huey helicopters and was service to the then 8,000 troops in Vietnam.  For 
the pilots flying the mission their only company was “Paddy Control”, the Air Force controllers 
who provided RADAR coverage for most of the Delta. 
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Table 14 – Case Study One Sequence of Events 
1 Paddy Control contacts Dustoff Operations with an emergency scramble mission - a Navy 
Seawolf helicopter had given a mayday call near Tra Vinh indicating that it had been hit by 
enemy fire and was going down. 
2 Captain David Freeman, a Dustoff pilot from the 57th Medical Detachment, and his crew 
scramble. 
3 Paddy vectors Freeman to the coordinates where they had last seen the downed Seawolf on 
RADAR. 
4 Freeman takes approximately 15 minutes to get there. 
5 Freeman starts a search pattern which involves flying north to south with the crew visually 
searching for the crashed helicopter or a signal from their crew.  At this stage Freeman does 
not know if anyone has survived or the tactical situation. 
6 Within a couple of minutes the crew chief spots and points out the wreckage of the helicopter.  
An initial assessment of the situation by Freeman and his crew is: 
6.1 The downed Seawolf is in an open area, easily visible and with plenty of room next to it for the 
Huey to land. 
6.2 The downed Seawolf looks in good physical condition with little external damage. 
6.3 From a tactical perspective the location is bad as the open area is difficult to defend with little 
cover. 
7 Freeman makes a low pass over the helicopter and sees four airmen.  They are huddled next to 
the downed Seawolf and holding off a squad of Vietcong with their personal weapons.  The 
downed Seawolf has a 50-calibre machine gun mounted on it but it was facing the wrong way 
and could not be swung around for defence. 
8 Freeman gets a call on UHF radio from another Seawolf helicopter which had responded to the 
emergency call.  The pilot told them he was five minutes away and would give them gun 
cover whilst they made the pickup. 
9 Whilst waiting for the Seawolf to arrive the Dustoff crew decide on what appeared to be the 
best plan of action. 
10 Freeman approaches the crash site facing the enemy location and, using the downed helicopter 
as cover, land within 20-25 yards of where the downed crew were making their stand.  As the 
downed crew ran towards the rescue helicopter the Seawolf arrived and fired on the enemy 
position with machine gun fire and rockets.  This caused the Viet Cong to cease-fire and dig in, 
allowing the downed crew to scramble onto the Dustoff and Freeman exited the way that they 
came in without taking any hits. 
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I.2 Functional Profile 
The following section presents the functional profiles generated for each of the available assets. 
I.2.1 Functional Profile: Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) 
Table 15 – Functional Profile Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) 
 
Name Huey Helicopter (Rescue Configuration) 
 
Basic Configuration 
Huey Helicopter, Pilot, Co-Pilot/Navigator, Crew Chief, 
Medic 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N 
  
4.5 Egress Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians Y 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target Y 
  
4.8 Sustain assets Y 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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I.2.2 Functional Profile: Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration) 
Table 16 – Functional Profile Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration) 
 
Name Huey Helicopter (Attack Configuration) 
 
Basic Configuration 
Huey Helicopter, Pilot, Co-
Pilot/Navigator 
 
    
Subsyste
m Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y 
  
4.5 Egress Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
 
  
 Appendices     - 253 - 
I.2.3 Functional Profile: Air Force Controllers 
Table 17 – Functional Profile Air Force Controllers 
 
Name Air Force Controllers - "Paddy Control" 
 
Basic Configuration 
Air Force Controllers, radar infrastructure, communications 
infrastructure 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y 
  
1.2 Collate distress information Y 
  
1.3 Validate distress information Y 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue N 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate N 
  
4.2 Ingress N 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target N 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N 
  
4.5 Egress N 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision N 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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I.2.4 Functional Profile: 57th Medical Attachment Controllers 
Table 18 – 57th Medical Attachment Controllers 
 
Name 
57th Medical Attachment Controllers - "Dustoff 
Operations" 
 
Basic Configuration 
Air Force Controllers, RADAR infrastructure, communications 
infrastructure 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call N 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt N 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources Y 
  
3.4 Prepare resources Y 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate N 
  
4.2 Ingress N 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target N 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N 
  
4.5 Egress N 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
 
 
 
 Appendices     - 255 - 
I.2.5 Functional Profile – Forming Systems 
Matrix 24 – Case Study One Functional Profile 
 
Name 
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1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  1.2 Collate distress 
information 
Y N N Y N  FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
  1.3 Validate distress 
information 
Y N N Y N  FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
  1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y Y Y Y N  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2 Collaborate with 
coalition 
2.1 Vet information for 
security 
N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  2.2 Transfer knowledge N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  2.3 Negotiate assistance N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.2 Plan rescue Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.3 Select appropriate 
resources 
Y N N N Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.4 Prepare resources Y N N N Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.5 Conform to the laws of 
war 
Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y Y Y N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL 
  4.2 Ingress Y Y Y N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL 
  4.3 Locate rescue target Y Y Y N N  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL 
  4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y N Y N N  Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL Y FAIL 
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 4.5 Egress Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL 
  4.6 Deal with civilians Y Y N N N  Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
  4.7 Deal with rescue target Y Y N N N  Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
  4.8 Sustain assets Y Y N N N  Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.2 Monitor progress Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.3 Make decision Y Y Y N Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  5.4 Disseminate information Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.2 Debrief team N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.3 Evaluate mission 
performance 
N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.4 Generate lessons learnt N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
  6.5 Recommend doctrine 
update 
N N N N N  N N N N N N N N N N N 
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I.3 Non-Functional Profile 
Table 19 – Non-Functional Profile 
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1 Adaptability 1.1 Mobility 1.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small small small small small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
    1.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Short Long Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL 
    1.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Long Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL 
2 Availability 2.1 Maintainability 2.1.1 Testability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    2.1.2 Supportability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    2.1.3 Durability Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Long Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL 
  2.2 Reliability 2.2.1 Redundancy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
3 Cooperability 3.1 Compatibility 3.1.1 Commonality High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.2 Seamlessness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.3 Sharability 3.3.1 Ambiguity High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
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    3.3.2 Sharing High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.4 Sociability/ 
ability to 
interact 
3.4.1 Good 
communicator 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.2 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.3 Conflict 
management 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.4 Collaborability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.5 Transparency High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.6 Social 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
4 Credibility 4.1 Acceptability 4.1.1 Legitimacy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.1.2 Believability High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    4.1.3 Transparency High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.1.4 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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  4.2 Accountability 4.2.1 Responsibility High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.2.2 Transparency High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    4.2.3 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
5 Decision 
Making 
Superiority 
5.1 Awareness 5.1.1 Bandwidth High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.2 Capacity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.3 Newness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.1.4 Predictability High / 
Low 
n/a Low High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.5 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.1.6 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.1.7 Social 
Orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  5.2 Situational 
Awareness 
Synthesis 
5.2.1 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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    5.2.2 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.2.3 Social 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.4 Assess 
implications 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  5.3 Decision 
Making 
5.3.1 Risk Tolerance High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.2 Time variance High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.3 Decide High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.4 Autonomy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  5.4 Error 
Management 
5.4.1 Retrieval High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.4.2 Cognitive 
preparedness 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.4..3. Flexibility in 
action 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
6 Deployability 6.1 Mobility 6.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small Small Small Small Small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
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    6.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Short Long Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL 
    6.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Long Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL 
  6.2 Recoverability   High / 
Low 
High High High Low Low  High High High High High High High High High High FAIL 
7 Effectiveness 7.1 Accessibility   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.2 Configurability   High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  7.3 Dependability   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.4 Integrity   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.5 Lethality 7.5.1 Deadliness High / 
Low 
High Low High Low Low  High High FAIL High High High FAIL High FAIL High FAIL 
  7.6 Mobility 6.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small small small small small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
    6.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Short Long Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL 
    6.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Long Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL 
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  7.7 Awareness 7.7.1 Bandwidth High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.2 Capacity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.3 Newness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.4 Predictability High / 
Low 
n/a Low High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.5 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.6 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.7 Social 
Orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  7.8 Timeliness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.9 Usability   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.10 Processing 
Capability 
7.10.1 Speed High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.2 Ambiguousness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
 Appendices     - 263 - 
ID
(1
) 
A
tt
ri
bu
te
 
ID
(2
) 
Se
co
n
da
ry
 A
tt
ri
bu
te
 
ID
(3
) 
Fa
ct
or
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
is
si
on
 
R
es
cu
e 
H
ue
y 
A
tt
ac
k 
H
u
ey
 
P
ad
dy
 C
on
tr
ol
 
D
us
to
ff
 O
pe
ra
ti
on
s 
 Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
3
,4
 
    7.10.3 Complexity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.10.4 Contradictions High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.5 Uncertainty 
(Value) 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.6 Incompleteness 
(Quality) 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.7 Objectivity High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.8 Prioritisation High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.9 Sharing High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
8 Flexibility 8.1 Configurability   High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  8.2 Interchangeabil
ity 
  High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
9 Interoperability 9.1 Compatibility 9.1.1 Commonality High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  9.2 Sharability 9.2.1 Ambiguity High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
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10 Orientability     High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
11 Survivability 11.1 Resilience 11.1.1 Stability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    11.1.2 Durability Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Long Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL 
  11.2 Robustness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  11.3 Security   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  11.4 Susceptibility   High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
  11.5 Vulnerability   High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
12 Sustainability 12.1 Degradability   High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
  12.2 Dependability 12.2.1 Trustworthiness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  12.3 Resilience 12.3.1 Stability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    12.3.2 Durability High / 
Low 
Long Medium Medium Long Long  FAIL Long Long Long Long Long Long Long Long Long Long 
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  12.4 Robustness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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I.4 Physical Environment Profile 
Matrix 25 – Case Study One Physical Environment Profile 
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1 Climate 
(Köppen 
climate 
classification) 
1.1 GROUP A: 
Tropical/mega 
thermal 
climates 
1.1.2 Tropical 
rain 
forest 
climate 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.1.3 Tropical 
monsoon 
climate 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.1.4 Tropical 
wet and 
dry or 
savanna
h 
climate 
Y 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  1.2 GROUP B: Dry 
(arid and 
semiarid) 
climates 
  n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  1.3 GROUP C: 
Temperate/me
sothermal 
climates 
1.3.1 Mediterr
anean 
climates 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.3.2 Humid 
subtropi
cal 
climates 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.3.3 Maritime 
Tempera
te 
climates 
or 
n/a 
N N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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Oceanic 
climates 
    1.3.4 Maritime 
Subarcti
c 
climates 
or Sub 
polar 
Oceanic 
climates 
n/a 
N N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  1.4 GROUP D: 
Continental/mi
cro thermal 
climate 
1.4.1 Hot 
Summer 
Continen
tal 
climates 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.4.2 Warm 
Summer 
Continen
tal or 
Hemibor
eal 
climates 
n/a 
Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.4.3 Continen
tal 
Subarcti
c or 
Boreal 
(taiga) 
climates 
n/a 
N N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.4.4 Continen
tal 
Subarcti
c 
climates 
n/a 
N N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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with 
extremel
y severe 
winters 
  1.5 GROUP E: 
Polar climates 
1.5.1 Tundra 
climate 
n/a N N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.5.2 Ice Cap 
climate 
n/a N N N N FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
2 Environment 2.1 Land 2.1.1 Relief n/a N N N N FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    2.1.2 Vegetati
on 
n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  2.2 Sea 2.2.1 Sea 
Conditio
ns 
n/a 
4-5? 4-5?   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      n/a ALL ALL   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  2.3 Littoral   n/a Y Y   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
3 Predictability 3.1 Predictable   n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  3.2 Unpredictable   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.3 Static   n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  3.4 Changing   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
4 Strategic 
Purpose 
4.1 Offensive   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.2 Defensive   n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  4.3 OOTW   n/a Y N Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
5 Political 
Environment 
5.1 Local Hostility 5.1.1 Friendly n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.2 Benign n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.3 Low n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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    5.1.4 Medium Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    5.1.5 High n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  5.2 Political 
Stability 
5.2.1 Despotis
m Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    5.2.2 High n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.3 Medium n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.4 Low n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
   
 5.2.5 Anarchy n/a Y Y Y Y FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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Appendix J  
Case Study Two – Rescue Of Lt Devon Jones 
J.1 Sequence of Events 
 
Table 20 – Case Study Two Sequence of Events 
1 AWACS receives mayday call from Slade as he parachutes down after ejecting from his 
aircraft. 
2  Jones and Slade land some distance away from each other 
3  Jones digs in and camouflages himself 
4  MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter scrambled to crash site 
5 Iraqi MiG-23 fighters appear, engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on RESCAP (Combat Air Patrol), 
MiG-23’s retreat 
6 At approximately 10:30 Jones hides from what he thinks are enemy fighters, actually the two F-
15Cs on RESCAP 
7 At approximately 10:30 Slade is discovered and detained by Iraqi forces 
8 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ helicopter returns to Arar to refuel, returning immediately to continue 
search 
9 ‘Sandy’ A-10A makes contact with Jones via radio on SAR frequency 
10  Jones guides the ‘Sandy’ A-10A  to him, ‘Sandy’ A-10A locates him exactly using its INS 
11 Iraqi MiG-23s move into area, engaged by two USAF F-15Cs on RESCAP (Combat Air Patrol), 
MiG-23’s retreat 
12 ‘Sandy’ A-10 sanitises the area 
13 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ moves in to rescue Jones, spots an Iraqi truck en route to Jones’ position 
14  ‘Sandy’ A-10A engages Iraqi truck 
15 MH-53J ‘Pave Low’ lands near destroyed Iraqi truck, Jones breaks cover and boards the 
helicopter, helicopter returns to base 
16 ‘Sandy A-10A’s stay on station to assure the MH-53J’s safety 
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J.2 Functional Profile 
The following section presents the functional profiles generated for each of the available assets. 
J.2.1 Functional Profile: MH-53J 'Pave Low' Helicopter 
Table 21 – Functional Profile: MH-53J 'Pave Low' Helicopter 
 
Name MH-53J 'Pave Low' Helicopter 
 
 
Basic Configuration 
Huey Helicopter, Pilot, Co-Pilot/Navigator, Crew Chief, 
Medic 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call N 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt N 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N 
  
4.5 Egress Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians Y 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target Y 
  
4.8 Sustain assets Y 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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J.2.2 Functional Profile: F-15C 'Eagle' Tactical Fighter Aircraft 
Table 22 – Functional Profile: F-15C 'Eagle' Tactical Fighter Aircraft 
 
Name F-15C 'Eagle' Tactical Fighter Aircraft 
 
Basic Configuration 
Pilot, assorted weaponry (One internally mounted M-
61A1 20mm 20-mm, six-barrel cannon with 940 
rounds of ammunition; four AIM-9L/M Sidewinder and 
four AIM-7F/M Sparrow air-to-air missiles, or eight 
AIM-120 AMRAAMs, carried externally. ) 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call N 
  
1.2 Collate distress information N 
  
1.3 Validate distress information N 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt N 
2 Collaborate with coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue N 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y 
  
4.5 Egress Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress N 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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J.2.3 Functional Profile: Sandy' A-10A Close Air Support Aircraft 
Table 23 – Functional Profile: Sandy' A-10A Close Air Support Aircraft 
 
Name Sandy' A-10A Close Air Support Aircraft 
 
Basic Configuration 
Pilot, assorted weaponry (One 30 mm GAU-8/A seven-
barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 
kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and 
three under-fuselage pylon stations, including 500 
pound (225 kilograms) Mk-82 and 2,000 pounds (900 
kilograms) Mk-84 series low/high drag bombs, 
incendiary cluster bombs, combined effects munitions, 
mine dispensing munitions, AGM-65 Maverick missiles 
and laser-guided/electro-optically guided bombs; 
infrared countermeasure flares; electronic 
countermeasure chaff; jammer pods; 2.75-inch (6.99 
centimetres) rockets; illumination flares and AIM-9 
Sidewinder missiles.) 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y 
  
1.2 Collate distress information Y 
  
1.3 Validate distress information Y 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y 
2 Collaborate with coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue N 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources N 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y 
  
4.5 Egress Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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J.2.4 Functional Profile: USAF Rescue Co-ordination Centre 
Table 24 – Functional Profile: USAF Rescue Co-ordination Centre 
 
Name USAF Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) 
 
Basic Configuration Various controllers, commanders etc 
 
    
Subsystem 
Rating 
1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call N 
  
1.2 Collate distress information Y 
  
1.3 Validate distress information Y 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt N 
2 Collaborate with coalition 2.1 Vet information for security Y 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge Y 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance Y 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources Y 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate N 
  
4.2 Ingress N 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target N 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces N 
  
4.5 Egress N 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians N 
  
4.7 Deal with rescue target N 
  
4.8 Sustain assets N 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N 
  
6.3 Evaluate mission performance N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N 
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J.2.5 Functional Profile 
Table 25 – Functional Profile 
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1 Detect distress call 1.1 Receive distress call Y N N Y N 
 
FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
  
1.2 Collate distress information Y N N Y Y 
 
FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
1.3 Validate distress information Y N N Y Y 
 
FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
1.4 Acknowledge receipt Y N N Y N 
 
FAIL Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y FAIL FAIL Y 
2 
Collaborate with 
coalition 2.1 Vet information for security N N N N Y 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
2.2 Transfer knowledge N N N N Y 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
2.3 Negotiate assistance N N N N Y 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
3 Planning & Adapting 3.1 Assess situation Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
3.2 Plan rescue Y Y N N Y 
 
Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
3.3 Select appropriate resources Y N N N Y 
 
FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
3.4 Prepare resources N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
3.5 Conform to the laws of war Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
4 Execute Action 4.1 Navigate Y Y Y Y N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
4.2 Ingress Y Y Y Y N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
4.3 Locate rescue target Y Y Y Y N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
4.4 Deal with hostile forces Y N Y Y N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL Y Y 
  
4.5 Egress Y Y Y Y N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
4.6 Deal with civilians Y Y N N N 
 
Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
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4.7 Deal with rescue target Y Y N N N 
 
Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
  
4.8 Sustain assets Y Y N N N 
 
Y Y Y FAIL Y Y Y FAIL Y FAIL FAIL 
5 Command 5.1 Gather information Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
5.2 Monitor progress Y Y N Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
5.3 Make decision Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
5.4 Disseminate information Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
6 Assess Mission 6.1 Debrief rescued asset N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
6.2 Debrief team N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
6.3 
Evaluate mission 
performance N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
6.4 Generate lessons learnt N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
  
6.5 Recommend doctrine update N N N N N 
 
N N N N N N N N N N N 
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J.3 Non-Functional Profile 
Table 26 – Non-Functional Profile 
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1 Adaptability 1.1 Mobility 1.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small small small small small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
    1.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Medium Short Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL Short 
    1.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Long Medium Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL Medium 
2 Availability 2.1 Maintainability 2.1.1 Testability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    2.1.2 Supportability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    2.1.3 Durability Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
  2.2 Reliability 2.2.1 Redundancy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
3 Cooperability 3.1 Compatibility 3.1.1 Commonality High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.2 Seamlessness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.3 Sharability 3.3.1 Ambiguity High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
    3.3.2 Sharing High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  3.4 Sociability/ 
ability to 
interact 
3.4.1 Good 
communicator 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.2 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
 Appendices     - 278 - 
ID
(1
) 
A
tt
ri
bu
te
 
ID
(2
) 
Se
co
n
da
r2
y 
A
tt
ri
bu
te
 
ID
(3
) 
Fa
ct
or
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
is
si
on
 
M
H
-5
3
J 
'P
av
e 
Lo
w
' 
H
el
ic
op
te
r 
F-
15
C
 'E
ag
le
' 
Ta
ct
ic
al
 F
ig
h
te
r 
A
ir
cr
af
t 
Sa
n
dy
' A
-1
0
A
 C
lo
se
 
A
ir
 S
u
pp
or
t 
A
ir
cr
af
t 
U
SA
F 
R
es
cu
e 
C
o-
or
di
n
at
io
n
 C
en
tr
e 
(R
C
C
) 
 Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,3
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,2
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,3
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
1
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
2
,4
 
Sy
st
em
s 
- 
3
,4
 
    3.4.3 Conflict 
management 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.4 Collaborability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.5 Transparency High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    3.4.6 Social 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
4 Credibility 4.1 Acceptability 4.1.1 Legitimacy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.1.2 Believability High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    4.1.3 Transparency High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.1.4 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  4.2 Accountability 4.2.1 Responsibility High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    4.2.2 Transparency High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    4.2.3 Trustability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
5 Decision 
Making 
Superiority 
5.1 Awareness 5.1.1 Bandwidth High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.2 Capacity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.3 Newness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.1.4 Predictability High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.5 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.1.6 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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    5.1.7 Social 
Orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  5.2 Situational 
Awareness 
Synthesis 
5.2.1 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.2.2 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.2.3 Social 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.4 Assess 
implications 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  5.3 Decision 
Making 
5.3.1 Risk Tolerance High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.2 Time variance High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.3 Decide High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.3.4 Autonomy High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  5.4 Error 
Management 
5.4.1 Retrieval High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.4.2 Cognitive 
preparedness 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    5.4..3. Flexibility in 
action 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
6 Deployability 6.1 Mobility 6.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small Small Small Small Small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
    6.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Medium Short Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL Short 
    6.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Long Medium Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL Medium 
  6.2 Recoverability   High / High High High High Low  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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Low 
7 Effectiveness 7.1 Accessibility   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.2 Configurability   High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  7.3 Dependability   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.4 Integrity   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.5 Lethality 7.5.1 Deadliness High / 
Low 
High Low High High Low  High High High High High High High High FAIL High High 
  7.6 Mobility 6.1.1 Footprint Small / 
Medium 
/ Large 
Small small small small small  Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
    6.1.2 Endurance Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Short Short Medium Short Long  Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short Short FAIL Short 
    6.1.3 Range Short / 
Medium 
/ Long 
Medium Medium Long Medium Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium FAIL Medium 
  7.7 Awareness 7.7.1 Bandwidth High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.2 Capacity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.3 Newness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.4 Predictability High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.7.5 Physical 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.6 Cognitive 
orientation 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.7.7 Social 
Orientation 
High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  7.8 Timeliness   High / High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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Low 
  7.9 Usability   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  7.10 Processing 
Capability 
7.10.1 Speed High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.2 Ambiguousness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.3 Complexity High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    7.10.4 Contradictions High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.5 Uncertainty 
(Value) 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.6 Incompleteness 
(Quality) 
High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.7 Objectivity High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.8 Prioritisation High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    7.10.9 Sharing High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
8 Flexibility 8.1 Configurability   High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  8.2 Interchangeabil
ity 
  High / 
Low 
n/a Low Low Low Low  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
9 Interoperability 9.1 Compatibility 9.1.1 Commonality High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  9.2 Sharability 9.2.1 Ambiguity High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
10 Orientability     High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
11 Survivability 11.1 Resilience 11.1.1 Stability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    11.1.2 Durability Short / 
Medium 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Long  Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
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/ Long 
  11.2 Robustness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  11.3 Security   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  11.4 Susceptibility   High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
  11.5 Vulnerability   High / 
Low 
n/a High High High High  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
12 Sustainability 12.1 Degradability   High / 
Low 
Low Low Low Low Low  Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
  12.2 Dependability 12.2.1 Trustworthiness High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
  12.3 Resilience 12.3.1 Stability High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
    12.3.2 Durability High / 
Low 
Long Medium Medium Medium Long  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL Long Long Long Long Long Long Long 
  12.4 Robustness   High / 
Low 
High High High High High  High High High High High High High High High High High 
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J.4 Physical Environment Profile 
Table 27 – Physical Environment Profile 
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1 Climate 
(Köppen 
climate 
classification
) 
1.1 GROUP A: 
Tropical/mega 
thermal climates 
1.1.2 Tropical rain forest 
climate 
 n/a  Y y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.1.3 Tropical monsoon 
climate 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.1.4 Tropical wet and 
dry or savannah 
climate 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  1.2 GROUP B: Dry (arid 
and semiarid) 
climates 
   Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  1.3 GROUP C: 
Temperate/mesother
mal climates 
1.3.1 Mediterranean 
climates 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.3.2 Humid subtropical 
climates 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.3.3 Maritime 
Temperate climates 
or Oceanic climates 
 n/a  N N Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.3.4 Maritime Subarctic 
climates or Sub 
polar Oceanic 
climates 
 n/a  N N Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  1.4 GROUP D: 
Continental/micro 
1.4.1 Hot Summer 
Continental 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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thermal climate climates 
    1.4.2 Warm Summer 
Continental or 
Hemiboreal 
climates 
 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.4.3 Continental 
Subarctic or Boreal 
(taiga) climates 
 n/a  N N Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.4.4 Continental 
Subarctic climates 
with extremely 
severe winters 
 n/a  N N Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  1.5 GROUP E: Polar 
climates 
1.5.1 Tundra climate  n/a  N N Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    1.5.2 Ice Cap climate  n/a  N N N N  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
2 Environment 2.1 Land 2.1.1 Relief 2.1.1.1 n/a  N N N N  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.1.1.2 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.1.1.3 Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    2.1.2 Vegetation 2.1.2.1 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.1.2.2 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.1.2.3 Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
      2.1.2.4 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.1.2.5 n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  2.2 Sea 2.2.1 Sea Conditions 2.2.1.1 n/a  4-5? 4-5? 4-5?   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
      2.2.1.2 n/a  ALL ALL ALL   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  2.3 Littoral    n/a  Y Y Y   FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
3 Predictability 3.1 Predictable    n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  3.2 Unpredictable    Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  3.3 Static    n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  3.4 Changing    Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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4 Strategic 
Purpose 
4.1 Offensive    Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  4.2 Defensive    n/a  Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  4.3 OOTW    n/a  Y N N Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
5 Political 
Environment 
5.1 Local Hostility 5.1.1 Friendly  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.2 Benign  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.3 Low  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.1.4 Medium  Y 
 
Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    5.1.5 High  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
  5.2 Political Stability 5.2.1 Despotism  Y 
 
Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
    5.2.2 High  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.3 Medium  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
    5.2.4 Low  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
   
 5.2.5 Anarchy  n/a 
 
Y Y Y Y  FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL 
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Appendix K  
Logical Modelling Procedure & Notations 
K.1 Natural Language Notations 
The following table outlines the natural language notations used in Logical Modelling (C. 
Dickerson 2008). 
 
Table 28 – Logical Modelling Natural Language Notations 
Word Capitalised Italics Bold Underlined Font Size 
Defined Term     Normal 
Key Words     Normal 
Other Words in definition     Normal 
Other Words not in definition     Small 
 
K.1.1 Example 
Consider a definition of System: 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
(International Council on Systems Engineering 2007) 
 
In the context of engineering the term System will always mean a man-made system. Based on the 
INCOSE definition of System, the term would be comprised of 7 key words: combination, 
interacting, elements, organised, achieve, stated, and purpose. 
K.2 Logical Assessment 
Criteria for a logical model of a term include the intrinsic consistency and completeness of the 
model, and the correctness of the model relative to the natural language definition and under 
accepted interpretations. It is also desirable to have independence between the relations and 
independence between the key words.  
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K.3 Finishing the Procedure 
The procedure is finished when all of the key words (both cited from the definition and necessary 
for completion of the model) have been identified and all of the relations between the words (both 
explicit and intended by the natural language definition) have been captured in the diagram. 
K.4 Graphical Notations 
The first step in modelling a term is to list out the key words that give it meaning. The key words 
will be undefined and their meaning will be determined by relations between the words, which 
will be represented graphically, using notations from the Unified Modelling Language (UML). The 
primary type of diagram needed from UML is the class diagram.  
 
Using the diagram notation presented in Appendix K.1 the model is built starting from the 
keyword being defined (system) and identifying its direct relationship to other keywords. The 
identification process is iterated until all direct relationships between keywords (both explicit and 
intended by the natural language definition) have been identified. Figure 92 illustrates the result of 
this process for the seven keywords in system. 
 
 
Figure 92 – Initial Logical Model for System 
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Appendix L  
Model Transformations 
This Appendix presents a more detailed explanation of the model transformations as discussed in 
section 5.4.2 and based on the work by Dickerson (2008). 
 
The relational structure of a model is represented by a matrix, the notation of which is an 
underlined capital letter, such as M. The notation for the underlying set of parameters is a capital 
italics letter, e.g. M = {y1, y2, … ym-1, ym}. A mathematical relation on the parameters M is denoted as 
a normal capital letter, for example R = {(y2, ym-1), (y2, ym), (ym-1, y2)}. The ordered pairs in R 
represent relationships between the parameters and correspond to the tick marks in the matrix M, 
as illustrated in Figure 93, which is read row then column. 
 
Consider the Matrix M: 
 
Figure 93 - Matrix M 
 
Relationships in M: {(y2, ym-1), (y2, ym), (ym-1, y2)} 
 
In Figure 94, Q transforms the parameters y1, … ym into a set of parameters x1, … xn by associating 
one or more of the xk with one or more of the yi. The notation yiQxk denotes that Q has associated yi 
with xk, hence the ordered pair (yi, xk) belongs to Q. 
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Figure 94 - Matrix Q 
 
Relationships in Q: {(ym, xn-1), (ym-1, x3), (y2, xn) , (y2, x2)} 
 
The implied transformation of the models extends the notation yQx to the notation RQ to show 
how Q transforms a subset R of M into a subset RQ of N. Recall that a subset R of M, in general, 
represents a mathematical relation on the underlying set of parameters M. RQ is defined as 
follows: for each pair of parameters (yi, yj) that belong to the mathematical relation R, if yiQxk and 
yjQxl then the pair (xk, xl) belongs to the mathematical relation RQ in N. If S is a relation in N and 
RQ is a subset of S, then Q preserves the relationships of M and it is called a relational transformation 
from M to N. Although the transformation of relationships is easily calculated in this way, it is 
important to understand that this is not an ordinary calculation involving matrix sums or products. 
In summary from M and Q we have: 
 
Relationships in M 
 (y2, ym-1) 
 (y2, ym) 
 (ym-1, y2) 
 
Relationships in Q 
 (ym, xn-1) 
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 (ym-1, x3) 
 (y2, xn) 
 (y2, x2) 
 
From Q the implications on the relationships in M are: 
 
Implications of (y2, ym-1) 
 (y2,xn) & (ym-1,x3) → (xn,x3)  
 (y2,x2) & (ym-1,x3) → (x2,x3) 
 
Implications of (y2,ym) 
 (y2,xn) & (ym,xn-1) → (xn,xn-1) 
 (y2,x2) & (ym,xn-1) → (x2,xn-1) 
 
Implications of (ym-1,y2) 
 (ym-1,x3) & (y2,xn) → (x3,xn) 
 (ym-1,x3) & (y2,x2) → (x3,x2) 
 
Hence, the relationships in N are: {(xn,x3), (x2,x3), (xn,xn-1), (x2,xn-1), (x3,xn), (x3,x2)} 
Figure 95 illustrates the relational transformation described in this appendix.  
 
Figure 95 – Relational Transformation Q of M to N 
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Appendix M  
Integrated Model Driven Approach 
This Appendix presents a user manual for the use of the Integrated Model Driven Approach 
shown in section 5.5. For clarity the diagram shown previously in Figure 46 is repeated below in 
Figure 96 as it will be referred to throughout this Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 96 – Integrated Model Driven Approach 
 
Each stage of the Integrated Model Driven Approach shown in Figure 96 is discussed in sequence 
in the following subsections. The purpose of this discussion is to serve as a guide; hence the 
specific terminology of CSAR will be abstracted up to more generic military missions. The first 
subsection provides an overview of the approach as a step by step guide for the user to follow. 
Subsequent subsections detail each of the steps. 
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M.1 Step by Step Guide 
This subsection provides a step by step guide to the integrated Model Driven Approach shown in 
Figure 96. 
 
1. Establish Flow Diagram  
2. Determine CIM 
3. Determine CIM-PIM Transform 
4. Determine PIM 
5. Complete PIM-PSM Transform 
6.  Transform PIM into PSM 
7. Determine Interoperation Diagram 
M.2 Flow Diagram 
The input to the Integrated Model Driven Approach is the Flow Diagram shown at the top of 
Figure 96. The Flow Diagram captures a common model for the mission being conducted. This 
Flow Diagram represents the clear vision of what is required by a mission as expressed as 
processes and flows. As done in this thesis a precursor to producing the Flow Diagram may be the 
creation of a Logical Model for the mission in question. This Logical Model would be produced 
from available doctrines and tactics and its purpose is to capture a precise, coherent model of what 
the mission entails. Logical Modelling was discussed in the previous Appendix K. Note that this 
logical modelling approach will analyse the logical integrity of the doctrines and help expose any 
omission, inconsistencies and conflicts within them. The principle value of such an approach is the 
clear graphical exposure of the content of the doctrine which in turn can be used as a precise 
reference for the debate and resolution of any found issues. In practice this would require an 
experienced practitioner to analyse available doctrines to produce an initial model. This could then 
be refined through focus group discussion facilitated by the practitioner. This will be most effective 
when the subject matter experts are free to discuss and debate the integrity and completeness of 
the model and guide the facilitator to do the modelling. Hence, the subject matter experts are not 
encumbered by the technicalities of the techniques (which they would only briefly use) and can 
focus on the quality of the end product – the Flow Diagram. The people who help capture the 
mission in the way will be referred to as the mission architects. 
M.3 CIM 
The CIM can be determined from the Flow Diagram by considering the relationships between 
processes which is captured as a matrix. The resultant CIM helps identify the role of each process 
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in terms of the number of interconnections. This helps reveal the relative importance of each of the 
processes in terms of mission importance by the dependencies as shown through the number of 
relationships that the process has. This would be used by the mission architects. 
M.4 CIM-PIM Transform 
The CIM-PIM Transform can be determined from the Flow Diagram by considering the 
relationship between processes and flows. This provides another view of the Flow Diagram and 
captures the process to flow relationships as a matrix. This helps visualise the numbers of flows 
associated with each process and helps show the importance of each. This would be used by the 
mission architects. 
M.5 PIM 
The CIM can be determined from the Flow Diagram by considering the precedent order of 
processes shown. This will require some interpretation as the precedents may become more 
complex as the scale and scope of the Flow Diagram increases. The PIM is the final artefact within 
the mission architects remit. 
M.6 PIM-PSM Transform 
The PIM-PSM Transform is completed by the decision maker in the field. This captures the 
relationship between available systems and the flows established in the PIM. This would be 
completed by the decision maker who would decide which particular systems they wished to use 
and the relationship of those systems to the flows established in the PIM. The decision maker only 
includes the systems they wish to use as a particular SoS, not all of the available systems. The 
decision maker may complete multiple PIM-PSM Transforms in order to compare these 
alternatives. 
M.7 PSM 
The PSM is the model of the specific SoS that will be employed for the mission and is generated 
from the PIM transformed through the PIM-PSM Transformation previously established. The PSM 
shows the relationships between the systems as a matrix. This helps the decision maker identify the 
interconnections within the SoS and helps them visualise the structure of the SoS. Where the 
decision maker has completed multiple PIM-PSM Transforms each will generate a PSM and these 
can be compared by the decision maker. 
M.8 Interoperation Diagram 
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The final output of the Integrated Model Driven Approach is an Interoperation Diagram which is 
determined from the PSM. The Interoperation Diagram is the end point of this process as it shows 
the solution in a form that can be utilised by Architecture Frameworks such as the Ministry of 
Defence Architectural Framework (MODAF) and the Department of Defence Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF). 
M.9 Further Thoughts 
This Appendix has outlined how the Integrated Model Driven Approach may be applied in 
practice outside of this research domain of CSAR. The approach may be extended through 
automation. For example, the relationships between systems and flows may be predetermined by 
suitable subject matter experts and hence the decision maker may only need to select a set of 
systems to use – the PIM-PSM Transform being auto filled from their selection. The aim of this is to 
minimise the workload on the decision maker whilst maximising the output of the mission 
architects. 
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Appendix N  
Model Transformation Software Tool 
This Appendix presents the code written for the model transformation software tool implemented 
in Microsoft® Excel® 2007. 
N.1 Description 
This code was written in Microsoft Visual Basic and allows the transformation of a Matrix M into a 
Matrix N through transform Q. With the values for M and Q entered the values for N will be 
programmatically calculated. 
N.2 Software Code 
Sub FindRelationships() 
 
' Macro written by Philip Johnson 
 
' All variables declared 
 
Dim Var1 As Variant 
Dim Var2 As Variant 
Dim Var3 As Variant 
Dim CellRow As Variant 
Dim CellColumn As Variant 
     
Dim MArrayRow As Variant 
Dim QArrayRow As Variant 
Dim QArrayRow2 As Variant 
Dim NArrayRow As Variant 
Dim RowArrayRow As Variant 
Dim ColumnArrayRow As Variant 
     
Dim MArray(1 To 99, 1 To 2) As Variant 
Dim QArray(1 To 99, 1 To 2) As Variant 
Dim NArray(1 To 99, 1 To 2) As Variant 
Dim RowArray(1 To 99, 1 To 2) As Variant 
Dim ColumnArray(1 To 99, 1 To 2) As Variant 
  
' Variables set to starting values 
     
Var1 = 0 
Var2 = 0 
CellColumn = 1 
CellRow = 1 
MArrayRow = 1 
 
' List M Relationships 
 
CellRow = 1 
CellColumn = 1 
MArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While CellRow <> 7 
    Var1 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow + 17, 10).Value 
    Do While CellColumn <> 7 
        Var2 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells((CellRow + 17), (CellColumn + 3)).Value 
        If (IsEmpty(Var2)) Then 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
        Else 
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            MArray(MArrayRow, 1) = Var1 
            MArray(MArrayRow, 2) = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(17, (CellColumn + 3)).Value 
            MArrayRow = MArrayRow + 1 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
    CellColumn = 1 
    CellRow = CellRow + 1 
Loop 
 
' List Q Relationships 
 
CellRow = 1 
CellColumn = 1 
QArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While CellRow <> 7 
    Var1 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow + 17, 10).Value 
    Do While CellColumn <> 7 
        Var2 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells((CellRow + 17), (CellColumn + 10)).Value 
        If (IsEmpty(Var2)) Then 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
        Else 
            QArray(QArrayRow, 1) = Var1 
            QArray(QArrayRow, 2) = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(17, (CellColumn + 10)).Value 
            QArrayRow = QArrayRow + 1 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
    CellColumn = 1 
    CellRow = CellRow + 1 
Loop 
 
' Determine N Relationships 
 
Var1 = 0 
Var2 = 0 
Var3 = 0 
 
MArrayRow = 1 
QArrayRow = 1 
QArrayRow2 = 1 
NArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While MArray(MArrayRow, 1) <> Empty 
    Var1 = MArray(MArrayRow, 1) 
    Var2 = MArray(MArrayRow, 2) 
    Do While QArray(QArrayRow, 1) <> Empty 
        If Var1 = QArray(QArrayRow, 1) Then 
            Var3 = QArray(QArrayRow, 2) 
            Do While QArray(QArrayRow2, 1) <> Empty 
                If Var2 = QArray(QArrayRow2, 1) Then 
                    NArray(NArrayRow, 1) = Var3 
                    NArray(NArrayRow, 2) = QArray(QArrayRow2, 2) 
                    NArrayRow = NArrayRow + 1 
                End If 
                QArrayRow2 = QArrayRow2 + 1 
            Loop 
            QArrayRow2 = 1 
        End If 
        QArrayRow = QArrayRow + 1 
    Loop 
    QArrayRow = 1 
    MArrayRow = MArrayRow + 1 
Loop 
 
' Change all cell shading colour to white 
 
CellRow = 1 
CellColumn = 1 
Do While CellColumn <> 7 
    Do While CellRow <> 7 
        Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow + 10, CellColumn + 10).Interior.ColorIndex = 2 
        CellRow = CellRow + 1 
    Loop 
    CellRow = 1 
    CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
Loop 
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' Shade Cells To Show Relationships 
' Scan the row headings 
 
CellRow = 1 
RowArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While CellRow <> 7 
    Var1 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(10 + CellRow, 17).Value 
    If (IsEmpty(Var1)) Or Var1 = 0 Then 
            CellRow = CellRow + 1 
        Else 
            RowArray(RowArrayRow, 1) = Var1 
            RowArray(RowArrayRow, 2) = 10 + CellRow 
            RowArrayRow = RowArrayRow + 1 
            CellRow = CellRow + 1 
    End If 
Loop 
 
' Scan the column headings 
 
CellColumn = 1 
ColumnArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While CellColumn <> 7 
    Var1 = Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(17, 10 + CellColumn).Value 
    If (IsEmpty(Var1)) Or Var1 = 0 Then 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
        Else 
            ColumnArray(ColumnArrayRow, 1) = Var1 
            ColumnArray(ColumnArrayRow, 2) = 10 + CellColumn 
            ColumnArrayRow = ColumnArrayRow + 1 
            CellColumn = CellColumn + 1 
    End If 
Loop 
 
' Match data to row and column headings 
 
CellRow = 1 
CellColumn = 1 
NArrayRow = 1 
 
Do While NArray(NArrayRow, 1) <> Empty 
    Var1 = NArray(NArrayRow, 1) 
    Var2 = NArray(NArrayRow, 2) 
     
    RowArrayRow = 1 
    Do While RowArray(RowArrayRow, 1) <> Empty 
    If Var1 = RowArray(RowArrayRow, 1) Then 
        CellRow = RowArray(RowArrayRow, 2) 
        Exit Do 
        Else 
        RowArrayRow = RowArrayRow + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
         
    ColumnArrayRow = 1 
    Do While ColumnArray(ColumnArrayRow, 1) <> Empty 
    If Var2 = ColumnArray(ColumnArrayRow, 1) Then 
        CellColumn = ColumnArray(ColumnArrayRow, 2) 
        Exit Do 
        Else 
        ColumnArrayRow = ColumnArrayRow + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
 
 
    If Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow, CellColumn).Value = "ü" Then 
        Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow, CellColumn).Interior.ColorIndex = 12 
        Else 
        Worksheets("Sheet1").Cells(CellRow, CellColumn).Interior.ColorIndex = 3 
    End If 
    NArrayRow = NArrayRow + 1 
Loop 
 
End Sub 
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Appendix O  
Executable Architectures – Air Warfare Model 
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Figure 97 – The Air Warfare System 
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Figure 98 – The Gas Station System 
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Table 29 – Interpretation of Gas Station Variables to Air Warfare Variables 
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Figure 99 – Functional Versus Domain Partitioning 
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Figure 100 – Air Warfare Domain Model 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 Appendices     - 306 - 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
Figure 101 – Air Warfare Domain Model with Viewpoints 
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Figure 102 – xUML Model Layers 
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Figure 103 – Executable UML (xUML) 
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Figure 104 – The Role of Sequence Diagrams 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 Appendices     - 310 - 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
Figure 105 – Use Case: Threat Engagement and Weapon Delivery 
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Figure 106 – Sequence Diagram: Air Warfare System Engages Threat 
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Figure 107 – Class Diagram: Air Warfare Control 
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Figure 108 – Class Collaboration Diagram: Air Warfare Control 
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Figure 109 – Example State Machine ASL Code Translation 
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Figure 110 – iUMLite Simulator Screen Shot 
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Appendix P  
Translation Of iUMLite Gas Station Case 
Study To Air Warfare 
This Appendix details the code translation of the iUMLite Gas Station case study to air warfare as 
outlined in the previous Appendix O 
P.1 Introduction 
We have taken the Gas Station case study from the book “Model Driven Architecture with 
Executable UML” and translated it in terms of a military application using the following platform 
specific model from the book “Using Architectures for Research Development and Acquisition.” 
 
Figure 111 – Representations of Air Warfare and Gas Station Systems 
Battlespace Battlegroup 
AW 
S P W 
S P W 
S P W 
Hardware 
(Pumps, bar code 
d  ) 
Attendant 
S P W 
S P W 
S P W 
Gas Station 
Store Forecourt 
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P.2 Approach 
1. Understand conceptual translation from the original Gas Station into an Air Warfare 
System 
2. Map these translations between these two domains 
3. Translate the Domain model within iUMLite (Use Cases & Sequence Diagrams) using the 
above map 
4. Translate the Static Model within iUMLite (Classes, Associations and Generalisations) 
using the above map & translated Domain model. 
P.3 Key Translation Map: 
Note: This does not contain all translations; it is a list of the key translations made. 
 
Customers  Threats 
Attendant  AW: processing information; control 
Forecourt  Battlespace: has threats [Responsive decisions, OODA] 
Store  Near-in portion of Battlespace (point defence) [Reactive decisions, SCA] 
Gas Station  “Area of influence” of Battlegroup within sensor & weapon range 
Fuel  Weapons 
Gas Pumps  Platforms (of Battlegroup) 
Pump  Release Weapons (the act of firing weapons from the Weapon Launcher) 
Delivery  Engagement (an event where a Platform prepares to engage a Threat) 
Holster  Sensors (on Platform, e.g. RADAR) 
Motor  Weapon System (the overall weapon system, include Tracking etc) 
Clutch  Weapon Launcher (the actual launch mechanism for the weapon) 
Transaction  D3 Assessment (analysis of effectiveness of an Engagement) 
Delivery  Engagement 
Gun  Trigger (fires Weapon Launcher) 
 
Fuel Grade  Weapon Type 
Fuel Grade (Four Star)  Weapon Type(Aster) – Aster is a surface to air missile 
Fuel Grade (Unleaded)  Weapon Type(Rapier) – Rapier is a surface to air missile 
P.4 Key Variable Translations List 
Note: This does not contain all variable translations; it is a list of the key ones made. 
 
connected_pumps = connected_platforms 
Cost = Cost 
Current_State = Current_State 
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Delivered_Volume = Engaged_Units 
Delivery_Cost = Engagement_Cost 
delivery_pump = engagement_platform 
Delivery_Pump = Engagement_Platform 
Delivery_Start_Time = Engagement_Start_Time 
Delivery_Time = Engagement_Time 
Fuel_Available = Weapons_Available 
new_pending_transaction = new_pending_d3assessment 
new_transaction = new_d3assessment 
new_transaction.Transaction_Number = new_d3assessment.D3Assessment_Number 
‘Pending’ = ‘Pending’ 
PENDING_TRANSACTION = PENDING_D3ASSESSMENT 
PUMP = PLATFORM 
pump = platform 
Pump_Number = Platform_Number 
this.Tank_Capacity = this.Store_Level 
this.Tank_Level = this.Store_Level 
TRANSACTION = D3ASSESSMENT 
Transaction_Number = D3Assessment_Number 
Transaction_Type = D3Assessment_Type 
Volume_Delivered=Engaged_Units 
P.5 Code Translation 
The following sections contain code translation from within iUMLite which have been captured as 
a resource for future coding activities. Original code form the Gas Station model is shown in italics 
and the translated code is shown in normal font. 
P.6 D3 ASSESSMENT (TRN) 
(Orig. TRANSACTION) 
Transactions record the interaction between a customer and a pump that has resulted in fuel being pumped. 
 
The transaction is identified by a unique arbitrary number. It is envisaged that transactions shall be archived 
at the end of each working day. 
 
The transaction records a number of details including The Pump used, Cost, Delivery Start time and the 
time the transaction was last processed. 
 
There are also a number of types of transaction :- 
'Evaded Transaction' - The customer absconds 
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'Paid Transaction' - The customer has paid for the fuel 
'Pending Transaction' - Waiting for the customer to pay. 
Transactions record the interaction between a customer and a pump that has resulted in fuel being pumped. 
 
D3Assessments record the interaction between a threat and a platform that has resulted in 
weapons being released. 
 
The d3assessment is identified by a unique arbitrary number. It is envisaged that d3assessments 
shall be archived at the end of each day. 
 
The d3assessment records a number of details including The Platform used, Cost, Engagement 
Start time and the time the d3assessment was last processed. 
 
There are also a number of types of d3assessments :- 
'Evaded D3Assessment' - The threat escapes 
'Neutralized D3Assessment' - The threat was neutralized 
'Pending D3Assessment' - Waiting for a d3assessment of the threat. 
P.6.1 State Machine 
1 Created 
(Orig. Created) 
 
3 Neutralized 
(Orig. Paid) 
Migrate pending subtype to paid subtype. Link all payments to the paid subtype. 
# Calculate the number of tokens and tell the operator to issue them to 
# the customer. 
 
switch this.Transaction_Type 
case 'Pending' 
 pending_transaction = this->R4.PENDING_TRANSACTION 
 unlink this R4 pending_transaction 
 connected_pump = pending_transaction->R9 
 unlink pending_transaction R9 connected_pump 
 delete pending_transaction 
case 'Evaded' 
 evaded_transaction = this->R4.EVADED_TRANSACTION 
 unlink this R4 evaded_transaction 
 delete evaded_transaction 
endswitch 
 
paid_transaction = create PAID_TRANSACTION with \ 
 Transaction_Number = this.Transaction_Number 
this.Transaction_Type = 'Paid' 
 
link this R4 paid_transaction 
 
# Migrate pending subtype to neutralized subtype. Link all d3assessments to the neutralized 
subtype. 
# Calculate the number of tokens and tell the operator to issue them to 
# the customer. 
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switch this.D3Assessment_Type 
case 'Pending' 
 pending_d3assessment = this->R4.PENDING_D3ASSESSMENT 
 unlink this R4 pending_d3assessment 
 connected_platform = pending_d3assessment->R9 
 unlink pending_d3assessment R9 connected_platform 
 delete pending_d3assessment 
case 'Evaded' 
 evaded_d3assessment = this->R4.EVADED_D3ASSESSMENT 
 unlink this R4 evaded_d3assessment 
 delete evaded_d3assessment 
endswitch 
 
neutralized_d3assessment = create NEUTRALIZED_D3ASSESSMENT with \ 
 D3Assessment_Number = this.D3Assessment_Number 
this.D3Assessment_Type = 'Neutralized' 
 
link this R4 neutralized_d3assessment 
 
4 Evaded 
(Orig. Evaded) 
 
# Migrate pending subtype to evaded subtype.  
# Record customer details. 
 
pending_transaction = this->R4.PENDING_TRANSACTION 
unlink this R4 pending_transaction 
pump = pending_transaction->R9 
unlink pending_transaction R9 pump 
delete pending_transaction 
 
evaded_transaction = create EVADED_TRANSACTION with \ 
 Transaction_Number = this.Transaction_Number & \ 
 Observations = Customer_Details 
 
this.Transaction_Type = 'Evaded' 
 
link this R4 evaded_transaction 
 
# Migrate pending subtype to evaded subtype.  
# Record customer details. 
 
pending_d3assessment = this->R4.PENDING_D3ASSESSMENT 
unlink this R4 pending_d3assessment 
platform = pending_d3assessment->R9 
unlink pending_d3assessment R9 platform 
delete pending_d3assessment 
 
evaded_d3assessment = create EVADED_D3ASSESSMENT with \ 
 D3Assessment_Number = this.D3Assessment_Number & \ 
 Observations = Target_Details 
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this.D3Assessment_Type = 'Evaded' 
 
link this R4 evaded_d3assessment 
TRN1:Create D3Assessment 
(Orig. Create Transaction) 
 
# Create pending transaction waiting payment from customer 
 
new_transaction = create unique TRANSACTION with \ 
 Delivery_Start_Time = Delivery_Time & \ 
 Pump_Number = Delivery_Pump & \ 
 Cost = Delivery_Cost & \ 
 Transaction_Type = 'Pending' & \ 
        Current_State = 'Created' 
 
new_pending_transaction = create PENDING_TRANSACTION with \ 
 Transaction_Number = new_transaction.Transaction_Number 
 
link new_transaction R4 new_pending_transaction 
 
delivery_pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = Delivery_Pump 
 
link new_transaction R10 delivery_pump 
link new_pending_transaction R9 delivery_pump 
 
# Create pending d3assessment whilst waiting d3 assessment of threat 
 
new_d3assessment = create unique D3ASSESSMENT with \ 
 Engagement_Start_Time = Engagement_Time & \ 
 Platform_Number = Engagement_Platform & \ 
 Cost = Engagement_Cost & \ 
 D3Assessment_Type = 'Pending' & \ 
        Current_State = 'Created' 
 
new_pending_d3assessment = create PENDING_D3ASSESSMENT with \ 
 D3Assessment_Number = new_d3assessment.D3Assessment_Number 
 
link new_d3assessment R4 new_pending_d3assessment 
 
engagement_platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = Engagement_Platform 
 
link new_d3assessment R10 engagement_platform 
link new_pending_d3assessment R9 engagement_platform 
P.6.2 TRN2:D3 Assessment 
(Orig. Payment Received) 
P.6.3 TRN3:Threat Escapes 
(Orig. Customer Absconds) 
P.6.4 TRN4:Threat Neutralized 
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(Orig. Transaction Paid) 
P.7 ENGAGEMENT (EGT) 
(Orig. Delivery) 
 
An Engagement records the Threat interaction with a Platform. 
 
The Engagement is identified by the Platform Number and the time the weapon engagement 
started. It also records the units of weapons released and the cost. 
 
On completion of the Engagement if the Threat has been engaged with weapons then a D3 
Assessment is created with the appropriate details. If no weapons were engaged then the 
engagement is deleted and no D3 Assessment created. 
P.7.1 State Machine 
3 Creating Engagement 
(Orig. Creating Delivery) 
 
# Create a delivery instance and enable the pump. 
 
time_now = current-time 
 
new_delivery = create DELIVERY with \ 
 Pump_Number = Pump_Id & \ 
 Time = time_now & \ 
 Volume_Delivered = 0.0 & \ 
 Cost = 0.0 
 
delivering_pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = Pump_Id 
 
link new_delivery R3 delivering_pump 
 
generate PMP7:Pump_Enabled() to delivering_pump 
 
# Create an engagement instance and enable the platform. 
 
time_now = current-time 
 
new_engagement = create ENGAGEMENT with \ 
 Platform_Number = Platform_Id & \ 
 Time = time_now & \ 
 Engaged_Units = 0.0 & \ 
 Cost = 0.0 
 
engaging_platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = Platform_Id 
 
link new_engagement R3 engaging_platform 
 
generate PTM7:Platform_Enabled() to engaging_platform 
 
5 Calculating price of unconstrained engagement 
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(Orig. Calculating price of unconstrained delivery) 
 
# A unit of petrol has been delivered.  
# Update the volume delivered and current cost.  
 
new_volume = this.Volume_Delivered + 0.01 
this.Volume_Delivered = new_volume 
 
grade = this->R3->R1->R2 
new_cost = this.Cost + grade.Unit_Price 
this.Cost = new_cost 
 
# A unit of weapons has been engaged.  
# Update the units delivered and current cost.  
 
new_engaged_units = this.Engaged_Units + 1.0 
this.Engaged_Units = new_engaged_units 
 
weapon_type = this->R3->R1->R2 
new_cost = this.Cost + weapon_type.Unit_Cost 
this.Cost = new_cost 
 
6 Engagement Complete 
(Orig. Delivery Complete) 
 
# Delivery completed so create a transaction. 
# Inform the tank amount of fuel dispensed. 
 
[] = TRN1:Create_Transaction[this.Time, this.Pump_Number, this.Cost] 
 
supplying_tank = this -> R3 -> R1 
generate TNK4:Fuel_Used(this.Volume_Delivered) to supplying_tank 
 
pump = this->R3 
unlink this R3 pump 
delete this 
 
# Engagement completed so create a d3assessment. 
# Inform the weapon store amount of weapons engaged. 
 
[] = TRN1:Create_D3Assessment[this.Time, this.Platform_Number, this.Cost] 
 
supplying_weapon_store = this -> R3 -> R1 
generate WPS4:Weapons_Used(this.Engaged_Units) to supplying_weapon_store 
 
platform = this->R3 
unlink this R3 platform 
delete this 
 
8 Engagement Cancelled 
(Orig. Delivery Cancelled) 
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# The customer has not pumped any fuel therefore there is 
# no pending transaction to be paid. 
 
[] = AT3:Delivery_Cancelled[] 
 
pump = this->R3 
unlink this R3 pump 
delete this 
 
# The no weapons engaged therefore there is 
# no pending d3assessment to be done. 
 
[] = AW3:Engagement_Cancelled[] 
 
platform = this->R3 
unlink this R3 platform 
delete this 
P.7.2 EGT3:Create Engagement 
(Orig. DEL3:Create Delivery) 
P.7.3 EGT4:Weapon Unit Engaged 
(Orig. DEL4:Fuel Unit Delivered) 
P.7.4 EGT5:Engagement Complete 
(Orig. DEL5:Delivery Complete) 
P.7.5 EGT6:Delete Engagement 
(Orig. DEL6:Delete Delivery) 
P.8 PENDING D3ASSESSMENT (PND) 
(Orig. Pending Transaction) 
 
A D3 Assessment that is waiting for sensor data. 
 
The Platform where the Engagement has been performed is recorded. 
P.9 PLATFORM (PTM) 
(Orig. PUMP) 
 
Represents the Platform within the Battlespace. 
 
Each platform is uniquely identified by a number. 
 
Each platform supplies one type of weapon and is permanently connected to a weapon store 
supplying that Weapon Type. 
P.9.1 State Machine 
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1 Waiting For Threat 
(Orig. Waiting For Customer) 
 
# The pump is idle. Wait in this state until 
# a customer removes the gun from its holster. 
 
# The platform is idle. Wait in this state until 
# a threat is detected by sensors. 
 
2 Waiting Platform Enable 
(Orig. Waiting Platform Enable) 
 
# Determine whether the connected tank contains  
# more than 4% of its capacity. 
 
supplying_tank = this -> R1 
 
if supplying_tank.Tank_Empty_Flag = TRUE then 
  generate PMP4:Fuel_Level_Low() to this 
else 
  [] = AT1:Request_Pump_Enable[] 
endif 
 
# Determine whether the connected weapons store contains  
# more than 4% of its capacity. 
 
supplying_weapon_store = this -> R1 
 
if supplying_weapon_store.Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = TRUE then 
  generate PTM4:Weapon_Level_Low() to this 
else 
  [] = AW1:Request_Platform_Authorization[] 
endif 
 
5 Weapons Unavailable 
(Orig. Fuel Unavailable) 
 
# Inform customer that the pump is unavailable. 
# Wait for fuel to become available for this pump. 
 
[] = CU1:Pump_Unavailable[] 
 
# Inform weapons officer that the platform is unavailable. 
# Wait for weapons to become available for this platform. 
 
[] = CU1:Platform_Unavailable[] 
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6 Weapon Engagement Complete 
(Orig. Fuel Delivery Complete) 
 
# Delivery Now Complete, Stop motor and return pump  
# to waiting state 
 
current_delivery = this->R3 
generate DEL5:Delivery_Complete() to current_delivery 
 
[] = MO2:Stop_Motor[] 
generate PMP12:Customer_Finished() to this 
 
# Engagement Now Complete, Stop weapon system and return platform  
# to waiting state 
 
current_engagement = this->R3 
generate EGT5:Engagement_Complete() to current_engagement 
 
[] = MO2:Stop_Weapon_System[] 
generate PTM12:Engagement_Finished() to this 
 
7 Ready To Release Weapons 
(Orig. Ready To Pump) 
 
# Start pump motor and wait for the gun trigger to be depressed. 
# Or the gun can be replaced. 
 
[] = MO1:Start_Motor[] 
 
# Start weapon system and wait for the trigger to be depressed. 
# Or the weapon system can be stopped. 
 
[] = MO1:Start_Weapon_System[] 
 
8 Weapon Release Paused 
(Orig. Pumping Paused) 
 
# Disengage clutch which stops pumping. 
# Wait for gun to be replaced into the  
# holster or for the trigger to be depressed. 
 
[] = CL2:Disengage_Clutch[] 
# Disengage weapon launcher which stops releasing weapons. 
# Wait for threat not to be detected   
# or for the trigger to be depressed. 
 
[] = CL2:Disengage_Weapon_Launcher[] 
 
11 Release Weapons 
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(Orig. Pumping) 
 
# Engage clutch which starts pumping.  
# Continue until the gun trigger is released 
 
[] = CL1:Engage_Clutch[] 
 
# Engage weapon launcher which starts releasing weapons.  
# Continue until the trigger is released 
 
[] = CL1:Engage_Weapon_Launcher[] 
P.9.2 PTM1:Threat Detected 
(Orig. PMP1:Pump Removed) 
P.9.3 PTM2:Threat Not Detected 
(Orig. PMP2:Gun Replaced) 
P.9.4 PTM3:Weapon Level OK 
(Orig. PMP3:Fuel Level OK) 
P.9.5 PTM4:Weapon Level Low 
(Orig. PMP4:Fuel Level Low) 
P.9.6 PTM5:Weapons Available 
(Orig. PMP5:Fuel Available) 
P.9.7 PTM7:Platform Enabled 
(Orig. PMP7:Pump Enabled) 
P.9.8 PTM8:Trigger Depressed 
(Orig. PMP8:Trigger Depressed) 
P.9.9 PTM9:Trigger Released 
(Orig. PMP9:Trigger Released) 
P.9.10 PTM12:Engagement Finished 
(Orig. PMP12:Customer Finished) 
P.10 TARGET ESCAPED (EVD) 
(Orig. EVADED TRANSACTION) 
 
A D3 Assessment where the target has escaped without D3. 
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P.11 TARGET NEUTRALIZED (PDT) 
(Orig. PAID TRANSACTION) 
 
A D3 Assessment where the Target has been D3'd. 
P.12 WEAPON STORE (WPS) 
(Orig. TANK) 
 
Represents the storage area of weapons within the Battlespace. A Weapon Store contains one type 
of Fuel and cannot be re-filled with another fuel type. 
 
Each weapon store a Capacity in units, current level in units, an empty threshold which is the 
percentage that the weapon store is allowed to fall to before it is regarded as being Empty.  
 
Each weapon store is identified by a Unique number. 
P.12.1 State Machine 
1 Check Levels After Weapon Delivery 
(Orig. Checking Levels After Tanker Delivery) 
 
# Add volume to tank level. If the level is greater 
# than 4% of the tanks capacity reset any waiting pumps. 
# If the tank is still below its threshold return to the 
# Nearly Empty state. 
 
[] = TNK3:Increase_Level[Added_Volume] on this 
 
[below_threshold] = TNK1:Check_Level[] on this 
 
if below_threshold = TRUE then 
 this.Tank_Empty_Flag = TRUE 
 generate TNK2:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
else 
 this.Tank_Empty_Flag = FALSE 
 [] = TNK4:Inform_Connected_Pumps_Fuel_Available[] on this 
 generate TNK3:Level_Above_Threshold() to this 
endif 
 
# Add units to weapon store level. If the level is greater 
# than 4% of the weapon store capacity reset any waiting platforms. 
# If the weapon store is still below its threshold return to the 
# Nearly Empty state. 
 
[] = WPS3:Increase_Level[Added_Units] on this 
 
[below_threshold] = WPS1:Check_Level[] on this 
 
if below_threshold = TRUE then 
 this.Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = TRUE 
 generate WPS2:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
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else 
 this.Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = FALSE 
 [] = WPS4:Inform_Connected_Platforms_Weapons_Available[] on this 
 generate WPS3:Level_Above_Threshold() to this 
endif 
 
2 Waiting For Weapon Delivery 
(Orig. Waiting For Tanker Delivery) 
 
# Fuel tank level below 4%. Wait for fuel to be delivered. 
 
# Weapon Store level below 4%. Wait for weapons to be delivered. 
 
3 Reset Waiting Platforms 
(Orig. Reset Waiting Pumps) 
# Tank In Use with greater than 4% of volume 
 
# Weapon Store In Use with greater than 4% of volume 
 
4 Checking Levels After Platform Usage 
(Orig. Checking Levels After Pump Usage) 
 
# Reduce recorded tank level by volume delivered.  
# If the level is less than 4% of the tanks capacity  
# then inhibit connected pumps from making further 
# deliveries. 
 
[] = TNK2:Reduce_Level[Delivered_Volume] on this 
 
[below_threshold] = TNK1:Check_Level[] on this 
 
if below_threshold then 
 this.Tank_Empty_Flag = TRUE 
 generate TNK2:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
else 
 generate TNK3:Level_Above_Threshold() to this 
endif 
 
# Reduce recorded weapon store level by units engaged.  
# If the level is less than 4% of the weapon stores capacity  
# then inhibit connected platforms from making further 
# engagements. 
 
[] = WPS2:Reduce_Level[Engaged_Units] on this 
 
[below_threshold] = WPS1:Check_Level[] on this 
 
if below_threshold then 
 this.Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = TRUE 
 generate WPS2:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
else 
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 generate WPS3:Level_Above_Threshold() to this 
endif 
 
5 Updating Weapon Levels 
(Orig. Updating Fuel Levels) 
 
# Fuel has been used so reduce the volume in the tank. 
 
[] = TNK2:Reduce_Level[Delivered_Volume] on this 
 
generate TNK3:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
 
# Weapons have been engaged/used so reduce the number (units) in the tank. 
 
[] = WPS2:Reduce_Level[Engaged_Units] on this 
 
generate WPS3:Level_Below_Threshold() to this 
P.12.2 WPS1: Check Level 
(Orig. TNK1:Check Level) 
 
percent_level = (this.Tank_Level / this.Tank_Capacity) * 100.0  
 
if percent_level < this.Empty_Threshold then 
 Below_Threshold = TRUE 
else 
 Below_Threshold = FALSE 
endif 
 
percent_level = (this.Weapon_Store_Level / this.Weapon_Store_Capacity) * 100.0  
 
if percent_level < this.Empty_Threshold then 
 Below_Threshold = TRUE 
else 
 Below_Threshold = FALSE 
endif 
P.12.3 WPS2:Reduce Level 
(Orig. TNK2:Reduce Level) 
 
new_level = this.Tank_Level - Delivered_Volume 
this.Tank_Level = new_level 
 
new_level = this.Weapon_Store_Level – Engaged_Units 
this.Weapon_Store_Level = new_level 
P.12.4 WPS3:Increase Level 
(Orig. TNK3:Increase Level) 
 
new_level = this.Tank_Level + Delivered_Volume 
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this.Tank_Level = new_level 
 
new_level = this.Weapon_Store_Level + Engaged_Units 
this.Weapon_Store_Level = new_level 
P.12.5 WPS4:Inform Connected Platforms Weapons Available 
(Orig. TNK4:Inform Connected Pumps Fuel Available) 
 
# The fuel level in this tank has return to  
# an operational level. Inform all connected 
# pumps that the fuel level is ok 
 
{connected_pumps} = this->R1 
 
for pump in {connected_pumps} do 
 generate PMP5:Fuel_Available() to pump 
endfor 
 
# The weapons level in this store has returned to  
# an operational level. Inform all connected 
# platforms that the weapon level is ok 
 
{connected_platforms} = this->R1 
 
for platform in {connected_platforms} do 
 generate PMP5:Weapons_Available() to pump 
endfor 
P.13 WEAPON TYPE (WPE) 
(Orig. FUEL GRADE) 
 
Each Platform can release a number of different types of weapon. Each weapon type has a name 
which uniquely identifies that weapon type and a cost for each use of that weapon type. 
P.14 AW (AW) 
(Orig. ATTENDANT) 
 
Represents the Air Warfare Officer interface. 
P.14.1 AW1:Request Platform Authorization 
(Orig. AT1:Request Pump Enable) 
P.14.2 AW2:D3 Assessment Pending 
(Orig. AT2:Transaction Pending) 
P.14.3 AW3: Engagement Cancelled 
(Orig. AT3:Delivery Cancelled) 
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P.15 WEAPON SYSTEM (MO) 
(Orig. MOTOR) 
 
Represents the interface with the Platform weapon system for targeting, tracking etc. Note that the 
actual release/launch of weapons is handled by the Weapon Launcher. 
P.15.1 MO1:Start Weapon System 
(Orig. MO1:Start Motor) 
P.15.2 MO2:Stop Weapon System 
(Orig. MO2:Stop Motor) 
P.16 WEAPONS OFFICER (CU) 
(Orig. CUSTOMER) 
Represents interface with weapons officer. 
P.16.1 CU1: Platform Unavailable 
(Orig. CU1:Pump Unavailable) 
P.17 METER (ME) 
(Orig. METER) 
 
Represents meter associated with a pump. 
Represents meter associated with a Platform – tracks number of weapons launched in an 
Engagement. 
P.18 WEAPON LAUNCHER 
(orig. CLUTCH) 
 
Represents interface with pump's clutch. 
Represents interface with Platform Weapon Launcher (the devices which launch the weapons). 
P.18.1 CL1:Engage Weapon Launcher 
(Orig. CL1:Engage Clutch) 
P.18.2 CL2:Disengage Weapon Launcher 
(Orig. CL2:Disengage Clutch) 
P.19 WEAPON LOGISTICS OFFICER (WLO) 
(Orig. TANKER OPERATOR) 
 
Represents interface with weapons logistics officer 
P.20 TRIGGER (TR) 
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(Orig. GUN) 
 
Represents interface with Platforms weapon launcher. 
P.21 SENSORS (HO) 
(Orig. HOLSTER) 
 
Represents interface with pump's holster. 
P.22 Model Execution Environment 
P.22.1 Initialisation Segment Method 
# Populate Gas Station Control domain with the initial 
# configuration. This station supplies two grades of fuel  
# "Four Star" & "Unleaded". This station has two fuel 
# storage tanks one containing "Four Star" the other  
# "Unleaded". This station has three pumps   
# pump 1 is supplied with "Four Star",  pumps 2 & 3 are  
# supplied with "Unleaded" 
 
# First instantiate 2 tanks which supply different fuel grades. 
 
four_star_fuel_grade = create FUEL_GRADE with Grade_Name = "Four Star" \ 
                                            & Unit_Price = 62.9 
 
unleaded_fuel_grade = create FUEL_GRADE with Grade_Name = "Unleaded" \ 
                                           & Unit_Price = 59.5 
 
tank_1001 = create TANK with Tank_Number = 1001 \ 
                           & Tank_Empty_Flag = TRUE \ 
                           & Tank_Level = 0.0 \ 
                           & Tank_Capacity = 100000.0 \ 
                           & Empty_Threshold = 4.0 \ 
                           & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Tanker_Delivery' 
 
tank_1002 = create TANK with Tank_Number = 1002 \ 
                           & Tank_Empty_Flag = FALSE \ 
                           & Tank_Level = 10000.0 \ 
                           & Tank_Capacity = 200000.0 \ 
                           & Empty_Threshold = 4.0 \ 
                           & Current_State = 'Reset_waiting_pumps' 
 
link four_star_fuel_grade R2 tank_1001 
link unleaded_fuel_grade R2 tank_1002 
 
# Create Pump 1 that supplies Four Star 
 
pump_1 = create PUMP with Pump_Number = 1 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Threat' 
 
link pump_1 R1 tank_1001 
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# Create Pumps 2 & 3 that supply Unleaded 
 
pump_2 = create PUMP with Pump_Number = 2 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Customer' 
 
pump_3 = create PUMP with Pump_Number = 3 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Customer' 
 
link pump_2 R1 tank_1002 
link pump_3 R1 tank_1002 
 
# Populate Air Warfare Control domain with the initial 
# configuration. This station supplies two types of weapon  
# "Aster" (a type of Surface to Air Missile) & "Rapier" (another type of Surface to Air # Missile). This 
battlespace has two weapon stores 
# one containing "Aster" the other  
# "Rapier". This battespace has three platforms   
# platform 1 is supplied with "Aster",  platforms 2 & 3 are  
# supplied with "Rapier" 
 
# First instantiate 2 weapon stores which supply different weapon types. 
 
aster_weapon_type = create WEAPON_TYPE with Weapon_Type = "Aster" \ 
                                            & Unit_Cost = 100000 
 
rapier_weapon_type = create WEAPON_TYPE with Weapon_Type = "Rapier" \ 
                                           & Unit_Cost = 50000 
 
weapon_store_1001 = create WEAPON_STORE with Weapon_Store_Number = 1001 \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = TRUE \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Level = 0.0 \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Capacity = 100000.0 \ 
                           & Empty_Threshold = 4.0 \ 
                           & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Weapon_Delivery' 
 
weapon_store_1002 = create WEAPON_STORE with Weapon_Store_Number = 1002 \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Empty_Flag = FALSE \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Level = 10000.0 \ 
                           & Weapon_Store_Capacity = 200000.0 \ 
                           & Empty_Threshold = 4.0 \ 
                           & Current_State = 'Reset_Waiting_Platforms' 
 
link aster_weapon_type R2 weapon_store_1001 
link rapier_weapon_type R2 weapon_store_1002 
 
# Create Platform 1 that can launch Aster weapons 
 
platform_1 = create PLATFORM with Platform_Number = 1 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Threat' 
 
link platform_1 R1 weapon_store_1001 
 
 Appendices     - 336 - 
# Create Platforms 2 & 3 that supply Rapier weapons 
 
platform_2 = create PLATFORM with Platform_Number = 2 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Threat' 
 
platform_3 = create PLATFORM with Platform_Number = 3 \ 
                        & Current_State = 'Waiting_For_Threat' 
 
link platform_2 R1 weapon_store_1002 
link platform_3 R1 weapon_store_1002 
P.23 Test Methods 
P.23.1 1 THREAT detected by Platform 2 
(Orig. CUSTOMER Removes Gun From Pump 2) 
 
# Customer removes gun from pump 2's holster 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
if pump != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PMP1:Gun_Removed() to pump 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
Endif 
 
 
# Threat detected by Platform 2’s sensors 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
if platform != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PTM1:Threat_Detected() to platform 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.2 2 AW Enables Platform 2 
(Orig. ATTENDENT Enables Pump 2) 
 
# Attendent enables Pump number 2 
 
generate DEL3:Create_Delivery(2) 
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# AW enables Platform number 2 
 
generate EGT3:Create_Engagement(2) 
P.23.3 3 WEAPONS OFFICER Presses Trigger At Platform 2 
(orig. CUSTOMER Presses Trigger At Pump 2) 
 
# Customer presses Gun trigger on pump 2 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
 
if pump != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PMP8:Trigger_Depressed() to pump 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no Instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
 
# Weapons Officer presses weapon launcher trigger on platform 2 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
 
if platform != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PTM8:Trigger_Depressed() to platform 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no Instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.4 4 METER Engages Weapon Unit For Platform 2 
(Orig. METER Delivers Fuel Unit For Pump 2) 
 
# The delivery needs to be informed about each metered fuel delivery 
 
delivery = find-one DELIVERY where Pump_Number = 2 
 
if delivery != UNDEFINED then 
  generate DEL4:Fuel_Unit_Delivered() to delivery 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: No active delivery for Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
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# The engagement needs to be informed about each metered weapon engagement 
 
engagement = find-one ENGAGEMENT where Platform_Number = 2 
 
if engagement != UNDEFINED then 
  generate EGT4:Weapon_Unit_Engaged() to engagement 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: No active engagement for Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.5 5 WEAPONS OFFICER Releases Trigger At Platform 2 
(Orig. CUSTOMER Releases Trigger At Pump 2) 
 
# Customer releases Gun trigger on pump 2 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
 
if pump != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PMP9:Trigger_Released() to pump 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
endif 
 
# Weapons Officer releases weapons launcher trigger on platform 2 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
 
if platform != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PTM9:Trigger_Released() to platform 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
endif 
P.23.6 6 WEAPONS OFFICER detects no Threat At Platform 2 
(Orig. CUSTOMER Replaces Gun At Pump 2) 
 
# Customer replaces gun in pump 2's holster 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
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if pump != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PMP2:Gun_Replaced() to pump 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
 
# Weapons Officer detects no Threat at Platform 2 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
 
if platform != UNDEFINED then 
  generate PTM2:Threat_Not_Detected() to platform 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.7 7 THREAT Neutralized D3 Assessment for weapons 
engaged from Platform 2 
(Orig. CUSTOMER Pays For Fuel For Pump 2) 
 
# Customer pays for fuel for Pump 2 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
 
if pump != UNDEFINED then 
  current_pending_transaction = pump->R9 
 
  if current_pending_transaction != UNDEFINED then 
   current_transaction = current_pending_transaction->R4 
   generate TRN2:Payment_Received() to current_transaction 
  endif 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
 
# Threat Neutralized D3 Assessment for weapons engaged from Platform 2 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
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if platform != UNDEFINED then 
  current_pending_d3assessment = platform->R9 
 
  if current_pending_d3assessment != UNDEFINED then 
   current_d3assessment = current_pending_d3assessment->R4 
   generate TRN2:D3_ASSESSMENT() to current_d3assessment 
  endif 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.8 8 THREAT Escapes From Platform 2 
(Orig. CUSTOMER Absconds From Pump 2) 
 
# Customer absconds from Pump 2 without paying 
 
pump = find-one PUMP where Pump_Number = 2 
 
if pump != UNDEFINED then 
 
  current_pending_transaction = pump -> R9 
 
  if current_pending_transaction != UNDEFINED then 
     current_transaction = current_pending_transaction -> R4 
     generate TRN3:Customer_Absconds("Dodgy looking geezer in vehicle with registration number M 
1OOA") to current_transaction 
  endif 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Pump number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
 
# Threat Escapes from Platform 2 without paying 
 
platform = find-one PLATFORM where Platform_Number = 2 
 
if platform != UNDEFINED then 
 
  current_pending_d3assessment = platform -> R9 
 
  if current_pending_d3assessment != UNDEFINED then 
     current_d3assessment = current_pending_d3assessment -> R4 
     generate TRN3:Threat_Escapes("Unidentified enemy aircraft, signature indicates low observable 
fighter”) to current_d3assessment 
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  endif 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Platform number 2.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
P.23.9 9 WEAPON LOGISTICS OFFICER Delivery For Weapons 
Store 1002  
(Orig. TANKER Delivery For Tank 1002) 
 
# Tanker driver fills tank 1002 with 10000  
 
tank = find-one TANK where Tank_Number = 1002 
 
if tank != UNDEFINED then 
  generate TNK1:Filled_Tank(10000.00) to tank 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Gas Station Error: There is no instance of Tank number 1002.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
 
# Weapons Logistics Officer fills weapon store 1002 with 10  
 
weapon_store = find-one WEAPON_STORE where Weapon_Store_Number = 1002 
 
if weapon_store != UNDEFINED then 
  generate WPS1:Logistics_Delivery(10) to weapon_store 
else 
 
$INLINE 
  printf("Air Warfare Error: There is no instance of Weapon Store number 1002.\n"); 
$ENDINLINE 
 
endif 
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